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‘Exactly the same life all-over again, only different’ – Fernando Pessoa 
 
‘Be a stout soldier, a faithful guardian, and an incorruptible judge; if summoned to bear 
witness in some dubious and uncertain cause, though Phalaris himself should bring up 
his bull and dictate to you a perjury, count it the greatest of all sins to prefer life to hon-
our, and to lose, for the sake of living, all that makes life worth having. The man who 
merits death is already dead, though he dine off a hundred Lucrine oysters, and bathe in 
a whole cauldron of Cosmus' essences’ – Juvenal  
  
iii 
 
Abstract  
This thesis about the German-American political scientist Hans J. Morgenthau inves-
tigates in the development of his Weltanschauung. It grew out of a discomfort with 
structuralist and post-structuralist interpretations of Morgenthau’s thought which are 
distorted, curtate, and/or selective. This Weltanschauungsanalyse contributes to the un-
derstanding of Morgenthau and his oeuvre in three distinctive ways and negotiates hith-
erto existing shortcomings. First, it provides a panoptic rather than selective reading by 
considering all of Morgenthau’s major published and unpublished writings. It is, second, 
unifying rather than segregative in the sense that it reflects all aspects of Morgenthau’s 
thought and sets it into relation with each other. Finally, it is inclusive rather than exclu-
sive meaning that the contexts in which Morgenthau developed his Weltanschauung are 
considered.  
This Weltanschauungsanalyse accentuates three dimensions in Morgenthau’s thought 
which are of relevance for contemporary theorising in International Relations. First, 
Morgenthau promoted a normative concept of power which is not to be confounded 
with violence, but to be considered as a group-dynamic element enabling to actively 
create a socio-political life world. Second, Morgenthau was one of the first IR-scholars 
to emphasise the conditionality of knowledge and political order, which makes his 
Weltanschauung a rich source for arguing that socio-political life is constructed and rea-
son is limited as it enables to question “grand theories”. Finally, studying Morgenthau’s 
Weltanschauung concedes an important societal role to scholarship in the sense of dis-
sidence. It is a sceptical appraisal of the socio-political status quo while being commit-
ted to a humanist normativity.  
To achieve this contribution to the current discourse on Morgenthau and elucidate his 
relevance for contemporary International Relations, this thesis applies Pierre Bourdieu’s 
concepts of field and habitus. It proceeds by, first, elaborating the field of Continental 
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European intellectuals of the late 19th and early 20th centuries in which Morgenthau’s 
thought was formed. Based upon its findings it is possible to dissect Morgenthau’s 
Weltanschauung into its constitutive parts: ontology, epistemology, and political agency. 
Material for this analysis was procured in the Library of Congress, the Bodleian Library, 
the Hoover Institution, the Bibliothèque Sainte-Geneviève, and the Archive for  
Christian-Democratic Policy of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. 
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Chapter 1. Hans Morgenthau, International Relations,  
and Weltanschauung 
 
The following study about the German-American scholar of International Relations, 
Hans J. Morgenthau, and his comprehensive oeuvre presents what can be called a 
“Weltanschauungsanalyse” (Karl Mannheim) which exceeds common Morgenthau-
interpretations in three ways. First, this study will refute mainstream interpretations of 
Morgenthau within the discipline of International Relations from neo-realism and neo-
liberalism. Second, it will also contradict core assumptions about his political thought as 
we find them in many post-structuralist writings and, finally, supplement individual re-
cent though selective studies from critical normative scholarship about Morgenthau and 
his political thought. A Weltanschauungsanalyse in contrast provides three advantages. 
It is panoptic rather than selective since all of Morgenthau’s creative periods are consid-
ered, unifying rather than segregative since it reflects on all aspects of Morgenthau’s 
thought in relation to each other, and inclusive rather than exclusive since it studies all 
major aspects of Morgenthau’s thought by putting it into perspective. Only this compre-
hensiveness allows for reflecting on the relevance Morgenthau’s oeuvre has for con-
temporary International Relations as the relation, scope, and depth of his thought are 
disclosed. Thereby, this study shall promote the argument that the philosophical com-
mitments which we find in Morgenthau’s oeuvre and which we can identify through a 
Weltanschauungsanalyse normatively speaking allow us a more appropriate understand-
ing of politics than structuralist and/or post-structuralist theorising. This normativity is 
to be seen in Morgenthau’s analytical focus on the human being and the anthropological 
condition of politics rather than on structures as it is to be found affirmatively in struc-
tural and deprecatingly in post-structuralist approaches to International Relations. This 
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will enable the student of international politics to consider spontaneous elements of hu-
man life and thereby examine the causes and consequences of certain actions and poli-
cies in international politics more comprehensively than approaches concentrating on a 
particular structure since the individual interests of the involved parties are paid tribute 
and can be emphasised.  
Putting the focus on the human being is a reflection of an encounter of two different 
cultures. Morgenthau received his intellectual socialisation in Continental European 
humanities of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Its discourses made a lasting impres-
sion on him, but he made his career in the United States in the second half of the 20th 
century. Despite his enormous academic success, Morgenthau remained a “marginal 
man” (Robert E. Park) and it was not until recently that his oeuvre received a more nu-
anced analysis than early structuralist attempts. Consequently, his Continental European 
intellectual socialisation is getting more and more into the spotlight. Stressing that 
Morgenthau offers a different approach to international politics demonstrates that he 
eventually did not succeed as a cultural broker and subsequently failed to set the agenda 
for the discipline of International Relations as structuralist approaches became the rul-
ing dogma during the second half of the 20th century. Furthermore, it was not before his 
death in 1980 that post-structuralism became more prominent in international politics, 
but Morgenthau was often ignored by its representatives for the development of anti-
structuralist and anti-positivist epistemologies and they mainly referred to different, of-
ten French scholars despite the fact that similar episteme could have been found in 
Morgenthau’s work. Evaluating, therefore, Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung enables In-
ternational Relations in the 21st century not only to put the analytical focus on the hu-
man condition, but to introduce Morgenthau’s Continental European intellectual cosmos 
to contemporary International Relations. This approach of the following study will be 
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outlined in its core assumptions and proceedings in the subsequent three sections and 
will then be explained in greater detail in chapter two of this study. 
 
1.1 Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung and International Relations  
The study of Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung particularly reveals three dimensions in 
his thought from which contemporary theorising in International Relations can profit 
most notably epistemologically and in its self-conception as an academic discipline. 
First, the study of Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung allows for a concept of power 
which is not confounded with violence, but which is considered as a group-dynamic 
element out of which a socio-political world can be constructed. Hence, power is not to 
be considered in means-ends relations, as it is often considered to be a realist position, 
but as the pre-requisite to even think in these relations. Understanding power as a posi-
tive, normative concept, as Morgenthau promoted for International Relations, rather 
than a negative, empirical notion will enable one to correspond more adequately the 
practical reason for the foundation of International Relations as an academic discipline 
since it stresses the ability to compromise and co-operate. This is the case because it ac-
centuates the human will to construct and achieve something lasting and worthwhile, 
rather than an inhuman impotence in complying with some form of imposed and unal-
terable structure. Therefore, it also provides scholars with the episteme to critically 
question the contemporary system of international relations and point towards alterna-
tive forms of human sociation than the nation-state. 
Second, considering that Morgenthau was one of the first International Relations 
scholars to stress the temporality and spatiality of knowledge and political order, his 
Weltanschauung is a rich source for arguing against positivistic convictions by stressing 
that the socio-political world is constructed and reason is limited. This does not mean 
that Morgenthau would have argued for relativism if understood as a cognitive and/or 
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moral inability to make judgements since otherwise International Relations would be 
bereft of the feasibility of scholarly insight. Such relativism would exempt outsiders 
from understanding, let alone normatively evaluating foreign political interests and ac-
tions since only an understanding of the researcher’s immediate socio-political life-
world could be achieved. Yet, following Morgenthau’s argument of the construction of 
the socio-political world accentuates for International Relations that its field of study 
has two characteristics. The first characteristic signifies that human behaviour rests on 
specific patterns and interests regardless of time and space, i.e. international relations 
are etic. These patterns and interests are, however, due to the fluctuation of human inter-
relations constantly rearranging in different combinations. This points to the emic char-
acter of international relations meaning that political concepts, discourses, or institu-
tions can only be understood by analysing the particular context in which people create 
them.  
Furthermore, the analysis of Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung enables the reader to 
emphasise the limits of reason. “Grand theories” are neither able to comprehend interna-
tional politics in its entirety, nor can this comprehension take place through an imperial-
ism of concepts meaning that a fixed format of them would be universally applicable. 
The latter connotes that International Relations requires a set of complex and open con-
cepts to be able to approximate an understanding that takes the conditions of human ex-
istence in their temporal and cultural context into account. The former signifies that 
studying Morgenthau demonstrates that singular, static theories are unable to adequately 
picture the fluctuation of human existence.  
Third, Morgenthau promoted an understanding of scholarship as intellectual dissi-
dence. Since Morgenthau put the human being at the centre of the analytical focus, 
studying his Weltanschauung enables the creation of a more pronounced role for schol-
arship than structuralist and post-structuralist approaches concede to it. Scholars not 
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only have to be concerned about creating knowledge for its own sake, which in struc-
turalist approaches often leads to the cementation of the status quo, but have to be 
committed to pursue a normative end. This end is manifested in arguing against the 
value-freeness of knowledge, what is eventually a disavowed anti-normativity, since in 
its ostensible objectivity, scholarship runs the risk of being manipulated for totalitarian 
means suppressing humans psychologically and/or physically. Therefore, scholarship 
has to focus on making a humanistic world postulate its straight edge aiming to protect 
human dignity, secure the freedom from structural oppression, and provide the liberty to 
actively participate in the creation of one’s own life-world. It is particularly this latter 
aspect which allows for the argument that Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung can be con-
sidered as a worthwhile addition to contemporary post-structuralist theorising. Scholar-
ship has, therefore, the function to provide a critical appraisal and sceptical questioning 
of political discourses through a hermeneutical approach. This means their development 
has to be dissected by identifying actors’ interests and elaborating the context in which 
they were created. Furthermore, it has to inform and give citizens guidance in their po-
litical decision-making. Following Morgenthau, this a posteriori analysis would through 
the inclusion of potential alternatives to the status quo lead to a priori assumptions 
which in the case of international relations would indicate a world community to over-
come the system of nation-states. These latter assumptions, however, stress that study-
ing Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung enables International Relations’ scholars to go be-
yond post-structuralist approaches. It not only permits us to critically reflect on how a 
particular political order came into being, but also, due to putting the focus on the hu-
man being, why this was the case. This in turn will allow rethinking the political be-
cause it enlarges our imagination to construct world postulates to better the contempo-
rary situation. 
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1.2 The rationale for analysing Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung 
Analysing a Weltanschauung is a panoptic approach. To this end, in a longitudinal 
analysis all of Morgenthau’s major published works – monographs, academic papers, 
and magazine articles – have been consulted which he wrote from the late 1920s to the 
late 1970s in Germany, Switzerland, Spain, and the United States. Furthermore, per-
sonal notes, newspaper articles, radio and television interviews, unpublished manu-
scripts, and letters amounting to a total of more than 80,000 items in the Library of 
Congress, the Hoover Institution, the Bodleian Library, and the Archive for Christian-
Democratic Policy of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung have been scrutinised and em-
ployed to give further evidence for the arguments made. This took place by considering 
the time and circumstances of the formation of each document since only this careful-
ness will safeguard from drawing premature conclusions.  
The methodological comprehensiveness which characterises a panoptic approach 
will provide an understanding of Morgenthau’s thought and contribution to Interna-
tional Relations which is more appropriate than previous, selective studies due to three 
distinct dimensions. First, through strict textual evidence, it will enable us to herme-
neutically identify the major concepts and questions of Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung 
to which he repeatedly referred during his lifetime. This longitudinal analysis will rule 
out an over-interpretation of temporary influences Morgenthau might have had during 
the formation of his thought-processes, while demonstrating if and in what way 
Morgenthau was influenced in his Weltanschauung by socio-political developments as 
well as his social field and in what way this led to alterations, amendments, or even to a 
continuity in his use of concepts. Second, it enables us to identify the persons and intel-
lectual currents which had lasting influence on Morgenthau. This does not mean that the 
entirety of scholars of Continental European humanities and social sciences, which in 
one way or another intellectually crossed Morgenthau’s path, will be or even could be 
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referred to. Rather, analysing Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung allows identifying the 
primary sources of influence and also classifying the weight of their contributions. Fi-
nally, it enables us to realise the range of the above mentioned dimensions of  
Morgenthau’s contribution to International Relations and demonstrate their interrelated-
ness. 
Furthermore, this panoptic approach prohibits misrepresentations of Morgenthau 
based upon selective readings of his work, which was often restricted to the six princi-
ples of realism, the first chapter in Politics among Nations since its second edition. This 
approach also averts misinterpretations based upon a selective reference to a particular 
period or aspect of his thought as well as to overemphasise a connection with a particu-
lar scholar or intellectual field. Hence, only arguments which rest upon extensive, recur-
rent textual evidence are provided in this analysis of Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung, 
rather than making claims of potential “hidden dialogues”. 
 
1.3 Analysing Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung: its contribution to  
international political theory 
To conclude, the particular contribution an analysis of Morgenthau’s Weltan-
schauung provides for current discourses in international political theory is to be seen in 
its distinct methodology, conceptual framework, and findings. Before this will be fur-
ther elaborated in chapter two the particular interest and intention of this study have to 
be disclosed. This knowledge-constitutive interest is twofold and explains why the fol-
lowing study was conducted in the particular way of a Weltanschauungsanalyse. On the 
one hand, this study is interested in demonstrating that Morgenthau was, as a European 
émigré scholar, a cultural broker and intends to evaluate his acculturation into American 
political science. Despite Morgenthau’s failure, this doctoral thesis takes place in the 
conviction that Continental European humanities and social sciences of the late 19th and 
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early 20th centuries are a rich, yet a largely uncharted source for contemporary Interna-
tional Relations. On the other hand, this study intends to provide a comprehensive inter-
pretation of Morgenthau’s thought. This interest is born out of a discomfort with inter-
pretations of Morgenthau which are selective either in their readings or research inter-
ests and which evidently will lead to abbreviated or even distorting classifications of 
Morgenthau’s contribution to International Relations.  
This study will finally contribute to contemporary discourses of international politi-
cal theory through its distinct findings, such as Morgenthau’s empirical and normative 
notion of power, alienation as his epistemological source, his critique on a commodifi-
ciation and acceleration of social life, or his insistence on the situational conditionality 
of knowledge and political order. It, furthermore, rebuts arguments that Morgenthau 
would have been exclusively influenced by scholars like Sigmund Freud or Max Weber 
and identifies Morgenthau’s relationship with Carl Schmitt as a negative, intellectual 
impasse, rather than a fruitful exchange of minds. This is achieved because the follow-
ing study is unifying rather than segregative by revealing and classifying the extensive 
list of intellectual sources behind Morgenthau’s concepts and demonstrating the close 
correlations of these concepts. It will be, furthermore, accentuated that there is a strong 
continuity of thought in Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung, which stresses the relevance of 
his contribution for contemporary International Relations since Morgenthau oriented his 
research agenda to general, recurrent political questions and aspects of human life 
which are of timeless importance for the discipline.   
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Chapter 2.  Weltanschauung as a conceptual framework 
 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter will explain the conceptual framework upon which this study was exe-
cuted. This explanation will begin with an analysis of the deeper dimensions of 
Morgenthau’s threefold relevance for (international) political theory (Chapter 2.2): the 
first dimension is intrinsic to his life, the second one is intrinsic to his work, and the fi-
nal element is to be found in the wider sphere of the history of political ideas in which 
the example of Morgenthau permits to argue for the mutability of concepts. This will be 
followed by an elaboration of interpretations of Morgenthau’s work and contribution to 
International Relations (Chapter 2.3). In this section it will be stressed that traditionally, 
interpretations of Morgenthau were concerned about either Morgenthau’s concept of 
power and to a significantly lesser extent about his epistemological approach. Only re-
cently a further stream of interpretation has evolved that aims to elucidate Morgenthau’s 
intellectual background, while pointing out that Morgenthau promoted what Michael 
Williams termed “wilful realism” (2005a). The third section will talk about the aim and 
purpose of elucidating Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung and its contribution to the current 
Morgenthau-discourse, what will be termed for the sake of clarity and distinction wilful 
realism (Chapter 2.4). What will be of importance in this section is to demonstrate in 
what way the concept of a Weltanschauung will enable to surmount hitherto existing 
shortcomings of works in the tradition of wilful realism. It will also have to address ca-
veats of the concept of a Weltanschauung and in what way they are dealt with. The 
fourth part will elaborate the conceptual framework (Chapter 2.5). This will, first, con-
tain a definition of the term Weltanschauung as well as terms which are used in a simi-
lar fashion. Second, the unifying, inter-relational aspect of a Weltanschauung will be 
demonstrated and, third, the collection of material will be discussed in order to furnish 
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proof that sufficient care was applied for the arguments made in this thesis. Finally, the 
structure of this thesis will be outlined as an analytical guideline for the subsequent 
chapters (Chapter 2.6). 
 
2.2 Morgenthau’s relevance for (international) political theory 
Studying Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung might initially cause mixed reactions since 
Morgenthau has not only been dead for thirty years, but he appeared outdated even dur-
ing his lifetime. The kind of research he pursued seemed to be too conservative, as he 
admitted to Sandra Frye on 25th November 1964 (HJM-Archive 20)1, and at odds with 
the positivistic outlook of the discipline, which is why Morgenthau gradually fell into 
oblivion. He remained in textbook-accounts as a founding father of the discipline, but 
seldom played a role in the discipline’s research agenda, at least in the United States.2 In 
the previous chapter it was remarked that this assumption is doing Morgenthau wrong 
since his concepts of power and relationality as well as his understanding of scholarship 
still provide fruitful impetus for contemporary International Relations. The following 
section will look deeper into the unfolding of this impetus and will stress particularly 
three dimensions:  
The first dimension is manifested in Morgenthau’s own life-experiences.  
Morgenthau was a marginal man which means that ‘… fate has condemned  
[Morgenthau] to live in two societies and in two, not merely different but antagonistic, 
cultures’ (Park quoted after: Golovensky, 1952, p. 334). Despite his enormous success 
with Politics among Nations, Morgenthau lived intellectually on the periphery and re-
mained torn between the American and Continental European culture. He never fully 
penetrated the former while he remained attached to the latter leaving him to be a 
“Wanderer zwischen beiden Welten” (wanderer between two worlds) (Walter Flex).3 
Like Hannah Arendt, Karl Deutsch, or Eric Voegelin, Morgenthau was part of the Euro-
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pean émigré scholars who had great influence on the initial development of Interna-
tional Relations in the United States and political science in general. Despite stemming 
from different academic fields, such as philosophy, history, sociology, geography, and 
in Morgenthau’s case jurisprudence, numerous émigré scholars made their career in In-
ternational Relations. Since there is until now no study exploring the acculturation of 
émigré scholars into the American discipline of International Relations and political sci-
ence in general, the elaboration of Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung serves as a case-study 
for what Alfons Söllner called ‘knowledge transfer’ (1987a) and is commonly referred 
to as cultural broker. This will, therefore, contribute to the elaboration of the plurality 
and diversity of political thought, according to Quentin Skinner (1969, p. 52) the genu-
ine task of a history of political ideas. This knowledge transfer is the case because most 
European émigré scholars could not agree with the historical optimism underlying the 
positivism they found in the United States due to their intellectual background and their 
personal experiences of anti-Semitic ostracism and prosecution.  
Another aspect of Morgenthau’s relevance as a cultural broker is to be found in the 
intellectual cosmos he was socialised in. Indeed, what has been persistently criticised 
about Morgenthau’s work is one of his strengths. Robert Keohane, for example, notes 
that ‘[h]is [Morgenthau’s] definition of power is murky, since he failed to distinguish 
between power as a resource and power as the ability to influence others’ behaviour’ 
(1986, p. 10). Equally, Joseph Nye (1988, p. 241) praises Kenneth Waltz for having sys-
tematised Morgenthau’s thought and making it more accessible for scientific enquiries. 
A decade later, the critical theorist Jim George, concluded that Morgenthau adhered to a 
‘very dark medieval perspective on the world and its peoples’ (1995, p. 204) since he 
would have cynically reduced human rights to the henchman of an uncontrolled arms 
race and the choices left for ‘Western policy makers … [were] arms racing, proxy war 
fighting, support for neo-fascist thuggery, and global containment’ (1995, p. 215). Fi-
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nally, recently even scholars who are engaged in a more profound discussion of 
Morgenthau’s work, like Oliver Jütersonke (2010, p. 175), express concern about the 
value of Morgenthau’s contribution. This shows that Morgenthau was, and is, difficult 
to grasp no matter if scholars are in favour of or opposed to him if a panoptic contextu-
alisation and elaboration of his work is missing. Even if a differentiated contextualisa-
tion took place analysing Morgenthau’s work through a particular lens, it might result in 
an underestimation of what Morgenthau has contributed to International Relations. Cer-
tainly, Morgenthau did not make it easy to be interpreted since he veiled his intellectual 
background due to the sparse use of references in his American writings. However, 
through a thorough elaboration of his Weltanschauung, Morgenthau can become a rich 
source for International Relations. Morgenthau’s work represents the Continental Euro-
pean intellectual cosmos of the late 19th and early 20th centuries and can be seen as a 
condensate of its controversies and insights. Arguments Morgenthau made and the kind 
of scholarship proposed by him demonstrate that it would not only be viable for schol-
ars in International Relations to get engaged with Morgenthau again, but also with other 
scholars of that time. Morgenthau, for example, considered questions of de-
territorialisation which were discussed at the turn of the century by scholars like Georg 
Simmel and these questions are still on top of research agendas in International Rela-
tions (Behr, 2004). Equally, Morgenthau argued for the scholarly acknowledgment of 
irrationalism and considered scholarship a sceptical corrective to socio-political devel-
opments as he found it demonstrated in the works of Freud and Gustav Ichheiser. Fi-
nally, he was also one of the first scholars to introduce socially conditioned knowledge 
to International Relations, a concept he had become acquainted with by studying the 
works of Karl Mannheim, but which in essence dates back at least to late 19th century 
Swiss art historians.  
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From this follows a second dimension. A careful and extensive elaboration of it will 
provide episteme which could be endorsed by critical theorists, feminists, or social con-
structivists alike and post-structuralists in general. However, often post-structuralists 
misperceived Morgenthau as having endorsed positivism or, indeed, having introduced 
it to American political science as George (1994, p. 92-5) claims. Morgenthau, further-
more, would not have opposed certain ‘ontological sensitivities’ (Tickner, 1997, p. 619), 
what J. Ann Tickner has identified to be one of the great strengths of post-structuralists’ 
approaches making them ‘superior’ to positivism (George, 1995, p. 222). Indeed, 
Morgenthau (1971b, p. 70) shared the same critique on International Relations and po-
litical science, though he did not, at least not openly, claim superiority for himself. 
Morgenthau, therefore, stands in the tradition of what Williams labelled wilful realism 
which is characterised by three dimensions: scepticism, relationality, and power politics 
(2005a).  
Scepticism refers to Morgenthau’s critical questioning of the usefulness of empiri-
cism and rationalism to study political science. Not that he would have opposed empiri-
cal and/or historical research, and subsequently the knowledge that is created out of it, 
but he would have asked about the limits of reason. The social world is created through 
the interests of humans, which often deprive themselves of rational examination. The 
second dimension, relationality, is the reason behind scepticism and stresses that wilful 
realists do not believe in any given order, be it individually or on any communal level. 
On the contrary, Morgenthau argued that the social world as an institutionalised entity 
and intellectual conception is constantly created out of human relationships and, there-
fore, subject to change. However, Williams also remarks that despite this relationality of 
politics, Morgenthau would have been sensitive enough not to perceive the social world 
as a set of conflicting dichotomies, but to stress the empowering capacities these rela-
tionships can provide. In the case of Morgenthau, as it will be argued later, this was a 
14 
 
humanist world postulate (Weltwollung). Therefore, power politics, the final dimension, 
reveals that Morgenthau (1964a; 1971b) argued that power is, on the one hand, the con-
stitutive factor of politics which, as Morgenthau defined in his doctoral dissertation 
(1929a), is the case why politics is a realm that can affect any other social realms. But, 
on the other hand, there are two forms of power. One that is used to dominate others 
physically and/or mentally and which he often referred to in his earlier writings as 
Macht or pouvoir (power) and one, which he labelled Kraft or puissance in order to de-
termine the capacity of self-determination and to be wilfully engaged in the creation of 
the social life-world. This demonstrates that Morgenthau’s epistemology is of particular 
relevance for current scholarship in political science since it provides the episteme to be 
(self-)critical and differentiated in one’s analysis while being open-minded and unpreju-
diced towards social and cultural contingencies.  
The final dimension the study of Morgenthau reveals is that his example is demon-
strating the persistence of thought styles in International Relations, while at the same 
time revealing that the content and meaning of concepts are subject to change. For 
Ludwik Fleck, scholarly thought would have been tied to social factors since they are 
created within thought collectives. A thought collective is ‘... a community of persons 
mutually exchanging ideas or maintaining intellectual interaction ...’ and Fleck added 
that it ‘... provides the special “carrier” for the historical development of any field of 
thought, as well as for the given stock of knowledge and level of culture’ (1981, p. 39). 
This carrier is the thought style, ‘[the readiness for] directed perception, with corre-
sponding mental and objective assimilation of what has been perceived’ (Fleck, 1981,  
p. 99). Morgenthau’s example shows that International Relations remained largely in-
susceptible to the temporal and spatial, hence cultural, conditionality of concepts since 
they remained in their American thought style. In other words, despite its international 
outlook, International Relations as a discipline largely failed to distinguish between etic 
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and emic dimensions. Despite similar or even equal wording, the meaning of a concept 
can alter drastically over time and/or in different cultures. This can be seen in  
Morgenthau’s dual concept of power which was for a long time not considered, maybe 
not even realised, and only the dominating aspect of it has been stressed. This demon-
strates the relevance to consider the conceptual history for political science and espe-
cially for International Relations since its students deal with a multitude of temporal and 
cultural factors. Such an elaboration cannot take place here, but it is argued that 
Morgenthau and the concepts he used have to be contextualised into the cultural and 
temporal context of their development in order to understand their meaning and to be 
able to see if and in what way his concepts can contribute to current discourses within 
the discipline.  
 
2.3 Morgenthau and International Relations 
2.3.1 Power and knowledge: assessments of Morgenthau’s contribution  
to International Relations 
Until recently, dominant interpretations of Morgenthau concentrated on two aspects 
of his work. One group primarily focused on Morgenthau’s concept of power, whereas 
another group, though significantly smaller, concentrated on Morgenthau’s approach to 
construct knowledge. Despite their different analytical concerns, both groups demon-
strate that Morgenthau remained largely intangible to representatives of International 
Relations, an, as Stanley Hoffman (1977) notes, American discipline. The first group of 
interpretations was classified by Williams into materialism and instrumentalism to 
which a third group, functionalism, will be added here. The materialist version, mainly 
brought forward by neo-realists, argues that Morgenthau understood power essentially 
as the potential to employ force calculated through material, often military capabilities. 
The other interpretation, instrumentalism, can be allocated to constructivist scholars. 
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This interpretation assumes that Morgenthau considered power as an end in itself, 
sought after in order to acquire further interests (Williams, 2004, p. 639-41).  
Furthermore, post-structuralist interpretations, exemplified in George (1994; 1995) 
and Tickner (1991; 1992), can be classified as functionalist. Functionalist interpreta-
tions in terms of entogenetic relations imply that Morgenthau considered power merely 
as a reaction of actors in international relations to structural implementations. Power 
would be sought by actors in order to secure their survival due to anarchy as a systemic 
characteristic of international relations. Hence, functionalist interpretations are a combi-
nation of materialist and instrumentalist interpretations, but more simplistic than the lat-
ter since Morgenthau’s notion of power is identified primarily with (military) force as a 
structurally determined end, which obligatorily serves the interest to secure one’s sur-
vival. The second group of interpretation is exemplified in the work of Richard Ashley 
(1981, similar: Rosecrance, 1981). Ashley stresses that there are two ways to read 
Morgenthau’s knowledge construction. The first, which he labels technical realism, 
would be positivistic, whereas the second, practical realism, would stress Morgenthau’s 
hermeneutic approach. Whereas in the first group of interpreters which was concerned 
with Morgenthau’s concept of power materialism, instrumentalism, and functionalism 
represent mostly opposing interpretations, Ashley sees both, technical and practical real-
ism, fulfilled in Morgenthau’s work. A similar understanding can be found in Christoph 
Rohde’s recent monograph in which he argues that Morgenthau would have made the 
attempt to synthesise hermeneutics with positivism (2004, p. 111-6).4 This means that 
Morgenthau’s quest for knowledge was interpreted as being informed by two potentially 
conflicting approaches; one which would eventually argue for the fabricability of and 
teleology in life which could be achieved through rational and empiricist reasoning and 
one which would argue for a differentiated understanding of the ideas and processes that 
shape human life-worlds. The merit of Ashley’s assessment is that he was presumably 
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the first American scholar to explicitly stress that Morgenthau stood in the tradition of 
Continental European humanities and social sciences in which knowledge would have 
been equated ‘… with understanding, not causal explanation, [and] its relevant meta-
phor is found in the interpretation of texts’ (1981, p. 212). 
However, both groups of interpretations demonstrate severe shortcomings and some 
are even ‘badly mistaken’ (Williams, 2004, p. 652). These shortcomings will be ad-
dressed in detail in the course of this thesis which is why it is sufficient here to state 
only the particular problems these interpretations are based upon. 
First, it is to be assumed that Morgenthau is more often cited than read (Williams, 
2005a, p. 82). This is the case, although Morgenthau was repeatedly acknowledged to 
be the founding father of International Relations (Hoffman, 1977, p. 44; Fromkin, 1993, 
p. 81; Kindermann, 2004, p. 85; Art, 2005, p. 77) and Henry Kissinger, a former student 
of Morgenthau, once even remarked that ‘Hans Morgenthau has turned contemporary 
study of international relations into a major science. All of us teaching in this field after 
him had to start from the ground he had laid’ (quoted after: Hacke, 2004, p. 5). Due to 
this status Morgenthau has to be cited and in textbooks a section is usually devoted to 
realism, but from his vast oeuvre more often than not only the six principles of realism, 
hence the first 13 pages of Politics among Nations, are considered in a de-
contextualised reading of Morgenthau.5 Hardly anything else is cited which is the case 
especially for his German and French writings, the most essential works if one is inter-
ested in the development of his Weltanschauung.  
Second, without claiming intentionality, positivists such as Waltz, Keohane, and Nye, 
refer to Morgenthau as their intellectual precursor and in doing so they can not only put 
themselves into a tradition of thought that ostensibly dates back to Ancient Greece, par-
ticularly to Thucydides, but they can also claim to have brought this intellectual process 
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to its teleological end through a systematisation and scientification6 of this tradition of 
thought, as implied in the title of Waltz’s Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory (1990).  
Finally, Morgenthau seems to have been made a “scapegoat”, who was misused by 
scholars critical to structural realism and positivism in general. The result of this is that 
much of their critique on positivism and, indeed, their own differentiated approach to 
International Relations suffer from delegitimisation because they criticise a scholar who 
would have been sympathetic to their research agenda since he followed similar aca-
demic goals, although arguably being less radical, and in doing so some post-
structuralists do not live up to their own academic standards (Gregory, 1989). This im-
pression is received, for example, in Tickner’s account. For her, Man, the State, and 
War are the objective laws upon which Morgenthau would have intended to formulate 
his “grand theory” (Tickner, 1997, p. 618).7 This, however, is the title of one of Waltz’s 
books. There is only proof of one personal encounter between Morgenthau and Waltz at 
a 1959 conference and a letter of reference was written by Morgenthau upon request for 
Erich Hula and Waltz, in which he essentially declined to give a reference for Waltz due 
to the lack of personal acquaintance (HJM-Archive 60). In this sense, Gerard Holden 
(2002) is right to ask Who contextualizes the contextualizers? as it demonstrates that 
post-structuralism is an Anglophone scholarship that has yet to explore the intellectual 
potential of Continental European (and indeed other parts of the world) history of politi-
cal thought.  
 
2.3.2 International Relations and wilful realism  
Until the early 1990s there was hardly any detailed elaboration of Morgenthau that 
would have challenged the dominant reading. Niels Amstrup wrote a piece on The Early 
Morgenthau in 1978, which despite rendering important service to the English-speaking 
academia since he consulted Morgenthau’s European works for the first time;8 it was 
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hardly ever referred to.9 Yet, Amstrup’s piece is valuable for this thesis since through 
the comparison of Morgenthau’s European and American works he concluded that there 
is a strong continuity of thought and that one subsequently needs to look deeper into 
Continental European humanities and social sciences to be able to establish a sound un-
derstanding of Morgenthau’s concepts. Only Morgenthau’s death in 1980 raised the 
academic interest in his work temporarily which led to special issues in Social Research 
and the International Studies Quarterly in 1981 and to an augmented edition of Kenneth 
Thompson’s Truth and Tragedy from 1984.10 All three provide value for the quest to 
elaborate Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung since not only do they contain his only auto-
biographical sketch and interview (Thompson and Myers, 1984), but also memories of 
personal friends and colleagues (e.g. Eckstein, 1981; Hotz, 1984; Thompson, 1984). 
These autobiographical accounts and memories are important cornerstones in the quest 
to contextualise Morgenthau’s concepts since they provide first correlations. They also 
contain first intellectual discussions on Morgenthau’s work which differ from the main 
reading of Morgenthau as a positivist (Ashley, 1981; Tsou, 1984). Hence, Morgenthau’s 
death marks the gradual turn in International Relations of reading Morgenthau differ-
ently. However, in English-speaking academia soon thereafter Morgenthau fell into 
oblivion. In the remainder of the 1980s it was primarily the German political scientist 
Söllner (1987a; 1987b; 1988; 1990) who was interested in Morgenthau. Söllner (1996), 
like Amstrup, mainly devoted his research focus on the European background of 
Morgenthau and his subsequent acculturation into American political science as part of 
a wider project on the acculturation of European émigré scholars resulting in a mono-
graph in the mid-1990s. Söllner’s works are particularly interesting in order to explore 
Morgenthau’s intellectual development. On the one hand, he stressed the influence 
German Staatslehre11, the discipline Morgenthau was educated in, had on the develop-
ment of political science and, on the other hand, the influence conservatism had on his 
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intellectual development, although Söllner failed to recognise that Morgenthau was not 
a conservative, but was sceptical of it, as he was of any ideology.  
Despite these early efforts to contextualise Morgenthau, which remained partial, 
scattered, occasionally misleading, and widely unacknowledged, there were no detailed 
elaborations of Morgenthau’s life and work which would have allowed questioning 
mainstream-interpretations analytically enough. This changed with the publication of 
Greg Russell’s Hans J. Morgenthau and the ethics of American statecraft (1990) and 
Christoph Frei’s intellectual biography (1994) which was translated into English in 
2001. While Russell primarily focused on Morgenthau’s time in the United States, Frei 
concentrated on his personal and intellectual European cosmos in which he researched 
not only Morgenthau’s German, French, and English publications, but also extensively 
consulted Morgenthau’s archive. This enabled Frei to provide a deeper understanding of 
Morgenthau’s scholarship since he was able to detect primary intellectual sources of 
Morgenthau, most notably Friedrich Nietzsche. However, Frei and Russell merely pro-
vided a solid starting point for the re-reading of realism and particularly Morgenthau, 
but this renewed interest was spurred by socio-political and intra-disciplinary develop-
ments. Williams recently identified three potential explanations, since ‘[t]he interpreta-
tion and use of “classical” thinkers in intellectual and political debate is never a wholly 
innocent process. It always reflects its historical genesis and context of current concerns’ 
(2007a, p. 5). 
First, there is an increased interest in the history of International Relations. Despite 
being a relatively young field, as an institutionalised discipline, it gained maturity re-
sulting in a rising interest in its historical and intellectual development which goes be-
yond canonical classifications of great debates, such as the dichotomy between idealism 
and realism (Waever, 1998; Wilson, 1998; Schmidt, 2002). Recent examples are works 
of Harald Kleinschmidt (2000) and Hartmut Behr (2010). Second, the renewed interest 
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in Morgenthau is also due to a reconsideration of the relationship of International Rela-
tions and political theory. There are widespread aspirations to reunite both strands of 
political science into international political theory which have been separated due to a 
‘forty years’ detour’ (Smith, 1992) by positivistic approaches, mainly neo-realism and 
neo-liberalism. These approaches had attempted to create a “grand theory” which, as an 
International Relations Theory, would have allowed exclusively analysing international 
relations. Recent elaborations under the premise to reunite political science are the stud-
ies combined in the Palgrave Macmillan Series on the History of International Thought, 
edited by Peter Wilson. Finally, Williams identified increasing discontent with positiv-
ism within the discipline since these approaches would not uphold their promise to pro-
duce a theory which would allow understanding and explaining international relations. 
Mounting complexities in international relations have led to a variety of approaches, 
such as social constructivism, critical theory, and feminism attempting to capture reality 
in a more differentiated way, and, hence, more appropriately. However, this has also 
caused a reconsideration of classical scholars in the search for analytical insights to cap-
ture these raising complexities. Attempts to do so can be found in Rohde (2004), and in 
the works of Kenneth Booth (2005), Williams (2007b), or Marco Cesa (2009), where 
Morgenthau’s realism was applied to gain insights about the end of the Cold War, neo-
conservatism, the transatlantic relationship, and tensions on the Korean peninsula. 
Interpreting Morgenthau as a wilful realist concentrated so far on the elaboration of 
primarily two research interests. The first aspect focused on the misreading of  
Morgenthau’s work which, he had attempted to confront early on. In 1959, to mention 
just one example, he wrote a letter to the editors of International Affairs in order to re-
pudiate Martin Wight’s view that he would have endorsed Thomas Hobbes’s doctrine 
that internationally there could be no morality or law (Morgenthau, 1959a, p. 502). 
There are two scholars in particular in which this misreading was discovered, its incon-
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sistency analysed, and explanations for its development sought. Behr (2005; Behr and 
Heath, 2009)  shed light into the beginnings of this misreading, by analysing material 
and technical realism in which he focused on Waltz’s understanding of Morgenthau. 
Equally, William Bain (2000) has to be credited for revealing that also George, who had 
intended to criticise positivism as an example of functional realism, reinforced the 
Waltzian reading. Behr and Bain have rendered service to the discipline by demonstrat-
ing that thought styles, such as the interpretation of Morgenthau as a positivist, are often 
of pertinacious persistence, although, as Fleck (1981, p. 27) remarked, contradicting in-
formation is readily available. 
The major interest in Morgenthau as a wilful realist, however, is devoted to his con-
textualisation. This quest concentrates on three factors. First, there is a wide array of 
studies trying to establish an intellectual endowment of Morgenthau by exploring his 
intellectual and/or personal relations with other scholars. Since all of the following 
scholars will be addressed in the subsequent chapters, it will be merely stated here that 
their relevance on Morgenthau has been researched in one way or another. This does not 
imply, furthermore, that all of the arguments provided in the subsequent accounts would 
always be endorsed. Frei (1994) initiated this research agenda in his intellectual biogra-
phy on Morgenthau by explicitly stressing his relationship with Nietzsche, which 
marked the beginning of an ever-increasing amount of such studies, whose latest contri-
bution was recently put forward by Mihaela Neacsu (2010). She also stressed that next 
to Nietzsche, Morgenthau would have grounded his, as she calls it, theory of interna-
tional relations on Weber. Her assessment is only the latest addition of a long list of 
scholars who argue they have found evidence of intellectual traces of Weber in  
Morgenthau. Most notably here are the contributions of Hans-Karl Pichler (1998),  
Tarak Barkawi (1998), and recently Stephen Turner (2009; Turner and Mazur, 2009). 
The third major scholar who, as it is widely believed, was one of Morgenthau’s intellec-
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tual sources was Schmitt. Indeed, William Scheuerman even argued that Morgenthau 
would have led a ‘hidden dialogue’ (1999, p. 225) with Schmitt. Over the course of a 
decade, Scheuerman (2007b, 2009a) further investigated this relationship resulting in a 
few more articles on Morgenthau and Schmitt, but in the meantime other scholars 
elaborated this relationship making it presumably the most extensively researched intel-
lectual relationship in this quest to contextualise Morgenthau (Pichler, 1998;  
Koskenniemi, 2000; 2004; Brown, 2007). Furthermore, Robert Schuett (2007) recently 
added a new scholar to the already extensive list by uncovering Morgenthau’s relation-
ship to psychoanalysis and particularly Freud. Finally, Anthony Lang (2007) and Seán 
Molloy (2009a) have provided first evidence that Morgenthau’s intellectual develop-
ment not only took place during the Wilhelmine Empire and Weimar Republic, but that 
he also profited from the educational canon of the German middle-class. Both stressed 
that Morgenthau was deeply engaged throughout his life with the works of Aristotle and 
that his own work profited from this intellectual engagement. Indeed, Morgenthau re-
peatedly gave lectures on Aristotle, versions of which from the early 1970s were finally 
edited by Lang (2004), but date back at least to 1947. In the light of the contextualisa-
tion of Morgenthau, there is also a reconsideration of Morgenthau’s relationship with 
Reinhold Niebuhr, as it is implied in Vibeke Schou Tjalve’s recent Realist strategies of 
Republican peace (2008) and David Rice’s Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau: A 
friendship with contrasting shades of realism (2008). This discourse takes up notions 
from the 1960s, when a first interest aroused to intellectually locate Morgenthau’s con-
tribution to International Relations (Good, 1960; Kindermann, 1965). 
The second, more elaborate array of studies aims to contextualise Morgenthau and 
his work within certain categorisations to which there are, however, significantly fewer 
contributions. The first of these attempts is to find evidence for Morgenthau’s political 
attitudes. This is the case in Scheuerman (2008) and implicitly also in Véronique  
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Pin-Fat’s article on the Metaphysics of the National Interest and the “Mysticism” of the  
Nation-State (2005). Both intend to reveal Morgenthau’s personal and intellectual rela-
tion to socialism. The influence the other side of the political spectrum, conservatism, 
would have had on Morgenthau was already mentioned in the 1980s by Söllner (1987a; 
1987b). Furthermore, Benjamin Mollov (1997; 2002) is to be credited for demonstrating 
the effect Judaism had on Morgenthau’s thought and political engagements. A final 
categorisation was recently provided by Jütersonke. In his study on Morgenthau, Law 
and Realism (2010), he contextualised Morgenthau within a particular culture by dem-
onstrating the influence German jurisprudence during the first half of the 20th century 
had on Morgenthau. With it, he could show that Morgenthau’s decision to study law – a 
decision of the head, not the heart – had, nevertheless, a lasting influence on  
Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung.  
A final contextualisation took place particularly in the works of Richard Ned Lebow 
(2003), Williams (2005a), Molloy (2006), and Robbie Shilliam (2009). They attempted 
to contextualise Morgenthau into a particular tradition of thought and consequently 
within the wider aspect of international political thought. Their studies represent a so-
phisticated attempt to contextualise Morgenthau through not only elaborating on major 
concepts of Morgenthau, but also through positioning these concepts within wider dis-
courses of realism and, indeed, political thought. Thereby, it is also pointed out to what 
extent Morgenthau’s concepts are of significance for contemporary scholarship in Inter-
national Relations and to what extent one could make justifiable claims to get engaged 
again with realists and Morgenthau in particular, other than to show the plurality of po-
litical thought. 
Contributions to the discourse of Morgenthau as a wilful realist can especially take 
credit for three achievements. First, this is especially valid for Frei (2001) and Lang 
(2004), they have managed to secure primary resources in the form of Morgenthau’s 
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unpublished manuscripts and lectures and have shown that any serious engagement with 
Morgenthau has to make use of these materials. Second, all of these works have made 
valid contributions to the contextualisation of Morgenthau. Schuett (2007), for example, 
by elucidating Morgenthau’s intellectual engagement with Freud, added a new layer to 
the discourse of Morgenthau’s intellectual development which until recently was not 
even considered. Finally, they have contributed to the argument, though not necessarily 
stressing it, that Morgenthau’s thought is the condensate of a European intellectual 
cosmos and shows a striking continuity throughout his career. Taken together, these 
studies virtually leave no room for contemplation whether Morgenthau drastically 
changed his intellectual outlook after his emigration to the United States or not.  
However, these contributions suffer from two shortcomings: one deriving from their 
analytical conceptualisation and one potentially resulting from this conceptualisation. 
The former is caused by a curtate presentation of Morgenthau’s development which 
renders it impossible to reveal the contextual comprehensiveness of Morgenthau’s 
thought. For this reason, the analytical concentration on one scholar may blind out other 
scholars who worked in the same discipline and made a similar impression on  
Morgenthau. As much as Schuett has to be credited for his work on Morgenthau and 
Freud, he left out the influence Ichheiser had on Morgenthau. Like Freud, Ichheiser was 
an Austrian psychologist and, unlike Freud, he was personally acquainted with  
Morgenthau. However, from this shortage suffer not only studies which link  
Morgenthau to one particular scholar, but also works which contextualised him into a 
specific category. Jütersonke, for example, elaborated the influence jurisprudence had 
on Morgenthau. This obstructs from recognising that Morgenthau was also influenced 
by other academic disciplines, such as sociology, philosophy, psychology, and even art 
history. In other words, Morgenthau would have to be contextualised within the entire 
Continental European humanities and social sciences at the time of his intellectual so-
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cialisation. The second shortcoming these works suffer from, although certainly not in-
tended by their authors, is that they allow a new kind of misinterpretation of  
Morgenthau. By claiming exclusivity for their readings, as a few authors do or at least 
imply (Schuett, 2007; Turner and Mazur, 2009), others might arrive at the conclusion 
that Morgenthau has to be understood in relation to one particular scholar, discipline, or 
attitude. This is beginning to be the case in Morgenthau’s relation with Schmitt. In this 
evolving Morgenthau-Schmitt-discourse, it is less and less of interest what Morgenthau 
actually thought of Schmitt, but only that there was some kind of relationship. Hence, 
the actual content is left more and more aside and filled with a potential hidden dialogue.  
 
2.4 Elucidating Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung: its contribution  
to the current discourse 
In consideration of these desiderata, this thesis takes on these shortcomings and in-
tends to rectify them by elucidating Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung. The guiding re-
search question of this thesis is, therefore: What was Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung 
and was it informed by Continental European humanities and social sciences? By pursu-
ing to answer this research question, this thesis makes a contribution to the reading of 
Morgenthau in (international) political theory in three ways: 
First, it is argued that Morgenthau was influenced by the discourses in Continental 
European humanities and social sciences that were prevalent during the time of his in-
tellectual socialisation. Although this thesis cannot claim to have produced “the truth” 
about Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung and primarily intends to shed new light and re-
vealing new layers of it (Fest, 2003, p. 38), it can be argued that in order to understand 
Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung this panoptic outlook is required since any curtailment 
would produce a simplified, if not distorted, result. The strongest authorisation, however, 
is to be found in Morgenthau’s work itself. In his autobiographical sketch and an inter-
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view he gave, which are both reproduced in Thompson’s anthology (1984), Morgenthau 
made explicit reference to a variety of scholars and disciplines which only leads to the 
conclusion that Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung was informed by this comprehensive-
ness. Hence, to fully appreciate the complexity of Morgenthau’s thought, to research its 
intellectual sources, and to consider its practical implications this panoptic outlook has 
to be sought. Furthermore, this allows contextualising the contribution Morgenthau 
made to the discipline, which prevents seeking a “grand theory” or “hidden dialogue” in 
it.  
Second, this thesis contains numerous biographical references because Morgenthau’s 
work is reflected in his life and his life is reflected in his work (Kissinger, 1980, p. 14). 
This is why without a reference to the contexts of his Weltanschauung, it would be im-
possible for students of International Relations to assess Morgenthau’s contribution 
(Raulff, 1997, p. 33; Ullrich, 2007, p. 51). This study is the most extensive reading of 
Morgenthau’s work up to date. To this end, the entire span of Morgenthau’s academic 
career is considered. Therefore, this allows, on the one hand, an analysis of the whole 
spectrum of Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung. On the other hand, it shows Morgenthau’s 
intellectual development. By demonstrating the personal correlation Morgenthau had 
with various scholars at that time, it is also possible to detect conceptual and contextual 
correlations. Frei’s intellectual biography has set the mark in this respect, but the pre-
sent thesis goes beyond that. First, Frei only concentrated on Morgenthau’s pre-
American years, which at the time of publication was a long-overdue project, but here 
Morgenthau’s entire life-span is considered. Second, Frei wrote an intellectual biogra-
phy, whereas this work is concerned about his Weltanschauung. This allows, as opposed 
to a biography, a consideration of his intellectual development in conceptual terms. 
Therefore, it is possible to recognise alterations, contradictions, and correlations in his 
thought. As this thesis emphasises Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung is characterised by a 
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coherence and pertinacity one would not expect from a person who led such a forced 
vagrant life.  
Third and finally, it is argued that elucidating Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung allows 
for the development of the earlier remarked relevance why Morgenthau is to be consid-
ered in International Relations. Morgenthau was, although for a long time misunder-
stood, a cultural broker who was part of a wider group of émigré scholars who intro-
duced Continental European political thought to American political science and Interna-
tional Relations in particular. Thereby, Morgenthau can be seen as part of a ‘separation-
ist movement’ (Guilhot, 2008) or better as a part of a critical, allochthonous move-
ment.12 It is, furthermore, demonstrated that particularly Morgenthau’s epistemology in 
terms of a critical scholarship is worth being considered for current political science. In 
addition, this thesis will manifest that, in order to consider Morgenthau’s episteme and 
avoid misinterpretations, a careful temporal and spatial contextualisation has to take 
place to approach Morgenthau’s intended meanings as close as possible. 
Before the conceptual framework is expounded, a caveat to a Weltanschauungsana-
lyse is to be mentioned. This analysis follows an approach that intends to understand 
Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung out of itself. This means that through extensive reading 
of Morgenthau’s (un-)published works and based upon textual evidence the concepts 
were condensed that constituted Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung. However, realising 
that all these concepts have a long history to which Morgenthau’s use is only a small 
addition, this thesis cannot discuss them in all philosophical detail (Koselleck, 2002,  
p. 23). This is the case because this thesis intends to add to the history of the concepts to 
be discussed, but it does not write their history. Therefore, it is asked how Morgenthau 
understood and used these concepts, what role they played for his Weltanschauung, and 
where their immediate origin is to be sought (Ball, 2004, p. 24-5). It also intends to elu-
cidate their ‘coherence constraints’ (Bevir, 1997, p. 167), hence their underlying convic-
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tions and desires which would be otherwise impossible to detect. Therefore, this thesis 
will provide a longitudinal conceptual history in the sense that Morgenthau’s concepts 
are analysed in the way he employed them throughout his life and a sequential concep-
tual history since these concepts are only considered in relation to Morgenthau.  
 
2.5 Analysing a Weltanschauung: its conceptual framework 
2.5.1 Why Weltanschauung? A definition 
Michael Smith (1986, p. 226) once stated that realism is a Weltanschauung rather 
than a theory and this statement is to be seen as the guiding principle of this thesis. It is 
argued that at least for Morgenthau a full appreciation of his intellectual spectrum is 
only possible if it is considered as a Weltanschauung and analysed as such. Therefore, 
at the beginning of this section there will have to be a definition of the term Weltan-
schauung in order to distinguish it from the similar, yet conflicting terms of ideology 
and theory. This is required since these terms are often confused with each other or even 
used simultaneously (Mullins, 1972, p. 500). It is also necessary since Morgenthau’s 
thought was often classified as a theory (e.g. Wasserman, 1959; Nobel 1995; Pichler, 
1998; Neacsu, 2010), but the distinction between Weltanschauung and theory will dem-
onstrate that the latter would be too short to characterise Morgenthau’s thought. For  
Arendt (1953, p. 317-8), to give just one example for this confusion, a Weltanschauung 
was part of an ideology as the expressive factor of the total explanation of the world. 
Indeed, as Giovanni Sartori (1969, p. 398) remarked for ideology, but which is equally 
applicable for the other two notions, all of them contain a convolute of definitions.13 To 
avoid this convolute, the following definitions will act as a guideline for this thesis. 
A Weltanschauung, as it is understood here, is quite literally an outlook of the world. 
It gives answers to the question of how the world, be it natural or social, is perceived 
and how its image is mapped, but also how it is desired. If a Weltanschauung is under-
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stood in this way, six factors particularly characterise it. The first two characteristics 
tend to be conscious constructs of the mind, whereas the next two factors are often un-
conscious. The final two factors deal more with the constructural aspect of a Weltan-
schauung, rather than the contentual part of it. 
First, a Weltanschauung is empirical. This means that the construction of a Weltan-
schauung is dependent on natural and social actualities which each person faces in 
his/her common habitat. The wider the habitat and the more experiences a person makes, 
hence the wider and deeper spatial and temporal aspects play into the construction of a 
Weltanschauung, the more pronounced it gets. Second, a Weltanschauung is normative. 
Every Weltanschauung also contains a world postulate (Mannheim, 1952, p. 184-5; 
Kettler, Meja, and Stehr, 1989, p. 78). This means that a Weltanschauung is directed 
towards a particular reason, often to maintain the status quo or, if it is a newly estab-
lished Weltanschauung, to create a new power structure through a paradigm shift. 
Therefore, a Weltanschauung provides not only a tool to see the world, but this tool also 
provides an unuttered perception-presetting of how the world should be. Kurt Danziger 
concludes in this respect that ‘[t]hese notions convey the strong implication that men are 
to be studied as the producers rather than as the “consumers” of ideas’ (1963, p. 64). 
Third, a Weltanschauung is ontological. This is the case since it arises out of the con-
templation about the essence and reason of one’s existence and it contains the urge to 
create the factual embodiment of the conclusions which are drawn out of this contem-
plation. Fourth, a Weltanschauung is epistemological. In the course of its construction 
the actual world is in a reciprocal, cognitive process perceived and classified according 
to the normative and ontological aspects of the Weltanschauung.  
The final two characteristics require more explanation since they are, due to their 
constructural aspect, essential for this thesis. The fifth characteristic is that a Weltan-
schauung is a mental visualisation of the floating world. In this sense, it bears resem-
31 
 
blance to Mannheim’s particular form of ideology (1985, p. 55-9; Woldring, 1986,  
p. 191-3). This concept remains on the psychological level and debarks from an indi-
vidual standpoint which means one considers the ideas of another person not necessarily 
as wrong, but as misleading and often as a lie towards oneself. Particular ideology is, 
therefore, at least on the political level, commonly used in a polemical way, in order to 
call into question the intentions of one’s opponent. As Terry Eagleton put it: ‘His 
thought is red-neck, yours is doctrinal, and mine deliciously supple’ (1991, p. 4). Also, 
Morgenthau referred to this particular concept of ideology. In Politics among Nations 
Morgenthau remarked that ‘… the element of power as the immediate goal of the policy 
pursued is explained and justified in ethical, legal, or biological terms. That is to say: 
the true nature of the policy is concealed by ideological justifications and rationaliza-
tions’ (1985, p. 101). However, one still shares a common set of criteria, out of which it 
would be possible to create objective validity in the sense of general acceptance. It is 
this last aspect how a Weltanschauung is understood here since it contains a positive 
rather than a negative element. A Weltanschauung is considered as open-minded since it 
is an intellectual process rather than a self-contained and completed condition. There-
fore, the term Weltanschauung was chosen since the German term, in contrast to the 
English world-view, captures in its etymological origin the processual character of a 
Weltanschauung more accurately.  
Finally, a Weltanschauung is individualistic, even though it is formed within a par-
ticular group and out of a distinctive cultural setting. As Mannheim noted: 
‘… fundamental experiences and attitudes do not emerge in the substratum of 
individuals’ lives in isolation, but that individuals who are together in the same 
group share a basic stock of experiential contents. A further presupposition is 
that individual segments of experience are not to be found in isolation alongside 
one another within these basic forms, but rather that they possess an internal co-
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herence and thereby constitute what might be called a “life-system”’ (1982,  
p. 91).  
This life-system draws in the process of its constitution upon what Jan Assmann called 
collective memory. Collective memory is characterised by its distance from the every-
day life. The members of a group or society share the same artefacts, like texts, rituals, 
ceremonies or monuments, on which they draw upon while making sense of their ex-
periences in everyday-life. These “figures of memory” create a stable though gradually 
changing intellectual horizon. This means that a group member draws upon this collec-
tive memory in order to create his/her Weltanschauung and eventually also his/her iden-
tity. Cultural memory allows a group to get an awareness of its own unity and creates a 
sense of belonging. This means one’s current situation influences the way the past is 
understood (Assmann and Assmann, 1994, p. 114-40; Assmann and Czaplicka, 1995,  
p. 126-33) . Yet, even though this is the case, a Weltanschauung is distinctively indi-
vidualistic since, although there is a similarity with the Weltanschauung of other people 
who drew from the same collective memory, but the correlation of the factors of a Welt-
anschauung makes it an individual undertaking. Empirical, normative, ontological, and 
epistemological factors might be similar in view of their constitutive significance for a 
Weltanschauung, but the way they are being invoked and their constellations to each 
other in each individual Weltanschauung is unique.  
To contrast a Weltanschauung from ideology and theory we focus on the processual 
character since this is the most distinctive aspect of Weltanschauung. This proceeds by 
giving definitions first and based on this definition the processuality of ideology and 
theory is assessed.  
Ideology is understood here in the classic Marxist reading as a closed, generalised, 
and self-referential worldview promoting a ‘false consciousness’ (Kennedy, 1979,  
p. 353; Geoghegan, 2004, p. 129). Hence, an ideology is defined as ‘… clusters of ideas, 
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beliefs, opinions, values, and attitudes usually held by identifiable groups, that provide 
directives, even plans, of action for public-policy making in an endeavour to uphold, 
justify, change or criticize the social and political arrangements of a state or other politi-
cal community’ (Freeden, 2004, p. 6; similar: 2003, p. 32). This definition accentuates 
that an ideology, unlike a Weltanschauung, is fundamentally characterised by statism. 
This statism rests on two pillars. First, following Mannheim’s concept of total ideology, 
ideologies claim to be based on some form of natural and/or teleological law(s) which 
allows them to monopolise thought within a collective. Mannheim noted to that effect 
that:  
‘… it is not primarily the man of action who seeks the absolute and immutable, 
but rather it is he who wishes to induce others to hold on to the status quo be-
cause he feels comfortable and smug under conditions as they are … This cannot 
be done, however, without resorting to all sorts of romantic notions and myths’ 
(1985, p. 87; emphasis in the original). 
Equally, Freeden informs that ‘all ideologies delight in surrounding their arguments 
in the opaque and non-transparent aura of terms … precisely because this captures the 
high ground that is immune from challenge’ (2004, p. 12). From Mannheim’s notion in 
particular follows that through such laws which act as a priori ontological parameters 
humans are turned into mere “executers” of these laws because life-experiences are mis-
taken to be ‘permanent constituents of reality’ (Lichtheim, 1965, p. 194) rather than 
temporal and spatial objectifications of human interaction.  
From this ontological distortion springs a second, epistemological distortion signify-
ing the statism of ideologies. Claiming total cognitive mastery of reality, ideologies are 
gnostic in Voegelin’s sense14 because the specific ideological rationale meticulously 
controls knowledge-construction prohibiting a critical view of reality. Accordingly,  
Arendt informs the student of politics that this would be the case because ideologies 
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treat the course of events as an unfolding of the logic they have derived from their ideo-
logical parameters. Therefore, history appears ‘… as something which can be calculated 
by it’ (Arendt, 1953, p. 317; emphasis in the original). The ontological and epistemo-
logical statism makes Mannheim’s notion of total ideology resemble Fleck’s thought 
style and Thomas Kuhn’s notion of paradigm since, as Ole Wæver remarks, ‘a paradigm 
contains with it a fundamental [irrevocable] view of the world, and its assumptions act 
as lenses through which that world is perceived …’ (1996, p. 159). This quotation con-
denses why the statism of an ideology cannot depict the processual character of 
Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung. It was the result of a constant cognitive process that 
repeatedly experienced amendments and alterations, due to new experiences and chang-
ing life-worlds, although in its foundation it remained remarkably stable. 
In contrast to an ideology, a theory is not static, but unlike a Weltanschauung a the-
ory is procedural. Whereas the process of a Weltanschauung happens to a certain extent 
uncoordinated, theory-making is a coordinated procedure to analyse a specific aspect. 
To accentuate this difference we have to define a theory in order to recognise that they 
particularly differ in scope and durability. For this definition, Morgenthau and the re-
sults of a Rockefeller Foundation symposium on theoretical approaches to international 
relations that took place in 1954 will be considered. In the course of this symposium 
Morgenthau defined a theory of International Relations as ‘… a rationally ordered 
summary of all the rational elements which the observer has found in the subject matter’ 
(quoted after: Thompson, 1955, p. 737). This definition is equally applicable to any so-
cial science and resembles George Sabine’s well-known definition of a ‘… disciplined 
investigation of political problems …’ (1973, p. 4).  
This definition emphasises that a theory is, first, shorter in scope than a Weltan-
schauung because a theory is not action. If we remember what was earlier said about 
Morgenthau that his work was his life and vice-versa than the concept of a theory could 
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not grasp this comprehensiveness. A theory in politics is the investigation of how and/or 
why a particular event took place in the political realm, but it does not contribute to po-
litical action; at least not intentionally. There is, certainly, the exception which in Inter-
national Relations, however, was the norm during the 20th century that the analytical is 
not distinguished from the normative aspect of a theory, as Behr (2010, p. 206-7) re-
cently noted. This distinction would lead to a reification of politics because the conclu-
sions drawn from analytical assumptions appear not as a normative reasoning, but as a 
logical rationale. However, if this is the case theory turns into an ideology if we follow 
Arendt’s discussion of ideology because, as it is the case with grand theories, reality is 
perceived to evolve in a deterministic manner and comprehended through this seem-
ingly logical deduction. 
A theory is, second, also different to a Weltanschauung in its durability. Since a the-
ory rests on a rationality postulate, it will eventually become abandoned if a theory no 
longer ‘… provides a base or fixed point upon which analysis can be founded’  
(Thompson, 1955, p. 738) because reality has moved on and its hypotheses are subse-
quently refuted. The abandonment may be prolonged for a long time for various reasons, 
but it will eventually have to succumb to the fact that the ‘cosmos [is] in flux’  
(Mannheim, 1985, p. 65). This is not the case with a Weltanschauung since its proces-
sual character allows the incorporation of changing life-situations and/or life-worlds. 
Therefore, it may even experience dramatic changes, as was the case with Mannheim, 
who after his emigration to the United Kingdom got engaged in social planning as a 
member of the “Moot” circle (Ziffus, 1988; Jones, 1997), but it still remains the Weltan-
schauung of an individual and cannot be abandoned.  
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2.5.2 Weltanschauung as the interplay of field and habitus 
2.5.2.1 Framing a Weltanschauung: the elements of field and habitus 
In order to elaborate Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung we will depart from Mannheim 
on whom we have relied so far due to a crucial flaw in his thought.15 For Mannheim a 
Weltanschauung was a  
‘structurally linked set of experiential contextures which makes up the common 
footing upon which a multiplicity of individuals together learn from life and en-
ter into it. A world-view is then neither the totality of spiritual formations pre-
sent in an age nor the sum of individuals then present, but the totality of the 
structurally interconnected experiential sets which can be derived from either 
side, from the spiritual creations or from the social group formations’ (1982,  
p. 91). 
However, in accordance with Thomas Jung (2007, p. 143), a Weltanschauung cannot 
be perceived as a structurally linked set of experiential contextures. First, the experi-
ences a person makes throughout his/her life are not structurally linked since neither has 
he/she full control over these experiences, nor is a person one-dimensional in the sense 
that a person will encounter different temporal and spatial life-worlds which can, but do 
not have to be interlinked.  Second, these experiences do not constitute the Weltan-
schauung, but merely contribute in a reciprocal process to its development as patterns of 
interpretation. To avoid this problem Pierre Bourdieu’s concepts of field and habitus 
will be considered as the general conceptual framework. Applying these concepts allow 
us to distinguish the personal and conceptual interrelationship within the field and the 
habitus, as well as between them. This interrelational elaboration of the field  
Morgenthau was intellectually socialised in and the Weltanschauung or habitus he de-
veloped out of it enables to pursue answers to the intentions of this thesis. It reveals how 
Morgenthau was influenced by Continental European humanities and social sciences 
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and it enables the tracing of the development of his Weltanschauung stressing what 
Morgenthau could contribute to contemporary (international) political theory. Finally, it 
accentuates the requirement of contextualisation.  
Bourdieu defined the field 
‘… as a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions. 
These positions are objectively defined in their existence and in the determina-
tions they impose upon their occupants, agents or institutions, by their present 
and potential situation … in the structure of the distribution of species of power 
… whose possession commands access to the specific profits that are at stake in 
the field, as well as by their objective relation to other positions …’ (Bourdieu 
and Wacquant, 1992, p. 97). 
This definition permits a general exegesis of social reality and its numerous subfields. 
Since Morgenthau’s life, however, happened to a large extent within an intellectual con-
text, numerous ties between intellectuals constitute the field in which Morgenthau de-
veloped his Weltanschauung. Therefore, this study refers mainly to the intellectual 
fields Morgenthau lived in.  
This definition suggests several aspects which need to be considered while elaborat-
ing on the development of Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung. First, each field has a logic 
of its own because social space is made up of various fields which are relatively 
autonomous to each other. For Bourdieu, the intellectual field was independent since its 
agents mainly devote themselves to the intrinsic demands of the creative projects he/she 
follows. Its autonomy leads to the development of their own institutions and professions, 
either by creating new or by altering the meaning of existing ones. Still, the agents of 
the field are influenced by major issues of the larger society, but through the growing 
independence of the intellectual field, the field mediates it and the outside influence 
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vanishes (Bourdieu, 1969, p. 89-95). ‘No doubt agents do have an active apprehension 
of the world’, Bourdieu remarked on this occasion and he added that  
‘[n]o doubt they do construct their vision of the world. But this construction is 
carried out under structural constraints. One may even explain in sociological 
terms what appears to be a universal property of human experience, namely, the 
fact that the familiar world tends to be “taken for granted”, perceived as natu-
ral’(1990, p. 130). 
Second, each intellectual field is characterised by a conflict. As Fritz Ringer noted: 
‘The agents in the [intellectual] field are in conflict with each other. They compete for 
the right to define or to co-define what shall count as intellectually established and cul-
turally legitimate’ (1990, p. 270). Indeed, this conflict is necessary for its constant re-
production and emphasises its dynamic character. This conflict is above all a competi-
tion for legitimacy. Bourdieu distinguished here between two positions: orthodoxy and 
heterodoxy. Orthodox agents claim for themselves the right to define what is intellectu-
ally valid and culturally legitimate since they occupy dominant positions within the 
field. But  
‘[e]very intellectual brings into his relations with other intellectuals a claim to 
cultural consecration … which depends … on the position he occupies in the in-
tellectual field and in particular his relation to the university, which, in the last 
resort, disposes of the infallible signs of consecration’ (Bourdieu, 1969, p. 111).  
This also means heterodox scholars, often occupied by agents at the edge of the field, 
try to participate in this competition. Although they question the validity and credibility 
of the scholars, which are in the position to define the intellectual doctrines, they still 
strive to achieve these academic positions. Only by occupying these positions can they 
claim legitimacy for themselves and gain confirmation of their intellectual work. By 
participating in this process they approve the institutional design they originally in-
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tended to dispute. In fact, this competition is especially pronounced in the intellectual 
field because its actors are generally more dependent on the foreign and meta image16 
than other occupations due to an inability to prove the quality of their work to them-
selves. This means that intellectuals aspire to assure their work, first, by the advocacy of 
other agents of the intellectual field and, second, through the achievement of its core 
positions (Bourdieu, 1985, p. 15-6; 1990, p. 143). 
Finally, the meaning and applicability of habitus has to explained. Whereas the fac-
tors of the field explained the objectivist more, the habitus refers largely to the subjec-
tivist perspective. This is the case, although, as the following definition by Bourdieu 
implies, the habitus is the result of a constant interrelation between the individual and 
social reality. Habitus is ‘a system of schemata of production of practices and a system 
of perception and appreciation of practices’ (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 131). The latter is pos-
sible due to the doxa. The doxic part of the habitus is ‘history turned into nature’ 
(Bourdieu, 1977, p. 78). This means that these undisputed, seemingly perennial beliefs 
and patterns of thought act as a framework of reference for the agents in order to under-
stand their current social reality. Mindful of the competition for consecration, both poles 
within the discourse – orthodoxy and heterodoxy – refer back to the same doxa which in 
turn makes them accept the practice of the field. However, to a large extent, the habitus 
furthers the production of practices. This happens with the help of the collective mem-
ory through the ability to problematise one’s situation and draw analogies to similar 
situations. From this follows that even though the doxa is rather similar for each agent 
in the field, it does not mean that the resulting habitus would be equal. Rather, each 
habitus is unique, because each agent refers to different parts of the doxa while applying 
the matrix. Bourdieu spoke here of an open system of dispositions. Hence, although the 
agents remain within the practice of the field, they gradually affect and alter practice 
(Bourdieu, 1977, p. 79-87; 1990, p. 129-37; Behr, 2001, p. 385-6).  
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Regarding the analytical side of the concept of habitus, Bourdieu remarked that it 
serves as a matrix of three, interrelated aspects. The habitus ‘… ensures the presence of 
experiences which [are] deposited in each organism in the form of schemes of percep-
tion, thought and action …’ (Bourdieu, 1992, p. 54). First, schemes of perception, or 
ontology, deal with how people perceive the structures of social reality. Second, 
schemes of thought, or epistemology, examine the ways people construct knowledge and 
use it to interpret social reality. Third, schemes of action, or political agency, demon-
strate specific actions, hence the practical conversion of the first two schemes. These 
three aspects – ontology, epistemology, and political agency – mark, therefore, the con-
stitutive elements along which Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung is explained and deter-
mine the structure of this thesis. Before this will be further laid down in greater detail in 
Chapter 2.6, the above mentioned aspects require definition. 
Ontology, as understood in this thesis, refers to the first elements of knowledge 
(Hartmann, 1949, p. 13). Hence, it is argued that these elements form the basis of 
knowledge since humans cannot think nothing, but have to think something (Bocheński, 
1951, p. 220). Even in the case of “not-knowing” (Niklas Luhmann), as the source of 
acquiring knowledge in a cognitive process, there is agreement that there must be some-
thing which is still veiled in darkness from one’s mind. This something orients itself on 
the real being (reales Sein), in other words, the social reality to which not only material 
and life belong as constitutive elements, but also consciousness and spirit. Social reality 
consists, therefore, not only of objectifiable things, but also of metaphysical elements. 
Hartmann distinguished here between empirical reality (Dasein) and normativity (So-
sein) (Hartmann, 1949, p. 22; Bocheński, 1951, p. 226). Hence, ontology has to con-
sider not only objectifications, as it is the case for example with neo-realism, but also 
normative aspects, what Mannheim called world postulate. Applying such an under-
standing of ontology means that those concepts have to be identified, of which  
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Morgenthau thought they would constitute social reality – while bearing in mind that 
Morgenthau gained them from an engagement with social reality – but at the same time 
contain an element of normativity revealing the kind of social reality Morgenthau as-
pired for.  
Applying Hartmann’s ontology provides the advantage of being able to consider the 
correlation between epistemology and ontology and demonstrate how ontological con-
cepts fed into Morgenthau’s epistemology and vice versa. Epistemology is here under-
stood as ‘… the study of the nature of knowledge and justification: in particular, the 
study of (a) the defining components, (b) the substantive conditions or sources, and (c) 
the limits of knowledge and justification’ (Moser, 2002, p. 3). However, although these 
elements of epistemology are considered here, the analysis of Morgenthau’s epistemol-
ogy departs from a philosophical inquiry and is more concerned with an elaboration 
providing intellectual insights for (international) political theory. This means that when 
it comes to sources and justifications of knowledge it will not be asked how perception, 
memory, or reason works (Steup, 2005), but what is of interest here are more the socio-
political and cultural aspects that helped him to construct his epistemology. Hence, it is 
of interest which concepts Morgenthau considered important in the process of knowl-
edge construction and how, where, and from whom did he acquire them.  
Finally, political agency, as the life-worldly implementation of ontology and episte-
mology, is understood here following Lang’s account in Aristotelian terms. Political 
agency is ‘… the capacity to change the world. This capacity, however, is not simply a 
physical characteristic … Rather, agency connects the physical capacity to change with 
either an analytical or evaluative dimension’ (Lang, 2007, p. 20). Since political agency 
is applied here in individual terms a philosophical interpretation is pursued rather than 
on a collective level as it is often the case in political science (Wendt, 1987). Aspiring to 
change the world requires a particular goal, or telos, in life, but this thesis concentrates 
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here on how Morgenthau turned his vita contemplativa into vita activa and what major 
concepts geared this action. Two aspects are of particular importance. First, and here 
Morgenthau’s telos will feed into the elaboration, it has to be analysed what socio-
political problems Morgenthau was most concerned with. Second, it has to be ques-
tioned what kind of virtues, understood ‘… as the pursuit of excellence’ (Lang, 2007,  
p. 22), Morgenthau regarded as most effective in the aspiration of his telos to create a 
society in which its members feel committed to the common good.  
 
2.5.2.2 Constructing a Weltanschauung: personal and conceptual  
interrelationships 
Having defined the terminology of a Weltanschauung, the interest can now be turned 
to the elaboration of the interrelationship of these concepts. Applying the interplay of 
field and habitus as a conceptual framework allows the cognitive separation of  
Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung into its constitutive framework and central aspects, but 
it also allows enough leeway to analyse the interrelationship between and within the 
field and habitus. This interrelationship is, on the one hand, personal, and, on the other 
hand, conceptual. 
In order to physically define the intellectual field, i.e. the personal interrelationships 
which served as an intellectual platform for Morgenthau, the method of prosopography 
is applied (Stone, 1971; Appadurai, 2000). Even though this thesis is not a biography in 
the traditional sense, it still makes use of it since the exegesis of Morgenthau’s Weltan-
schauung will be retraced through his biography. A prosopography is ‘a sophisticated 
tool for establishing links between action and context’ (Shapin and Thackray, 1974,  
p. 3). Indeed, Bourdieu also positively stressed the use of this method to identify fields 
(Broady, 2002, p. 381-5). Lawrence Stone defined prosopography as ‘the investigation 
of the common background characteristics of a group of actors in history by a means of 
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collective study of their lives’ (1971, p. 46). A collective biography, as it is also called, 
is a means to study particularly the political action and social structure of a group. Since 
this thesis leans more towards the elitist school of prosopography, it is required to ana-
lyse mainly the ideas, disputes, and debates of intellectuals because the academic prac-
tice is at the core of the life of intellectuals and it serves as the constitutive factor of 
their field, not least because this group has otherwise only a vague sense of togetherness 
(Stone, 1971, p. 63; Gallus, 2005, p. 42-5). Of course, we can neither recreate the entire 
field of German humanities and social sciences here, nor would it provide any analytical 
value. To ensure the latter, a star or wheel network (Evan, 1972, p. 186) is created 
within the field of German humanities and social sciences during the beginning of the 
20th century. This network contains Morgenthau at its centre and it demonstrates the in-
tellectual and personal links he had with other scholars and the topics that concerned 
them. 
The conceptual interrelation is examined by considering the insights of conceptual 
history. First, it has to be asked what conceptual history can offer for analysing  
Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung and, second, it is outlined how it proceeds. Applying 
this approach allows the analysis of Morgenthau’s concepts through historical semantics. 
This means it will be argued here that concepts do not have fixed contents, but are con-
tingent, changing entities depending on space and time (Bevir, 2000, p. 274). The con-
ceptual history approach also enables to combine the history of ideas with social history 
(Koselleck, 2002, p. 20-37). Hence, it allows consideration, in what way Morgenthau’s 
concepts were informed by the social situation and strata he was part of. These two ad-
vantages of a conceptual history have to be considered when the procedure is outlined, 
which we will turn to now. 
The procedure of a conceptual history explains why a subjective access to the elabo-
ration of Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung was chosen since it overcomes some of the cri-
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tique conceptual history was exposed to. First, the concepts that formed Morgenthau’s 
Weltanschauung are analysed in their historic-semantic fields. This contextualisation 
will be less concerned with the identification of antonyms, synonyms, or related terms, 
as is often the case, but what is of interest here is to identify Morgenthau’s major con-
cepts through a longitudinal analysis of his work and consider these concepts as they 
were understood at their very time and place. This means the student of Morgenthau’s 
Weltanschauung has to free oneself from a potential contemporary understanding of 
these concepts and only consider their previous understandings by examining the dis-
courses they were employed in. Second, the onomasiology and semasiology of the con-
cepts will be considered. The former identifies the words which are related to one con-
cept and the latter identifies the concepts which are directed to one word. This analysis 
will be of importance since in Morgenthau’s case, the German meaning of the words 
behind his concepts often remain unconsidered and have led to frequent misinterpreta-
tions. Furthermore, it enables to demonstrate the correlations of the particular concepts 
to be discussed in this thesis. Finally, the analysis of Morgenthau’s concepts will pro-
ceed in a synchronic and diachronic manner. The former is concerned with the elabora-
tion of the particular class, strata, or order that employed a concept in a particular man-
ner. Hence, elaborating a field may not end in identifying a group at a particular time 
and space, but the specific subgroup in which Morgenthau was intellectually socialised 
has to be mapped. This means it would not be sufficient enough to argue that  
Morgenthau’s socialisation took place in the Wilhelmine Empire and Weimar Republic, 
but one has to look deeper into his specific stratum. The latter will require relating 
Morgenthau’s concepts to specific socio-political developments. This is important dem-
onstrating the mentioned alterations, amendments, or continuities in Morgenthau’s 
Weltanschauung (Bevir, 2000, p. 276; Koselleck, 2002, p. 45-83; 2010, p. 77-85).  
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The final aspect which has to be discussed at this stage are potential shortcomings of 
this combination of prosopography and conceptual history and how these potential limi-
tations are taken into consideration. The first is what John Diggins called “the oyster 
and the pearl”. For him, it might be possible that ‘… an idea exists in relation to its his-
torical context as a pearl to an oyster: we can appreciate the jewel without knowing 
what mysterious forces of nature produced it; and an idea, like a pearl, does not neces-
sarily lose its meaning when it leaves its original context behind’ (1984, p. 156). Indeed, 
a mere elaboration of personal interrelationships would tell the political scientist very 
little, but in combination with the contextualisation, the development and meaning of 
Morgenthau’s concepts can be more closely and appropriately approximated than with-
out it (Collins, 1998, p. 21; Muslow and Mahler, 2010, p. 8-9). Therefore, contextualisa-
tion will allow prohibiting misinterpretations that arise out of a separation of the oyster 
from the pearl due to an understanding of interests, which led to the creation of concepts 
in the first place. To remain in the language of Diggins, we might be able to enjoy the 
pearl without the oyster, but we do so even more if we know how and where it was 
sourced and if we can prove its authenticity. But for this, we need the oyster.  
A second potential shortcoming is recorded by Melvin Richter. He argues that a new 
scholarship is required in order to ‘… inquire into the linkages and oppositions among 
concepts hitherto treated in isolation’ (Richter, 1995, p. 54). This remark points out that 
studies in conceptual history might have so far failed to stress the correlation of con-
cepts. Since here the concepts are analysed by directing them to one particular person, 
this thesis will overcome this potential shortcoming. This is the case because, at least in 
this individual case, the meaning of concepts is developed precisely out of their linkages 
and oppositions. Finally, Mark Bevir (2000, p. 281) remarks that conceptual history 
runs the risk of losing the agency of concepts. However, this thesis is able to avoid the 
risk since, as before, the concepts is related to Morgenthau and their development is 
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elaborated by stressing similarities to other scholars. Therefore, the accountability of 
concepts is ensured, precisely because the agency of the concepts to be discussed, hence 
Morgenthau, is at the centre of this thesis.   
 
2.5.3 Researching a Weltanschauung: the triage of material 
Finally, the methodological procedure to provide textual evidence for the exposition 
of the argument needs to be explained. The ambitious task of analysing Morgenthau’s 
Weltanschauung must rest on the gathering and ascertaining of an extensive amount of 
material. Two kinds of sources were most important. 
First, all of Morgenthau’s major published works were consulted. These works range 
from his doctoral thesis and early journal articles of the late 1920s and his Habilitation 
(post-doctoral thesis) from the 1930s, to first publications in the United States, like  
Scientific Man vs. Power Politics and Politics among Nations, and his latest publica-
tions from the 1970s, like Science: Servant or Master?. In other words, all of his crea-
tive periods – German, French, and English – are considered. However, intending to 
elucidate Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung cannot rest solely on a textual analysis of his 
published accounts. Not only would it be difficult to contextualise Morgenthau, due to 
his scarce referencing, but it would also hardly enable to depict the processual character 
of a Weltanschauung since publications are “only” the end result of a thought-process. 
Fortunately, Morgenthau gave reference for his Weltanschauung in the above men-
tioned autobiographical sketch and interview. Still, an analysis of a Weltanschauung 
cannot rest exclusively on such scarce and dubious source. Even though Morgenthau 
seems to have been a very strong-willed person with a remarkable capacity to remember 
(Postscript, 1984, p. 352-3), a second set of sources had to be consulted. This further 
source is archive material in the Library of Congress in Washington D.C., the Hoover  
Institution in Stanford, the Bodleian Library in Oxford, and the Archive for Christian-
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Democratic Policy of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. Archives not only ‘… enable a 
broader, richer, and more robust understanding of the nature of political thinking’ 
(Hazareesingh and Nabulsi, 2008, p. 170), but even more so can provide ‘… impetus for 
fundamental reinterpretations …’ (Hazareesingh and Nabulsi, 2008, p. 152). Certainly, 
this is the case with Morgenthau. In the archives numerous unpublished manuscripts 
from the 1930s are to be found, which are essential for analysing the development of 
Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung. In manuscripts like Der Selbstmord mit gutem  
Gewissen (Suicide with a good conscience) (1930b), Über den Sinn der Wissenschaft in 
dieser Zeit und über die Bestimmung des Menschen (On the meaning of scholarship in 
this time and the human purpose) (1934b), or Die Krise der Institutionen als  
Glaubenskrise (The crisis of institutions as a crisis of faith) (1970d) this development 
becomes almost tangible since it reveals its processural character through hand-written 
amendments or deletions. Furthermore, the Morgenthau-Archive in the Library of  
Congress also contains letters which were particularly insightful since Morgenthau not 
only kept the letters he had received, but also made carbon-copies of his own. Therefore, 
it is possible to trace entire conversations which added a particular value for understand-
ing the development of his thoughts. Despite the necessity of archival work to under-
stand Morgenthau’s thought and action, it seems only two works have made exhaustive 
use of the material available (Frei 2001, Scheuerman, 2009a). Schuett (2007) and  
Jütersonke (2010) also refer to German, French, and English publications of  
Morgenthau, but due to their specific analytical interest they did not consult all avail-
able resources. Tjalve (2008) and Rohde (2004) make references to German and English 
works of Morgenthau, and Neacsu (2010) even only refers to English archive material. 
Particularly, the latter reveals that a cursory reading of Morgenthau may produce sig-
nificant shortcomings if a contextualisation of Morgenthau is desired. 
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Working in an archive is like being confronted with a ‘black box’ (Hill, 1993, p. 44) 
since there is no knowledge about the content. Therefore, in order to make this content 
tangible for scholarly purposes, a systematic procedure is required. This might be sim-
pler in purely academic or chronologically ordered archives, but the Morgenthau-
Archive is alphabetically ordered. This often made it impossible to infer the content 
from, for example, the letters he exchanged with another person. Although the register 
of Morgenthau’s archive was examined, each person he had exchanged letters with was 
identified, and a set of research questions were developed as a guideline before the ar-
chive research began, it still required consultation of all 200 containers in the search for 
relevant material (Romein, 1948, p. 154-66). This comprehensiveness means that more 
than 30,000 letters and a total of 80,800 items were scrutinised. This enabled to make 
discoveries one could not have thought of before, as it proved that a deep personal 
and/or academic relation with Morgenthau was not often reflected in the content of the 
letters.  
Finally, a word of caution is appropriate. Archives are ‘repositories of memory’ 
(Jimerson, 2003, p. 89) and as such allow reconstructing and reinterpreting political 
thought. However, archives are the result of a threefold process of ‘sedimentation’ (Hill, 
1993, p. 8-19). This means that an archive is a collection of material of a person or insti-
tution put together by personally involved people. First, the creator of the archive con-
tent, in this case Morgenthau, might have removed material for various reasons  
(Harrison and Martin, 2001, p. 124). Second, also the persons putting together the mate-
rial for archiving might have intentionally not included material, and finally archivists 
might have removed some material due to financial and/or spatial restrictions (Van 
Wingen and Bass, 2008, p. 578). Judging from previous archive research and consider-
ing the Eric-Voegelin-Library at the Friedrich-Alexander-University in Erlangen-
Nuremberg, Germany, which solely contains academically relevant material, it seems 
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possible that little sedimentation happened in the case of Morgenthau. This assumption 
can be made since otherwise presumably private, even intimate letters and postcards 
would have not made their way into the archive. It even contains his birth certificate and 
dismissal papers from the German civil service due to the Law for the Restoration of the 
Professional Civil Service from 1933 (HJM-Archive 65). It is, therefore, a fortunate co-
incidence that Morgenthau was a ‘paper saver’ (Frei, 2001, p. 4), and that a shell that 
had hit Morgenthau’s apartment in Madrid in 1936 did not destroy his papers, which he 
only got back after years to his great relief as he confessed to Rafael Altamira on 5th 
March 1945 (HJM-Archive 3). If he had not succeeded in retrieving them, a contextu-
alisation of Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung would have been certainly more strenuous 
as presumably many of his manuscripts would have been lost. An archive can, further-
more, only record written and at best audio-visual material. Private oral conversations 
are, however, excluded from any collection. Although, as it will be later remarked in the 
elaboration of the creation of the six principles of realism, access to such material would 
have been most valuable. 
 
2.6 Analytical reflections and structure 
From the conceptual framework outlined above, the composition of this thesis be-
comes almost self-explanatory. First, the field in which Morgenthau’s intellectual so-
cialisation took place will have to be elaborated, before in the next step the three com-
ponents of his Weltanschauung – ontology, epistemology, and political agency – will be 
assessed, each in one chapter. 
Chapter three will discuss the fundamentals of Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung. 
Morgenthau was the child of a Jewish physician who grew up in the small Ernestine 
town of Coburg which later, at the time of his graduation from the local Gymnasium 
(grammar school), became Bavarian (Fromm, 1990). As he was part of the Jewish 
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Bildungsbürgertum, the first part of this chapter will outline this specific German con-
cept of a middle-class that stressed the importance of self-education since the Bildungs-
bürgertum provided the intellectual cosmos that informed Morgenthau’s Weltan-
schauung. The second part of this chapter will analyse the concepts that were widely 
discussed at that time among academics, the part of the Bildungsbürgertum Morgenthau 
was most influenced by as a student and young scholar, and became the foundations of 
his own Weltanschauung. These concepts would have been the disenchantment of the 
world, understood as Morgenthau’s critique on ideologies, the pariah, representing 
alienation as an epistemological source, and the power of dissent, understood as 
Morgenthau’s epistemological tool in his quest to safe democratic and humanist ideals. 
The disenchantment of the world largely shaped his ontological beliefs, while alienation 
mainly influenced his epistemology. Finally, the power of dissent informed his political 
agency.  
Chapter four will discuss the fundamental aspect of Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung; 
his ontology. This will, first, stress Morgenthau’s thought about human nature. This is 
required since, as will be mentioned, his Weltanschauung evolved around the individual 
human being, rather than any structural aspect. From this it will be possible to distin-
guish Morgenthau’s concept of power, as the major concept that, on the one hand, dis-
tinguishes politics from other social realms and, on the other hand, establishes politics 
as the realm that interlocks each of the other social realms with each other. It will be 
stressed that Morgenthau differentiated two varieties of politics, as mentioned before. 
One notion acknowledged the dominating possibility of power, hence a largely negative 
term, while the other notion stressed its positive engaging and enacting possibilities. 
The latter was the concept Morgenthau normatively propagated, while the former repre-
sents the empirical concept he understood as being prevalent during the 19th and 20th 
centuries; the time of nation-states. Hence, Morgenthau distinguished between an em-
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pirical and normative concept of power. Finally, this chapter will analyse Morgenthau’s 
understanding of politics, how he perceived it by building upon his ideas about human 
nature and power, and what kind of values and society he aimed to establish through 
politics.  
Chapter five will deal with Morgenthau’s epistemology. As outlined before, this is 
mainly interested in the practical aspects of his knowledge-construction. Therefore, first, 
Morgenthau’s stand towards positivism will be analysed, not only because this was the 
kind of knowledge-construction towards which Morgenthau largely directed his critique, 
but also because it gradually became the dominant form of knowledge-construction in 
the social sciences and particularly in political science. Second, we will turn towards the 
elaboration of Morgenthau’s major concepts that informed his epistemology: the tempo-
rality and spatiality of human knowledge and political order. With them in mind, 
Morgenthau argued it would be impossible to establish objective forms of knowledge, 
hence truth, since no knowledge could claim temporal or spatial universality. Hence, 
there would be truths, but no truth. Finally, this chapter will turn to Morgenthau’s own 
construction of knowledge. It will look, on the one hand, into the development of his 
methodology stressing that Morgenthau owed much credit here to Mannheim and Swiss 
art historians and their evaluation of Zeitgeist. On the other hand, it will be emphasised 
that Morgenthau anticipated with his hermeneutical approach what would nowadays be 
referred to as conceptual history.  
Chapter six, finally, discusses Morgenthau’s political agency. This chapter will stress 
the importance Morgenthau gave to scholarship whose task he argued was to act as a 
socio-political corrective. Based upon this understanding, it will be, first, asked, what 
were for Morgenthau the major societal problems and what potential consequences 
would democracies have to face. It will be pointed out that Morgenthau primarily criti-
cised modern democracies for their idealism and subsequent lack of acknowledging ir-
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rationalism. Furthermore, he argued against the commodification and acceleration of 
life, due to an ever increasing technologisation. In a second step, it will be examined 
what solutions Morgenthau had in mind to solve these potentially dangerous shortcom-
ings of democracies. For this Morgenthau propagated, on the one hand, the national in-
terest as a rational and balanced tool to bring the various domestic interests to a com-
promise and, on the other hand, the world community to eventually overcome the sys-
tem of nation-states. 
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Chapter 3.  Fin de siècle and Kulturkrise: Hans Morgenthau,  
the German Empire, and the Weimar Republic 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Following the logic of a Weltanschauungsanalyse the analytical intention of this 
chapter is to investigate the field in which Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung evolved. The 
necessity to contextualise was pointed out by Morgenthau himself, since in Scientific 
Man vs. Power Politics he acknowledged that the individual ‘concerns itself not with ... 
survival but with his position among his fellows once his survival has been secured’ 
(1947a, p. 165). The field that had lasting influence on Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung, 
however, was not located in the United States, but was distinctively German.17 Indeed, 
Morgenthau was condemned by ‘American political theorists ... [for his] “Germanic 
way of looking at things”’ (Thompson, 1978, p. 7). In a letter from 18th April 1961 to 
his former student and later professor in Munich, Gottfried-Karl Kindermann,  
Morgenthau disclosed which field was decisive for the formation of his Weltan-
schauung: 
‘As concerns your question about the ultimate source of my values, we are here, 
of course, in the realm of philosophy and religion. Men assure certain values as 
self-evident and justify theory in terms either of these religions or philosophic 
conditions. I would assume that mine stem from the Judeo-Christian tradition, 
fortified by Greek and German philosophy’ (HJM-Archive 33).18 
Despite the caesura of the First World War, this investigation of Morgenthau‘s intel-
lectual field will consider the German Empire and the Weimar Republic lasting from 
1871 until 1933 because Morgenthau was not only a citizen of both states, but the po-
litical, social, and cultural conditions that shaped the Weimar Republic were already 
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laid out during the time of the Empire (Wehler, 2003; Büttner, 2008, p. 21-32). Peter 
Gay remarks especially in view of culture that:  
‘the Weimar spirit ... was born before the Weimar Republic; so was its nemesis. 
As in the Empire, so now, too, there were exceptions [progressive intellectuals] 
and thanks to Weimar, there were more exceptions than before, but the bulk of 
the historical profession trafficked in nostalgia, hero worship, and the uncritical 
acceptance – indeed, open advocacy – of apologetic distortions and sheer lies ...’ 
(2001, p. 91-2).19 
It will be argued that five concepts shaped Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung, which are 
reflected in the outline of this chapter. The first two concepts, Bildungsbürgertum 
(Chapter 3.2.1), the educated middle-class, and Kulturkrise (cultural crisis) (Chapter 
3.2.2), are fundamental in locating the field Morgenthau was socialised in as well as to 
position him within it. Like his friends, acquaintances, and colleagues, Morgenthau was 
part of the Bildungsbürgertum. This distinctively German elite (Kocka, 2008, p. 7-8) 
with their emphasis on Bildung (education) perceived itself to be in a cultural crisis. 
Whether this crisis was merely in the minds of the people or not, it is crucial to under-
stand that it influenced the thoughts, discussions, and actions of the German Bildungs-
bürgertum and reference to this crisis has to be made in order to understand the remain-
ing three concepts. 
These concepts were major issues for the Bildungsbürgertum at that time and last-
ingly contributed to the formation of Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung by maturing his 
perception, thought, and action. The disenchantment of the world as a counter-ideology 
(Chapter 3.3), alienation as an epistemological source (Chapter 3.4), and the power of 
dissent (Chapter 3.5) are those concepts. The German Empire and Weimar Republic 
were the heyday of ideologies. People were yearning for an explanation of life and ide-
ologies offered them a meaning to their existence. Morgenthau recognised the distortion 
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ideologies provided to life and hence argued for a realistic approach. Like ideologies, 
also the feeling of alienation grew out of this crisis. Since society in its pluralism of-
fered no epistemological reference point anymore, many intellectuals focused on the 
human being. This individualism gave way to make epistemological use of alienation. 
The final concept implies that the Weimar Republic provided opportunities for a small 
group of intellectuals, previously segregated from the majority of society. Only a few of 
them, however, were engaged in politics and, therefore, the Weimar Republic lacked 
support not only from the masses, but also from the people who profited most from its 
existence. Morgenthau had recognised this circumstance and subsequently shifted his 
interest towards the political from his early academic stages onwards. 
Before going into medias res, it has to be remarked that the following chapter can 
neither depict the entire development of Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung, nor is this its 
intention. Rather, these concepts signify the foundations, the pillars so to speak, upon 
which his Weltanschauung rested. Therefore, his Jewish identity is not discussed at 
length: although this identity fed into the development of the following concepts, it was 
not fundamental to the development of Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung per se. 
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3.2 The Bildungsbürgertum during the German Empire and  
Weimar Republic 
3.2.1 The significance of Bildung 
The German Bürgertum was a small group at that time, made up of civil servants 
with an academic education, judges, physicians, lawyers, priests, and faculty members 
of universities. It represented merely, according to Hans-Ulrich Wehler (2003, p. 294), 
0,8 % of the German population, or approximately 540,000 to 680,000 persons at the 
beginning of the Weimar Republic.20 Agreeing with Wehler regarding the composition 
of the Bürgertum, Ringer defined them ‘... simply as a social and cultural elite which 
owes its status primarily to educational qualifications, rather than hereditary rights or 
wealth’ (1969, p. 5-6) and referred to them as “mandarins”. Morgenthau, the only child 
of a physician from the then Ernestine Coburg21, who was married to the daughter of a 
wealthy merchant from nearby Bamberg, was throughout his life in Europe, from his 
birth in 1904 until his forced emigration in 1937, part of the mandarins (Fromm, 1990,  
p. 285; Frei, 2001, p. 12-3). In 1926 or 1927 his father could even afford a used car, 
which is, due to its exceptionality in the 1920s, a clear indicator that the Morgenthaus 
were well-established in the Bürgertum of Coburg (Postscript, 1984, p. 342). Further-
more, Morgenthau’s choice to major in law, after briefly studying philosophy, reflects 
his mandarin upbringing and the importance that was shed on the instance of having ar-
rived in the middle of society by one’s own capacities. Originally planning to study lit-
erature, Morgenthau’s father dismissed the thought since it would have been no profit-
able occupation (Morgenthau, 1984, p. 4; Postscript, 1984, p. 344).  
Ringer’s definition emphasises that the defining factor of the German Bürgertum was 
Bildung which is why it is commonly called Bildungsbürgertum.22 Its importance is tied 
to its particular historical development. Unlike in England and France with its noblesse 
de robe, wealth and birth mattered less in Germany. Until the foundation of the German 
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Empire in 1871, Germany was a loose federation of states and this ‘system of mini-
states’ (Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 31) led to a considerably larger demand for higher gov-
ernment officials than anywhere else in Europe because the Deutscher Bund (German 
Confederation) consisted of 39 states, all with their own administration.23 In the Stein-
Hardenberg-Reforms after Prussia’s defeat to France in 1806 the administration became 
modernised and professionalised, but already in the 18th century with the absolutist state 
and mercantilism as its economic policy, a larger administrative organisation became 
necessary to coordinate its various tasks. The development of, for instance, standing 
armies and a bacchanal lifestyle of its rulers required a basic form of economic coordi-
nation in order to create a positive balance of trade so that a constant source of revenue 
was ensured. The bureaucratisation became even more rapid in the 19th century since 
the “Great Transformation” (Polanyi, 2001) with the development of market economies, 
accompanied by industrialisation, required more synchronised action of various policy 
fields and, indeed, created new ones, such as social policy (Giesen, 1993, p. 105-14; 
Wehler, 1996, p. 712-72).  
At that time government officials were often assigned to positions far away from 
their hometown which caused an inability to communicate with the local population on 
common grounds due to different educational and linguistic backgrounds. That different 
life-worlds exist within societies was demonstrated to Morgenthau during his legal 
clerkship in Wolfratshausen, a village at the foothills of the Alps, in 1927. Even decades 
after it, he was taken aback by the primitiveness and brutality of its inhabitants (Post-
script, 1984, p. 345-7). What this manifests is that the Bürgertum was an exclusive class 
at that time. Not only was the number of members limited, but even more so Bildung 
was its entrance requirement and served as a status symbol for its members (Daum, 
2002, p. 111-6). Therefore, the Bildungsbürgertum – the mandarins – was to a certain 
extent uprooted from the rest of the population. They had their own manners, values, 
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and knowledge which prohibited them – consciously and unconsciously – to intermingle 
with other society members.  
Bildung was also a central aspect in Morgenthau’s life. As a ten year old child, for 
example, Morgenthau, the grandson of the local rabbi, became so terrified by his Latin 
teacher who told him that he only got an A minus in the latest exam that he claimed to 
be able to find the exact place in Coburg where the teacher had informed him about his 
grade, more than half a century after the incident (Postscript, 1984, p. 339). Also later in 
his life Morgenthau set high intellectual standards on himself, but also on friendship 
(Eckstein, 1981, p. 680). The institutions, where the centrality of Bildung was observed, 
were primarily the universities. Already in 1770 Germany had 40 universities, whereas 
in France there were 23 and in England only two (Giesen, 1993, p. 113). Since then 
Prussia, as the biggest German state, centralised higher education and controlled its en-
trance requirements. In 1791, for example, Prussia standardised entry examinations for 
the regular civil service and introduced the Abitur (A-level) as the general requirement 
to enter universities in 1812 (Ringer, 1969, p. 16-32).24 With such actions, the state was 
able to control the abilities of future government officials, ensured that its subjects be-
came obedient patriots, and created social barriers that separated its new elite from the 
rest of the population (Vierhaus, 1972, p. 523-5). Hence, universities provided the de-
grees which were not only then necessary requirement to lead a bourgeois life, but they 
also served as the symbol to be recognised as members of the Bildungsbürgertum.25 
Furthermore, in the course of the Prussian Reforms after the defeat to France, 
Wilhelm von Humboldt became head of the Department of Religion, Public Institution, 
and Health of the Ministry of the Interior in 1809 and developed a modern kind of uni-
versity, exemplified in the foundation of the Friedrich-Wilhelm-Universität (today the 
Humboldt-University) in Berlin one year later. Its fundamental principles were aca-
demic freedom and the unity of research and teaching, aspects soon to be found at all 
59 
 
German universities (Reill, 1994, p. 345-66; Kehm, 2004, p. 6-7).26 This freedom not 
only provided universities with the right of self-government (though under the legal 
auspices of the state), the right to train their own academic successors with the venia 
legendi (permission to lecture) through a Habilitation, and the right to do research for 
its own sake. By contrast with universities under absolutist rule, knowledge was to be 
increased through critical scholarship. Yet, Wissenschaft (scholarship) was less con-
cerned with the immediate applicability of the research results, but committed to the 
ideal of pure scholarly work, whose task it was to increase knowledge (Sheehan 1968,  
p. 366-7; Schnädelbach, 1984, p. 20-30; Szöllösi-Janze, 2005, p. 343-6). Hence, the 
condition and purpose of the university, as the place where Bildung could be pursued, 
provided the faculty members with such a high self-esteem that they were convinced to 
be moral and virtuous role-models for the entire population. This is the case, because 
Bildung was, following humanist ideals, committed to the general education of people. 
It happened as an individual act, liberally executed, segregated from the practical world, 
and committed to the freely chosen interests of its pursuers (Vierhaus, 1972, p. 529).  
The special status professors and Privatdozenten (associate professors) had, allowing 
them to set the rules and standards for membership to the mandarins, is expressed in 
Ringer’s term ‘mandarin intellectuals’ (1969, p. 6). The mandarin intellectuals were the 
core of the Bildungsbürgertum and it was this field Morgenthau intended to become part 
of. Not that Morgenthau aspired to make science his vocation ever since his childhood 
since it was not until 1928, when he came to Frankfurt to finish his doctoral thesis, 
where he decided, impressed by the intellectual air, to follow an academic career. “Uhu” 
(eagle owl), as Morgenthau was called in Frankfurt (HJM-Archive 54), made not only 
friends with other clerks of Hugo Sinzheimer’s law office, like Ernst Fraenkel, Franz 
Neumann, and Otto-Karl Freund, but he also became acquainted with Martin Buber, 
Paul Tillich, Mannheim, Franz Oppenheimer, and members of the Institut für  
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Sozialforschung (Institute for Social Research), such as Theodor W. Adorno, Max 
Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse, and Erich Fromm (Postscript, 1984, p. 348-9; Frei, 2001, 
p. 37-40; Lebow, 2003, p. 253). Being at the periphery of this field and striving to be-
come a full member of the mandarin intellectuals is one reason why Morgenthau de-
cided to critically engage with the most eminent German legal theorists of his time in 
his inaugural lecture in Geneva from 1932: Georg Jellinek, Kelsen, and Schmitt. 
 
3.2.2 Fin de siècle and the cultural crisis 
The concept of fin de siècle is employed here to depict the significant socio-
economic and cultural changes, such as urbanisation, political radicalisation, and an in-
creasing industrialisation (Hochindustrialisierung), at the turn of the 19th century caus-
ing people to mentally and physically deteriorate (Marchand and Lindenfeld, 2004, p. 1; 
Osterhammel, 2009, p. 102-3). As guardians of culture, the mandarin intellectuals per-
ceived these changes as threatening for three causes.  
The first cause concerns the structure of knowledge production. The unique position 
universities had since Humboldt’s educational reforms in 1809 were questioned on the 
one hand by the foundation of numerous research facilities outside traditional academia. 
There were government funded bodies, like the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft27, or tech-
nical universities, private research institutes, like the Institute for Social Research, and 
research departments in large companies which appeared as new actors of knowledge 
production (Markl, 2003, p. 49-55; Szöllösi-Janze, 2005, p. 339-60). On the other hand, 
the structure of the university itself was subject to change. As the classicist Werner  
Jaeger observed in 1924: ‘Higher education has become an article of mass consumption, 
cheap and bad ... The mass as such is uncritical and fanatic’ (quoted after: Ringer, 1969, 
p. 256). This structural change of higher education was an effect of the rapid industriali-
sation in Germany in the latter half of the 19th century. It required university education 
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to focus more on immediate applicability of the learning outcome. Natural and applied 
sciences became more important and received more funding as the economy needed 
well-trained engineers. Particularly after the accession of the throne of Wilhelm II in 
1888, this need became more and more pressing when the military entered a cataclysmic 
alliance with the economic and educational sector to achieve Germany’s imperialistic 
“place in the sun” (Bernhard von Bülow). Therefore, not more than three of the 29 insti-
tutes of the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft were attributable to the social sciences and 
humanities.  
The structural change, however, was only the apparent result of a deeper, second de-
velopment. Philosophy was losing the primacy it had upheld among the classic faculties 
(medicine, law, and theology) and Geisteswissenschaften (humanities) in general fell 
behind natural sciences regarding public awareness because of rapid technological de-
velopments. Knowledge production in the universities shifted from the ideal of pure 
scholarship trying to enhance knowledge for its own sake to a knowledge more engi-
neered for its applicability. Although rationalism and empiricism were identified as the 
primary means that will deprive humanities of their intellectual dominance, attempts 
were made to alter humanities into positivistic sciences by applying these means to epis-
temological and ontological questions in order to secure the place of humanities in the 
higher education curriculum (Lichtblau, 1996, p. 77-101). However, other scholars 
aimed to distinguish themselves from the exact sciences to which, as we will see, 
Morgenthau was particularly drawn to. Indeed, the very term Geisteswissenschaften re-
ceived its contour in the 1880s from Wilhelm Dilthey in order to distinguish them from 
natural sciences and was further refined in the Formation of the Historical World in the 
Human Sciences in 1910 (Thielen, 1999, p. 91-2). The fierceness with which the man-
darin intellectuals tried to uphold their position and set them apart is manifested in 
Nietzsche’s The Twilight of Idols, published around the same time in 1889.  
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‘All our political theories and state constitutions ... are derivatives, necessary 
consequences, of decline; the unconscious effect of décadence has mastered 
even the ideals of specific sciences. My objection to the whole of English and 
French sociology remains the fact that it knows by experience only the struc-
tures of decay in society and, in all innocence, takes its own instincts for decay 
as the norm for sociological value judgements. ... Our socialists are décadents, 
but Mr Herbert Spencer is also a décadent – he sees the triumph of altruism as 
desirable!’ (1998, p. 64; emphasis in the original).  
What this quote shows is that the mandarins were essentially in fear that this develop-
ment would make Wissenschaft seem banal; a fear that was shared by many of 
Nietzsche’s contemporaries, such as Simmel (2008, p. 169).28 Again Jaeger stressed this 
by remarking that ‘... since both are two fundamentally different things, and wissen-
schaft [sic] has no place where Empirie is required, for theory kills the instinct’ (quoted 
after: Ringer, 1969, p. 110).   
Finally, it was believed that this striving for applicability would underestimate dif-
ferent forms of life, deny the importance of space and time, and eventually lead to a 
mediocrity that still had the power to shape German culture. What Hartmut Rosa (2005,  
p. 161-240) described for the age of “globalisation” was also the case at the fin de siècle. 
The original liberating and empowering impact of the Enlightenment’s legacy which 
was further increased through economic, technical, and social acceleration changed into 
its converse around the turn of the 20th century. The perception of time and the meaning 
of history were altered from a perspective of teleological, ever-increasing optimism to-
wards the perception of an incoherent, self-preserving, meaningless, and vertiginous 
accelerating cycle (Ringer, 1969, p. 253-304). This ‘directionless, frantic change’ (Rosa, 
2009, p. 102) shattered the identities and sense of belonging of many Germans by deriv-
ing them from the meaning their life was supposed to have.29 The mandarin intellectuals 
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feared that this meaninglessness would lead to a profanity and vulgarity of life, as they 
saw it exemplified in a fetishisation of mass-produced objects. What counted was no 
longer the materiality, but the ‘shop-window quality of things’ (Simmel, 1997a, p. 257). 
Meaning was sought in the very objects that were the products of a process which de-
prived people of their identity in their first place. Yet, it would be misleading to speak 
of a Kulturpessimismus (Gismondi, 2004)30, but Germany experienced this during the 
Kulturkrise (Mannheim, 1953, p. 218): the mandarins were not pessimistic about culture 
per se, but believed that “pure culture” was threatened to be overwhelmed by all these 
developments evoked by the legacy of the Enlightenment and industrialisation.  
Throughout the different intellectual professions – art, literature, theatre, academics, 
and even politics – there were two distinct ways to cope with these aspects of the cul-
tural crisis. Ringer chose the terms orthodoxy and modernists to emphasise this dichot-
omy, but due to numerous meanings the term modernity has, creating a definitional pre-
occupation (Gumbrecht, 1978, p. 93-131), Bourdieu’s term heterodoxy will be consid-
ered here.31 
Representatives of the orthodox position were generally critical towards the social 
developments at the fin de siècle. This does not come as a surprise, since they were 
threatened with losing their significant position which they had upheld since the estab-
lishment of Humboldt’s educational reforms, and the apparent materialism just rein-
forced their fear that culture would slip into banality. Unwilling to cope with the 
changed circumstances, they reacted by protecting their vested interests. As Bourdieu 
outlined in his concepts of field and habitus, the orthodoxy’s sense of protection ex-
tended also to their profession. In most cases their work reproduced the common schol-
arly grounds and little was produced that furthered knowledge significantly. New ten-
dencies in the social sciences and humanities, such as sociology, were eyed. To a large 
extent, German intellectuals thought of sociology as a scholarly field solely concerned 
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with the promotion of positivism (Ringer, 1969, p. 233). The above cited passage of 
Nietzsche in which he uttered legitimate concerns exemplifies this since Nietzsche 
failed to see the potential that sociological research could have for the analysis of mod-
ern life. This protection of their vested interests also determined their position towards 
politics. During the German Empire a large part of the Ordinarien (full professors) sup-
ported reactionary thoughts and were fierce followers of imperialistic claims. After the 
downfall of the monarchy, they were still arguing for a conservative revolution, essen-
tially an undemocratic and nationalistic movement in order to perpetuate the old ideals. 
Therefore, most rejected the Weimar Republic (Laqueur, 1972, p. 226; Hardtwig, 2004, 
p. 337). Ludwig Fulda, the first German PEN-president and Thomas Mann, who pub-
lished his Reflections of an Unpolitical Man in 1918, are two of the few examples who 
made the transformation from an ardent supporter of the Empire in terms of culture to a 
Vernunftrepublikaner (republican by reason) and, finally, to an equally ardent democrat. 
The anti-democratic nationalism of the orthodox intellectuals was often accompanied by 
anti-socialism and anti-Semitism, the latter being made socially acceptable again not 
least because of the work of the historian Heinrich von Treitschke from the 1870s on-
wards.32 As Fritz Stern (1989) has shown in his study The Politics of Cultural Despair, 
it was this anti-Semitism, nationalism, and the fear of cultural decline of the intellectu-
als that not only led to a lack of support for the Republic, but eventually fostered the 
rise of national-socialism in Germany. 
However, there was also a second position towards the cultural crisis among German 
intellectuals, but it received significantly less support than the orthodox. They were 
equally critical of changes caused in an industrialised society, but other than the ortho-
doxy, the heterodoxy tried to engage with the given circumstances. It was particularly 
this group of scholars that affected Morgenthau’s intellectual socialisation. Simmel, for 
example, not only extensively worked on the impact modern cities had on social rela-
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tions and produced a treatise on fashion, but was also concerned about fetishised mate-
rialism, as cited above, and argued for women’s liberation (Gassen and Landmann, 
1958; Coser, 1965b; Simmel, 1964b, p. 409-24; 1995, p. 7-37; 2005, p. 33-8). Besides, 
as the next paragraphs will show, this group of scholars was also engaged to enhance 
the methods applied in humanities and social sciences to ensure a more rigid, but yet 
more creative contribution to knowledge production (Dahme and Rammstedt, 1984,  
p. 463-75). During the time of his doctoral thesis, Morgenthau shifted his interest from 
pure jurisprudence towards sociology of law, which he considered better suited to pro-
vide an effective tool to study international law (Scheuerman, 2009a, p. 12-8). To fur-
ther this research interest, Morgenthau edited an issue on sociology of law for the  
University of Kansas City Law Review in 1940 for which he also contacted his former 
colleague from Madrid, Altamira, where Morgenthau was briefly working from 1935-
1936 (HJM-Archive 3).  
Heterodox intellectuals, like members of the orthodoxy, were to be found in all pro-
fessions of the liberal arts, but especially the new discipline of sociology was their field 
of activity, since ‘German sociology is the product of one of the greatest dissolutions 
and reorganizations, accompanied by the highest form of self-consciousness and self-
criticism.’ Mannheim added that ‘... sociology is seen to be not only the product of this 
process of dissolution but also a rational attempt to assist in the reorganization of human 
society ...’ (1953, p. 210). Certainly, this is what scholars like Simmel, Weber, Norbert 
Elias, or Walter Benjamin wanted to achieve. Since a lot of these scholars tended politi-
cally towards socialism and/or were Jewish, it was not only their progressive ideas that 
hindered their career progress in the German Empire. Simmel, to mention just one ex-
ample, was not awarded with a full professorship until 1914 in provincial Strasbourg; 
four years before his death (Jung, 1990, p. 14-8). Morgenthau himself once remarked 
that ‘[i]f Simmel or Freud had been baptized, they would have become full professors in 
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no time’ (2004, p. 43). This, however, gradually changed during the Weimar Republic. 
They could now achieve senior positions in university, but also in other fields of intel-
lectual life that were until then blocked by orthodox concerns. Indeed, Gay (2001, p. 9-
10) is convinced that it was this minority of thinkers (Kulturschaffende) that contributed 
most to the success of the Weimar Spirit with its support for democracy in general and 
intellectual creativity in particular, but were also symptomatic for Weimar’s subsequent 
downfall. Already in 1907, for instance, 12% (19% including the converts) of the Pri-
vatdozenten and 3% (7% including the converts) of the professors were Jewish (Gay, 
1978, p. 96, 118). Given the Jewish share of approximately 1% of the population and 
the confessional reservations, these figures were high and rose during the Weimar Re-
public. Indeed, by April 1936 1,145 Jewish (full) professors were forced to retire  
(Lamberti, 2006, p. 159) and Claus-Dieter Krohn (1997, p. 222) reports that more than 
2,000 scholars emigrated alone to the United States. Morgenthau’s faith might have 
played a role that he felt more inclined to these scholars, but, as the rest of the chapter 
will show, it was their understanding of the social world, commitment to democracy, 
and their scholarly pursuit of humanism that convinced Morgenthau of their agenda. 
Morgenthau retained this tendency to opt for heterodox scholars in the USA demon-
strating that subsequent concepts became fundamental to his Weltanschauung. In a let-
ter to the Committee for Selected Social Study from 17th June 1941 he remarked that he 
had little contact with the faculty members in Kansas City, other than ‘... politically 
progressive members ...’ (HJM-Archive 10).  
 
3.3 Time of ideologies and Morgenthau’s quest to disenchant the world 
3.3.1 The loss of simplicity 
The Kulturkrise fostered the development of ideologies. Life in its totality went out 
of joint due to the above mentioned dramatic changes and consequently seemed incom-
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prehensible. Ideologies had filled the metaphysical void and subsequently formed “po-
litical religions” (Voegelin) since they were able to serve the need of the masses by pro-
viding shelter from the yearning for a meaning in life and guidance to make sense of the 
social world. Following Morgenthau’s assessment, Germans were particularly suscepti-
ble to the promises of ideologies (1930a, p. 171-2), as he agreed with his mentor 
Sinzheimer, who had remarked in a letter to Morgenthau from 11th March 1932 that 
there would exist ‘eine absolute Furcht des Deutschen vor der Realität’ (an absolute fear 
of the Germans of reality) (HJM-Archive 197). It, furthermore, explains Morgenthau’s 
anti-ideological stance as he aspired to disenchant the world, to employ a Weberian 
phrase (Weber, 2004, p. 30). Even though Morgenthau (1930a; p. 42; 1937, p. 8-11) at 
times acknowledged the urgency to re-establish a metaphysical system precisely be-
cause it would enable humans to find a sense in life again, he still remained critical to-
wards the promises of ideologies. A metaphysical system would have to guarantee em-
pirical and normative objectivity (Morgenthau, 1937, p. 97-100) and, at least the latter, 
ideologies would not be able to provide because they would remain the subject of their 
particular time and culture, despite their intentional obscuring of their own perspectivist 
outlook on the world. Mannheim, whom Morgenthau got to know in Frankfurt during 
the late 1920s, had identified hereunto mainly four types of ideologies in his study on 
Ideology and Utopia, originally published in 1929, which dominated the political dis-
course at that time: socialism, conservatism, liberalism, and fascism (Mannheim, 1985, 
p. 117-46), but particularly the first two were important for his intellectual development. 
The socialist ideology particularly found adherents within the heterodoxy.  
Morgenthau got into closer contact with its representatives when he started to work for 
Sinzheimer in Frankfurt in 1928. Sinzheimer was one of the most prominent lawyers in 
the Weimar Republic, specialised in labour law, and a social-democratic member of the 
National Assembly in 1919-20 (Livneh, 1975, p. 272-5; Frei, 2001, p. 35-6). Over the 
68 
 
years, Morgenthau and Sinzheimer became not only friends, but Sinzheimer also af-
fected Morgenthau’s quest for a sociology of law which ‘... called for an analysis of the 
fundamentally dynamic or historical character of the nexus between legal norms and 
reality’ (Scheuerman, 2009a, p. 17).33 This quest that was fostered through the study of 
the works of Mannheim and Simmel led Morgenthau to support Sinzheimer’s view that 
laws can only be understood if they are put into the social context in which they exist. 
Morgenthau became convinced that it was not legal norms that shaped social reality, but 
it was social reality that in the first place influenced the creation of norms. This implied 
that even equal laws could be applied differently under diverse social contexts 
(Scheuerman, 2008, p. 31-8; 2009a, p. 12-8). As it will be pointed out later, it can be 
clearly seen that Morgenthau took the importance of contextualisation to heart from his 
doctoral thesis Die internationale Rechtspflege, ihr Wesen und ihre Grenzen (interna-
tional judicature, its nature, and its limitations) onwards in which he was dealing with 
international law. 
However, this does not mean that Morgenthau was embracing socialism per se. On 
the contrary, he remained critical towards socialism due to its estrangement from reality. 
Later in his life, he recalled the night before he left Germany for Switzerland. That night 
he attended a lecture given by Mannheim at the Institute for Social Research in which 
he proposed the “free-floating intelligentsia” as a key factor in the fight against Nazism. 
This instance convinced Morgenthau that ‘[m]oi, je ne suis pas Marxiste’ (I am not a 
Marxist) (1984, p. 14; emphasis in the original). What Morgenthau criticised socialists 
for, was not necessarily the content of their concepts and thoughts, but their conviction 
in their reality changing capacity, as the reference to Mannheim suggests, and their in-
capability to see that it was rather the particular context that shaped their concepts and 
thoughts. On an undated slip he accentuated that ‘[t]he idea of scientism is clearly rec-
ognizable here [Marxism], the idea that you only need to use the correct formula to ap-
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ply to the right mechanical device, and the political subjugation of man will disappear ...’ 
(HJM-Archive 30). This estrangement is what Morgenthau criticised Kelsen for. Kelsen, 
founder of the Vienna School of legal positivism, came to Geneva when Morgenthau 
was submitting his Habilitation (Métall, 1969, p. 63-77).34 After inner-departmental 
disputes, Morgenthau only passed it because Kelsen provided a comment in favour of 
Morgenthau’s work. Kelsen was chosen because Morgenthau’s work was primarily a 
critique of his “pure theory of law”. Morgenthau remained thankful for this intervention 
for the rest of his life, but this did not change his criticism of Kelsen.35  
Kelsen argued for a strict separation of the different norm systems, such as mores 
and laws. The reason for this was that, according to Kelsen, law had often been misused 
by politics in the name of justice. Hence, law and the analysis of law needed to be 
strictly separated from distorting effects to ensure its purity (Raz, 1986, p. 79-97; 
Dyzenhaus, 1997, p. 102-60). Morgenthau dismissed legal positivism not only in his 
Habilitation, but already in his inaugural lecture in Geneva. There he argued against the 
proposition to separate the realm of be, the actual reality, from the normative ought be-
cause, following the sociology of law, the normative would not exist without reference 
to the realm of actuality. Indeed, this metaphysical nihilism fostered for Morgenthau an 
ideology that in its framework of thought created a pure, hence rationalistic system of 
norms that Morgenthau considered as a worthwhile and to a certain extent necessary 
theoretical exercise. However, due the denial of its social context, Kelsen’s legal posi-
tivism was facing the threat of either being misused or being unaware of contemporary 
problems.36 This is what he not only criticised socialism for, but also later, after his 
emigration to the United States, liberalism. In a letter to Sister Dorothy Jane Van  
Hoogstrade from 6th December 1951 he remarked that  
‘both liberalism and Marxism believe that the evils to which the flesh is heir can 
be remedied here and now by man’s unaided efforts. In other words, liberalism 
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and Marxism are really secular religions which believe that salvation attained 
[sic] in this world through ... social reform, economic and technological devel-
opment, or political revolution’ (HJM-Archive 26). 
Having experienced the ultimate effect ideologies can have, it becomes comprehensible 
why Morgenthau laid his academic focus in uncovering the failures of liberalism, cul-
minating in his book Scientific Man vs. Power Politics from 1946. 
The other ideology that affected Morgenthau was conservatism, whose representa-
tives were compiled primarily out of the orthodox part of the mandarin intellectuals. 
They promoted a conservative revolution by arguing to recreate a worthwhile cultural 
and political system which had evaporated with the collapse of the German Empire after 
the First World War. They agreed in their denial of the Weimar Republic as a weak 
state without real sovereignty. Morgenthau came into contact with this kind of thought 
in the work of Schmitt whom he had studied, like his colleagues from Sinzheimer’s law 
office, in his quest to develop an approach capable of properly reflecting the reality 
within the field of Staatslehre (Morgenthau, 1932; Wolin, 1992; Scheuerman, 2009a,  
p. 32). Presumably this intellectual engagement with Schmitt began while Morgenthau 
studied in Munich as it is suggested by library tickets which are conserved in the  
Library of Congress (HJM-Archive 151). This might seem astonishing, bearing in mind 
Schmitt’s later development to the “Kronjurist of the Third Reich” (Waldemar Gurian), 
but as Morgenthau (1932) himself remarked, Schmitt was alongside Kelsen and Jellinek 
the doyen of German Staatslehre.37 One should, therefore, not overestimate the relation 
to Schmitt, as it is the state of current academic debates (e.g. Pichler, 1998; Scheuerman, 
1999; 2007b; Koskenniemi, 2000) since he left no doubt about his contempt for Schmitt. 
After a personal meeting with Schmitt, he later recalled that he had met ‘… the most 
evil man alive’ (Morgenthau, 1984, p. 16).38 At that time the controversies between the 
leading ideologies were still only academic disputes and not yet a question of life and 
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death. Schmitt (2002, p. 23), for example, later remembered of having had a few inter-
esting discussions with Mannheim, who in his youth had close relations to socialism.39  
Morgenthau’s position becomes apparent in his lecture Der Kampf der deutschen 
Staatslehre um die Wirklichkeit des Staates (The fight of German Staatslehre about the 
reality of the state), but was briefly outlined in his piece on Gustav Stresemann (1930a, 
p. 176) and in the unpublished manuscript Einige logische Bemerkungen zu Carl 
Schmitt’s Begriff des Politischen (Some logical remarks about Carl Schmitt’s notion of 
the political), written in Geneva (HJM-Archive 110). Schmitt steps in where scholars 
like Kelsen have failed in the course of the cultural crisis. According to Morgenthau, 
they not only have denied their own particularity while claiming to have produced a 
pure theory of law, but they have also neglected the ideological standpoints of their fel-
low citizens. This means that Staatslehre would have to acknowledge, in Morgenthau’s 
words, an ‘irrational element’ caused by the fact that it is impossible to think about the 
structure of the state completely rationally since this question would affect one’s own 
environment. Hence, there would always be emotions, fears, and nescience involved. 
Morgenthau was convinced that especially within a society like the Weimar Republic, 
characterised by its pluralism, Kelsen could not succeed. Morgenthau argued, however, 
that Schmitt would have been aware of the importance of the political for a Staatslehre 
committed to accurately depict reality. In agreement with Schmitt, the political would 
have to be understood as the ‘entity of public reality’ that would be created by the inte-
raction between its people and the political as an ‘objectification of thought and action’ 
(Morgenthau, 1932) would lie within the soul of the human beings. Hence, not laws 
would create the state, but the political would create and give meaning to laws. Here, it 
is important to note that Morgenthau agreed with Schmitt on the importance of the po-
litical, also supported by his interest in sociology of law, but disagreed with Schmitt’s 
embodiment of the political. Schmitt argued in his “friend-foe-scheme” that the political 
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would be violent, but Morgenthau believed that this opinion is underlined by the fact 
that Schmitt would lack the necessary ‘geistig-seelische Zentrum’ (spiritual-moral cen-
tre) (1932; 1933, p. 47). Schmitt’s quest for scholarly insight would not have been 
guided by an ethical relation towards an aspiration of truth, but would be biased and 
openly promoting a reactionary ideology. This was the trouble in Schmitt’s thought for 
Morgenthau since, like Kelsen, he would not have been able to reflect on his own spa-
tial and temporal conditionality. As it is reasoned by Morgenthau (1932), he would have 
been looking for the solution in the same ideology which would have created the prob-
lem in the field of Staatslehre. Schmitt’s ideological position concerning the political 
led him to the proposition of creating a strong state by arguing for homogeneity among 
its population regarding the fundamental social principles (Morgenthau, 1934b, p. 54-5). 
The existing pluralism of thoughts would, therefore, endanger the order of the state.  
 
3.3.2 The alternative route of life philosophy and German historicism  
Since ideologies conceal the pluralism of reality, Morgenthau turned to life philoso-
phy, whose representatives offered for Morgenthau the possibility to gain a deeper and 
critical understanding of it. A first access to life philosophy was provided for  
Morgenthau in the study of Nietzsche, ‘the God of my [Morgenthau] youth’ (quoted af-
ter: Frei, 1994, p. 101). Indeed, Nietzsche remained a constant intellectual companion 
throughout his life, as a request to the library in Chicago to acquire more copies of 
Nietzsche’s books exemplarily demonstrates (HJM-Archive 52).40 Nietzsche was influ-
ential for Morgenthau regarding his distrust in ideologies. As it is manifested in 
Nietzsche’s remark that ‘God is dead’ (2003, p. 120), for him there was no objective 
world order anymore and certainty could only be found in distorting concepts of order 
that simplify reality. Nietzsche argued to recognise what and how it exists is a much 
nobler scholarly task than claims to how it should be. Certainly, Morgenthau took this 
73 
 
to heart, as demonstrated in an article written in Madrid, where he exclaimed: ‘Je con-
state simplement ce que je vois’ (I only remark what I see) (1936, p. 5). This led to an-
other aspect Morgenthau found stimulating in Nietzsche. By demystifying eternal truth 
proclaimers, Nietzsche pointed out those forces that appeared to really shape the world: 
emotions, passions, hopes, and wishes. All of this is ‘human, all too human’ (Nietzsche, 
1996a) and eventually led Morgenthau to the conviction that human beings need to be at 
the focus of scholarly work. Late in his life Morgenthau was still convinced that this 
task was far from being achieved, since ‘[t]here is a fog of mystery in which human ex-
istence is embedded’ (1972, p. 63). 
This occupation with Nietzsche brought Morgenthau into further contact with repre-
sentatives of life philosophy and particularly German historism (Jung, 1990, p. 152; Frei, 
2001, p. 108-9). On the basis of his Nietzsche studies, Morgenthau found affirmation 
regarding the anthropological condition of political order and relativism of being, which 
were cornerstones of life philosophy and also became central to Morgenthau’s thought 
(Bochénski, 1951, p. 133). Simmel, whom Morgenthau frequently read with satisfaction 
during his formative years41 and whom he recommended to Alfred Hotz in a letter from 
11th October 1950 (HJM-Archive 28), considered irrationalism as a defining factor of 
modern societies. To make sense of this irrationalism one had to start from analysing 
the anthropological condition of political order. This is the case since for Simmel sci-
ence, technology, works of art, and even civil laws would only gain meaning through 
the reciprocal relation of the involved persons. Since the entity of life would be incorpo-
rated in them and life would be in constant flux, also the context of these relations 
would be dynamic and could take numerous forms. For Simmel, therefore, truth would 
have only existed within the realm of a specific context (Kaern, 1990, p. 78-83). 
Morgenthau became aware of this irrationalism while studying international law. This 
realm would have been, according to Morgenthau, marked by a tension of the statism of 
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international law and the constantly changing actualities. Therefore, international law 
would have been incapable of depicting reality appropriately (Morgenthau, 1929b,  
p. 623; 1930b, p. 18). But there would be a further conflict within life itself. Life would 
not only be expressed through a curtailed ego, but also manifested in an infinite continu-
ity. This would be the case since, on the one hand, there would be a ‘struggle [of life] 
against form itself, against the very principle of form ...’ (Simmel, 1997b, p. 77). Life 
would be dynamic and in constant flux, but would need to manifest itself in forms. Yet, 
they would be static expressions that from the moment of their creation would be inade-
quate images of life, manifested for Morgenthau in international law. ‘[F]rom the first 
moment of their existence, they have fixed forms of their own, set apart from the ... 
rhythm of life itself ...’ (Simmel, 1997b, p. 76). Hence, according to Simmel, life would 
have to recreate continuously new forms of manifestation since the old ones, due to 
their statism, would not be allowed to be filled with life. There would be irrationalism in 
life because the form in itself would not reflect the intentions of its creators anymore 
and would remain excluded from life, although having been created out of it. By argu-
ing to do so, Simmel anticipated Alfred Schütz’s idea of multiple realities (Šuber, 2002, 
p. 172). For Simmel, therefore, one could not speak of a society, but of sociation. It is 
not the forms, hence institutions, that would be of importance, but the interactions of 
people (Simmel, 1908, p. 4-10; Frisby, 1984, p. 120-3; Scaff, 1990, p. 288; Lichtblau, 
1997, p. 83-98).  
Morgenthau concluded from this that scholarship would need to consider a critical 
relativism and in doing so, he particularly referred to Mannheim, whom he later rec-
ommended to Charles A. McClelland on 16th March 1949: ‘I am glad to know that you 
got acquainted with Mannheim’s Ideology and Utopia. It will pay re-reading, and you 
will probably find, as I have, that the oftener you read it, the more it will help you in 
your thinking on political problems’ (HJM-Archive 53). Though Mannheim had a sim-
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ple understanding of relativism which was based on the argument that there would be 
no objective standards or laws, Mannheim is important to consider since Morgenthau 
initially started from a similar assumption. For Mannheim thought would be existen-
tially determined: 
‘The existential determination of knowledge may be regarded as a demonstrated 
fact in those realms of thought in which we can show (a) that the process of 
knowing does not actually develop historically in accordance with immanent 
laws ... On the contrary, the emergence and the crystallization of actual thought 
is influenced in many decisive points by extratheoretical factors ... existential 
factors. This existential determination of thought will also have to be regarded as 
a fact (b) if the influence of these existential factors on the concrete content of 
knowledge is more than mere peripheral importance ...’ (1985, p. 267).  
This means that thought and knowledge would be constructed in one particular social 
reality and that this constellation would be constitutive for the content and the way a 
person would think due to the specific semiotics (Scott, 1987, p. 41-54; Knoblauch, 
2005, p. 100-15; Jung, 2007, p. 120-41). This thought was explicitly supported by 
Morgenthau: ‘In other words, political thinking is ... “standortgebunden”, that is to say 
it is tied to a particular situation’ (1962a, p. 72-3; emphasis in the original). Morgenthau 
agreed, therefore, with Mannheim that any reflection would be tied to a particular per-
spective and only the totality of these perspectives would lead to an objective reflection. 
Being aware of one’s own perspective would enable to acknowledge other perspectives 
as well and this would lead to a more sound truth claim since the scholar would be able 
to incorporate other perspectives into his/her own (Mannheim, 1985, p. 75-83). The lack 
of being able to relate one’s position to another position is what Morgenthau criticised 
Schmitt for. Schmitt would have had only his point of view and interest in mind. There-
fore, Schmitt’s scholarship would, following Morgenthau, not contribute to truth, but to 
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a specific ideology. It will be pointed out later, that this, what Mannheim called rela-
tionism, was not only important for Morgenthau’s perception since dealing with repre-
sentatives of life philosophy and historicism showed him that as a scholar, but also gen-
erally one should never consider his own perception so highly that it would lead to a 
denial of other perceptions, but also for his thought and action.  
 
3.4 The alienated mind 
3.4.1 Recourse to individualism 
Morgenthau’s anti-ideological stance moved his focus of attention towards the hu-
man being. Therefore, already early in his career he got into contact with Freud and 
psychoanalysis, not least because with Fromm, psychoanalysis was well received at the 
Institute for Social Research. Besides, the Weimar Republic with its cultural open-
mindedness during the 1920s offered the stage for ground-breaking theory, like psycho-
analysis, to become popular (Gay, 1988, p. 446-69). Since psychoanalysis is individual 
psychology, Morgenthau hoped to have found the solution in his quest to develop an 
approach that considered the political as the key to understanding reality (Schuett, 2007, 
p. 65). This is why he got briefly engaged with it between his doctoral thesis and Ha-
bilitation resulting in a manuscript called Über die Herkunft des Politischen aus dem 
Wesen des Menschen (The derivation of the political from the nature of man) (HJM-
Archive 199). 
Freud seemed to be well suited to Morgenthau’s quest since he provided an analyti-
cal scheme to explain the human mind. According to Freud, the mind would be divided 
into three instincts: the id, ego, and super-ego. The id would be the realm of uncon-
scious drives that would influence human actions. This would include hunger, thirst, 
and sexual desires. It would also include the conflictive drives of Eros (life drive) and 
Thanatos (death drive). The latter would be characterised in the human aspiration to re-
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peat, to keep, and the yearning for a standstill, whereas Eros would be the exact oppo-
site. This drive would instil in humans the urge to construct and be productive. The su-
per-ego, however, following Freud, would be opposed to the natural drives of the id. 
The super-ego would contain instructions and prohibitions imposed by the environment 
on human beings, such as family or other social authorities. Perception of morality and 
values would be created with the intention to restrain the id within human beings. These 
two opposed instincts would clash into the ego. This is the realm where humans would 
make sense of the world and live their life by trying to balance the other instincts. This 
conscious process of balancing would be intended to produce seemingly rational solu-
tions for the questions that have to be taken throughout one’s life (Freud, 1961a, p. 13-
59; Gay, 1988, p. 403-16). Morgenthau thought he had found the solution for his quest, 
not least because Freud provided with the id and super-ego space to analyse human 
conditionality. Indeed, even later Morgenthau acknowledged that ‘[i]n our time  
Sigmund Freud has rediscovered the autonomy of the dark and evil forces which, as 
manifestations of the unconscious, determine the fate of man’ (1947a, p. 175). 
This belief was put on a firm basis since Freud also tried to apply this theory on the 
international level. Freud pointed out that the instincts intrinsic to people could not be 
followed at the national level due to moral, societal, or legal restraints. Indeed, within a 
society these instincts would have to be suppressed because the potential aggression that 
comes along with human instincts would otherwise threaten to dissolve the society. As 
Freud put it:  
‘The existence of this tendency to aggression ... is the factor that disturbs our re-
lation with our neighbours and makes it necessary for culture to institute its high 
demands. Civilized society is perpetually menaced with disintegration through 
this ... hostility of men towards one another ... Culture has to call up every pos-
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sible reinforcement in order to erect barriers against the aggressive instincts of 
men ...’ (1953, p. 37-8). 
However, the international level with no legal or social restrictions, only at best moral 
ones, would give, according to Freud, the possibility to follow one’s instincts ruthlessly, 
as the First World War showed. Through identification with the nation-state especially 
at times of crisis, by “rallying around the flag”, to use a more modern term, each citizen 
could satisfy his instincts by receiving a share of the power a nation acquires on the in-
ternational scene (Schuett, 2007, p. 61-66; Scheuerman, 2009a, p. 37-8). 
Yet, Morgenthau eventually abandoned Freud’s thought. Not that he did not gain 
useful insights in the human psyche that consolidated his picture of men and women, 
whose foundation was already laid through the studying of Nietzsche (Morgenthau, 
1937, p. 82-7), but Morgenthau was dissatisfied with the insights psychoanalysis pro-
vided which is why he did not even consider the above mentioned manuscript as good 
enough for publication. In his autobiographical sketch, Morgenthau provided us with 
the reasons for his dissatisfaction: ‘[W]hat defeats a psychoanalytical theory of politics 
is the impossibility of accounting for complexities and varieties of political experience 
with the simplicities of a reductionist theory, economic or psychological’ (1984, p. 14). 
Hence, psychoanalysis seemed too static for Morgenthau. It did not allow him to incor-
porate all aspects of human life and eventually showed him that in order to effectively 
fulfil this task, the thought has to focus on one’s own self, instead of other persons’ egos. 
Once again, life philosophy provided Morgenthau with a solid basis to channel his 
thoughts effectively. As the next section will show, Morgenthau’s ‘methodological in-
dividualism’ (Schuett, 2007, p. 62) was not based upon Freud, but found its scholarly 
expression in reflections of life philosophy. 
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3.4.2 Alienation as an epistemological resource  
Alienation is without doubt a concept that has triggered philosophical debates again 
and again (Behr, 1995, p. 178).42 Also, during the time of Morgenthau’s intellectual so-
cialisation alienation played a crucial role, not least because of the cataclysmic experi-
ences of the loss of metaphysics, and moved into the centre of epistemological thought 
of numerous German humanists (Geisteswissenschaftler) (Pachter, 1972, p. 236; Björk, 
2005). 
Within Morgenthau’s field, the two most prominent attempts to make use of alien-
ation for epistemological elucidation were provided by Simmel and Schütz. Both fol-
lowed different conceptions of alienation. While Simmel focused on the stranger within 
a society, ‘... the person who comes today and stays tomorrow’ (1964a, p. 402), exem-
plified in the history of European Jews, Schütz considered the stranger as an outsider, 
manifested in the ideal type of the emigrant. Certainly, Schütz’s experiences as an émi-
gré scholar, having been expelled by the rise of Nazism, played a role in his understand-
ing of the stranger since the stranger is ‘... an adult individual ... who tries to be perma-
nently accepted or at least tolerated by the group which he approaches’ (1944, p. 499). 
Both, nevertheless, appraised an increased epistemological ability as the most important 
feature (Endreß, 2006, p. 123). Alienation, on the one hand, would increase it since the 
stranger would be better suited to rationally analyse his/her environment. This would be 
the case since, following Simmel, the stranger would have more ‘freedom’ (1964a,  
p. 405) because he/she would be more detached from social conditions and obligations 
that would determine the perception and thoughts of people living under these condi-
tions. Schütz emphasised that alienation might increase knowledge since people, well-
established within society, would not have to question everyday actions and common 
beliefs because one could assume their general acceptance. Their knowledge would be 
‘... (1) incoherent, (2) only particularly clear, and (3) not at all free from contradictions’ 
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(Schuetz, 1944, p. 500). This, on the other hand, would lead to a further reason for the 
increased epistemological abilities of strangers. Whereas for Simmel the enhanced mo-
bility of the stranger was essential because it would enable the stranger to acquire more 
knowledge due to more experiences, and he saw estrangement consistently positively, 
Schütz also acknowledged the burden alienation would require from its bearers. The 
stranger would enter a life-world in which nothing would remain unquestioned since it 
would be different from one’s former life and common beliefs. Although, according to 
Schütz, the past of the new society would remain excluded to the stranger, numerous 
beliefs, manners, and rules would have to be understood to ensure one’s subsistence. 
Recently, Enzo Traverso (2004) provided an example which emphasises this question-
ing of common assumptions. Émigré scholars, like Arendt, Adorno, and Horkheimer, 
would have contributed significantly to the interpretation of the Holocaust since they 
would have been free from the constraints of national contexts. Simmel and Schütz’s 
remarks accentuate that within life philosophy there was a tendency to acknowledge that 
more objectivity would be achieved through the physical and/or mental detachment 
from the rest of society and through an increased willingness to self-reflect. Morgenthau 
was exposed to both kinds of alienation and gradually turned his circumstances of life 
into his epistemological basis (Frei, 2001, p. 23). 
On the one hand, Morgenthau was, due to his family and religious background, a 
stranger in Europe in the sense of Simmel. Morgenthau grew up as the only and lonely 
child of an authoritarian father. Although patriarchy was then common, it left scars in 
Morgenthau’s psyche in the form of shyness and the fear of being rejected (Postscript, 
1984, p. 339-41; Frei, 2005, p. 39). The relation to his father was further tested in 1927, 
when Morgenthau was diagnosed with tuberculosis, very much then a socially ostra-
cised disease. As a result he not only had to spend five months in a sanatorium, but also 
suffered from a fragile health for the rest of his life (Frei, 2001, p. 34-5). The family, 
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however, was not the only source of Morgenthau’s alienation. What made matters 
worse, was that Morgenthau grew up in Coburg, where in 1929 the National Socialist 
German Workers' Party (NSDAP) won the absolute majority in city council (Stadrat) 
elections (Hayward and Morris, 1988, p. 110-5).43 Life as a Jew in a particularly anti-
Semitic area was difficult and lonesome. This was manifested in an incident at the boy 
scouts, as Morgenthau later recalled: ‘I remember being spit at when marching in a 
group. This treatment aggravated the traumatic experiences I had at home and led to a 
kind of retrenchment. I retreated into my own shell in fear of disappointing human con-
tacts’ (Postscript, 1984, p. 339). Being in the boy scouts, however, just like the mem-
bership to the fraternity Thuringia (HJM-Archive 44), which was partly his father’s 
wish, shows that Morgenthau took various efforts to overcome alienation and become 
an unquestioned member of society. The road to consider alienation as a source for his 
epistemology was long and stony and became not obvious before he made science his 
vocation and certainly aggravated, when he was forced to leave Europe. But from 
Frankfurt onwards this certainty became a deliberate act since the transfer to Frankfurt, 
being a Prussian city, from Bavaria’s capital Munich, required special, official permis-
sion to do so (Postscript, 1984, p. 348).  
As an intellectual, Morgenthau’s forced emigration had three implications, as  
Neumann, his former colleague in Sinzheimer’s office, once remarked. Not only was he 
displaced with his family from his friends and belongings, but he was also displaced as 
a scholar from his intellectual field and, finally, as a political person, who promoted re-
publican and humane conditions (Eisfeld, 1991, p. 116). But unlike other émigré schol-
ars, such as Reinhard Bendix and Arendt, Morgenthau was also a ‘double exile’ as Felix 
Frankfurter remarked in a letter to Nathan Greene from 9th December 1937, since he 
was expelled from Germany and Spain (HJM-Archive 22). Hence, twice in his life 
Morgenthau was forced to adapt to new life-worlds and the second time was especially 
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difficult for Morgenthau. He knew nobody in the United States since his only acquaint-
ance, Richard Gottheil, a professor at Columbia, had died shortly before Morgenthau 
arrived in 1937 (Postscript, 1984, p. 364) which aggravated his anxiety to get a position 
in American academia. This was different from Madrid since he went there, like 
Hermann Heller, to take up a position at the Instituto de Estudios Internacionales y 
Económicos (Meyer, 1967, p. 310-1). His first academic position in the United States at 
Brooklyn College consequently required him to teach ‘... just about everything under 
the sun’ (Postscript, 1984, p. 367).44 A further problem was the different intellectual 
tradition in which liberalism was the ruling dogma. In accordance with his anti-
ideological stance, Morgenthau early on warned of the dangers an exaggerated under-
standing of liberalism would cause. This almost intransigent understanding of philoso-
phical traditions is manifested in his remark to Rita Neumeyer Herbert from 2nd June 
1947 in which he stated after reading the reviews to Scientific Man vs. Power Politics 
that ‘.... they literally don’t know what I am talking about’ (HJM-Archive 26). Indeed, 
this might explain why most of Morgenthau’s friends were also European emigrants. 
Among them were the already mentioned Arendt and Gurian as well as Richard and 
Hildegard Mainzer, Karl Löwenstein, and the Schulmann family. It is to be assumed 
that there was a particular bond between German-speaking émigrés since, as Elisabeth 
Young-Bruehl remarked for the circle around Arendt, these were people ‘… who could 
respond to a quotation from Goethe with a quotation from Heine, who knew German 
fairy tales’ (1982, p. XIV).45 Besides, Morgenthau used any possibility to return to 
Europe, be it for official reasons, like the sojourn to Austria upon the request of the 
American Department of State (HJM-Archive 59), academic reasons, teaching at the 
Salzburg Seminar in American Studies from 1950-1976 or the Villa Serbelloni in Italy 
(HJM-Archive 50; 53), or private reasons, since ‘man streicht sich [dort] die Seele glatt’ 
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(one can mentally recover there) as Arendt mentioned shortly before her death in a letter 
to Morgenthau in 1975 (HJM-Archive 5).  
On the other hand, Morgenthau was also as an immigrant a stranger in Schütz’s 
sense. The hardship Morgenthau suffered throughout his life proved decisive for the de-
velopment of his epistemology. As pointed out, it is reasonable to believe that early on 
Morgenthau was aware of the possibilities alienation could offer as his choice to work 
for Sinzheimer and writing Scientific Man vs. Power Politics put him at odds with the 
orthodoxy of American political science (Amstrup, 1978, p. 173; Scheuerman, 2009a, p. 
13). Alienation was for Morgenthau the conscious act of detachment that enabled him to 
analyse situations with greater rationality due to his greater capacity of synopsis, as 
Mannheim also had hoped to achieve with his “free-floating intelligentsia” (Kögler, 
1997, p. 144-8; Loader, 1997, p. 217-29; Barboza, 2006, p. 232-255). This ability to ra-
tionalise is confirmed by several people who knew Morgenthau personally. George 
Eckstein noted that Morgenthau had a ‘... very rational mind, always coolly alert to ana-
lyze and understand any given event or situation’ (1981, p. 641). Likewise,  
Richard Falk accentuates Morgenthau’s ‘... unflinching capacity for objectivity’ (1984, 
p. 77).46 Alienation also enabled Morgenthau to become more aware of his own and the 
position of others. This not only allowed him to remark and obviate own distortions of 
his consciousness, but it also provided him with the capacity to perceive the nuances in 
human interrelation that often mark the difference (Morgenthau, 1965, p. 81), as a re-
viewer remarked about Morgenthau’s The Purpose of American Politics: 
‘Prof. Morgenthau’s great advantage is that, as a scholar and citizen already ma-
ture, when he chose the United States as his country, he can look at it from 
within and also with the critical objectivity of an outsider. So he knows where 
the foundations, emotional and social, are weak’ (HJM-Archive 144). 
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3.5 The outsider as insider and the power of dissent 
3.5.1 The nemesis of the Weimar Republic 
The Weimar Republic was for the intellectual elite in many ways a possibility to 
overcome the rigid social conventions of the German Empire if we just think of the 
Neue Sachlichkeit in literature, film, and art. Still, the downfall of the Weimar Republic 
was not only a constant political and economic threat, but particularly also culturally 
and intellectually (Büttner, 2008, p. 296). Neither orthodox nor heterodox intellectuals 
used the opportunities which they were conceded in the Weimar Republic responsibly 
and, therefore, they eventually contributed to its downfall.  
For numerous orthodox intellectuals the Weimar Republic was a symbol for vulgar-
ity and decadence. The emergence of a commodified mass-culture threatened traditional 
family structures as much as moral conceptions (Büttner, 2008, p. 332-3). This not only 
had far-reaching consequences for their life-world, but also eroded their position as cus-
todians of these traditional structures which is why orthodox intellectuals aspired to a 
conservative revolution right after the downfall of the German Empire. As the  
University of Berlin, then the most eminent German university, was the centre of ortho-
doxy, it was perceived by open-minded students like the literary critic Hans Mayer and 
also Morgenthau, who studied there briefly, as an anachronistic place where professors 
desperately clung to their old positions (Postscript, 1984, p. 345; Mayer, 1988, p. 77). 
One reason for this threatening prospect was for the Germans and the orthodox mandar-
ins in particular that the same people who were made responsible for, in their eyes, 
shameful defeat, were often to be found in leading government positions of the Weimar 
Republic. Morgenthau later recalled the importance this “stab in the back” legend had 
gained in the minds of the people (Postscript, 1984, p. 335). The ultimate denial of the 
Weimar Republic is manifested in the assassination of several hundred people, often 
Jews, Catholics, and liberals that were associated with this legend. Many of the assas-
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sins were academics with roots in the nobility and/or military. Both groups suffered the 
steepest decline in importance after the downfall of the Empire since the nobility had 
lost its privileges in the Weimar Republic and the military had been restricted in the 
Treaty of Versailles. The father of Heinrich Tillessen, for example, who was one of the 
assassins of Matthias Erzberger, a member of the delegation to sign the Versailles Peace 
Treaty, was Lieutenant General and the Bavarian Prime Minister, Kurt Eisner, was as-
sassinated by the law student Anton Graf von Arco auf Valley (Mommsen, 1996,  
p. 125-7). 
Yet, also the heterodox intellectuals, who profited most from the changed political 
and social conditions, contributed to the Republic’s nemesis. Right after the Empire’s 
downfall, numerous heterodox intellectuals engaged in the promotion of society. How-
ever, they were too idealistic and had no possibility of implementing their ideas for a 
different society. This pluralism of views is demonstrated in the formation of the  
Novembergruppe (November group) in December 1918, where artists like Lyonel  
Feininger, Otto Dix, George Grosz, and Walter Gropius wanted to create a young and 
free Germany. Likewise, the Arbeitsrat für Kunst (work council for art), formed in 1919, 
argued that the people needed to be able to get culturally engaged and, therefore, pro-
moted the construction of people’s theatres, arenas, and parks. Yet, the government was 
supposed to remain in the hands of intellectuals. A first step towards this platonic 
noocracy was the proposal to nominate Gerhard Hauptmann and later Heinrich Mann as 
President (Gay, 2004, p. 138-57; Büttner, 2008, p. 297-8). When these idealistic tenden-
cies remained unfulfilled, not least, because of the orthodoxy’s instigation, the hetero-
dox turned away from expressionism towards the Neue Sachlichkeit, a symbol of their 
Republic’s renunciation (Peukert, 1991, p. 33-5). 
Few of the heterodox intellectuals, like the peace activist Ludwig Quidde, full heart-
edly supported Weimar. Typically, its representatives pursued one of the following 
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three attitudes towards the Weimar Republic. The first attitude, although positive to-
wards the Weimar Republic, was characterised by a political misinterpretation towards 
its problem-solving capacity and the mind of Germans in general. In particular, Jewish 
members of the mandarins misinterpreted the ameliorations which were achieved during 
the German Empire and Weimar Republic as further steps to assimilation and often un-
derestimated the latent anti-Semitism. Morgenthau noted in a lecture given at the Leo 
Baeck Institute New York in 1961 that ‘... it so happens that the philosophy and the in-
stitutions of liberalism are not the expression of eternal verities. [They] arose under cer-
tain historic conditions and, hence, were bound to disappear under different historic 
conditions’ (1961a, p. 6-7). Morgenthau’s assessment rested on his own family experi-
ence since he was born into one of those liberal Jewish families. His father was a patriot, 
trying to assimilate as best as possible, as his support for Morgenthau’s fraternity mem-
bership demonstrates (Frei, 2001, p. 21-2). 47  Despite this positive stance towards  
Weimar, their support vanished because this group was not aware of the changing actu-
alities of the political. Apart from this misinterpretation, there was also indifference to-
wards the republican ideal of the common good. Although the proverbial German Ver-
einsmeierei (devotion to associational life) was a distinctive trait of social life during the 
early 20th century, it cannot be considered as a strengthening feature of the Republic per 
se (Berman, 1997, p. 401-29; Heilbronner, 1998, p. 443-63). On the contrary, the asso-
ciations promoted their own particular interests, some openly anti-republican, national-
istic, and even racist, like the Thule-Gesellschaft, the Stahlhelm, or the Blücherbund, 
and, therefore, had a negative impact on Weimar’s already weak institutions. But even if 
they were not anti-republican, heterodox intellectuals retreated into associational life 
after their initial idealistic disillusion and turned at best into Vernunftrepublikaner, like 
the historian Friedrich Meinecke. Others, however, could not even support Weimar for 
sound reasons anymore. Indeed, they openly opposed it. After the idealism of the start-
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ing years had vanished, due to conservative efforts, exemplified in the abolition of the 
Bavarian Soviet Republic in 1919, the Kapp-Lüttwitz-Putsch in 1920, or the Hitler-
Ludendorff-Putsch in 1923, numerous mandarin intellectuals turned to communism in 
their quest for a more equal and free society. As a consequence, they refused to support 
Weimar and occasionally worked against it (Peukert, 1991, p. 172-4; Wehler, 2003,  
p. 535-41). The capital Berlin especially remained a hotbed for extreme ideals and nu-
merous younger members of the mandarin intellectuals turned to communism while try-
ing to find their place in life. Both Mayer (1988) and Eric Hobsbawm (2002), to men-
tion just two examples, became communists in Berlin.48  
This demonstrates that the Weimar Republic was certainly a highly politicised state 
because there was a multitude of interests which either struggled for a niche to exist or 
tried to change the political system altogether. Yet, it was no ‘Republic of the reason-
able’ (Bookbinder, 1996) because in the end there were not enough supporters of the 
Republic. Like representatives from the orthodoxy, heterodox members of the mandarin 
intellectuals also showed little interest in the Republic as a hoard of the common good 
and followed their own particular interests. This weak support was one of the reasons 
why the institutions of the Weimar Republic could no longer withhold the forces that 
were tearing them apart.    
 
3.5.2 The political as society’s core 
The developments in Europe, culminating in the Holocaust and the Second World 
War, reinforced Morgenthau’s conviction that the political is the central aspect of soci-
ety and active civic engagement is required to prohibit its violation. 
Morgenthau was an eye-witness of the rise of the totalitarian national-socialistic state. 
In the 1920s and 1930s, agitation and propaganda gradually mantled the political dis-
course with a total form of ideology. Through a discourse of exclusivity, minorities like 
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Jews, Jehovah’s Witnesses, or communists could be barred from society and the indi-
vidual was attached and subdued in his/her quest for identity to the masses. Shortly after 
Adolf Hitler was appointed Chancellor (30th January 1933) on the “Day of Potsdam” 
(21st March 1933), this discourse of uniqueness was further historicised and visualised 
through the seizure of the Prussian myth (Münkler, 2009, p. 275-94) which was sup-
posed to put Hitler into direct line with Fredrick the Great, Otto von Bismarck, and Paul 
von Hindenburg as depicted in contemporary postcards. Arendt (1953, p. 303-6) has 
noted that totalitarianism would have been a new form of government precisely because 
it would provide remedy for the modern feeling of meaninglessness and solitude by rec-
reating identity within the totalitarian framework. A democratic republic, like Weimar, 
would have been especially endangered by totalitarianism since other than in an abso-
lute monarchy or theocracy, where the subjects are born into a transcendental order and 
would not have to question their identity, it would require its citizens to create their 
identity by themselves. The specific danger of totalitarian regimes would be that they do 
not operate from a lawless and arbitrary basis, like tyrannies, but would claim to be de-
rived, in the case of national-socialism, from natural law. Since these laws would pre-
cede positive laws, totalitarian regimes would remain within this realm, though gradu-
ally washing it out (Arendt, 1953, p. 306-10).  
It was this danger that Morgenthau had in mind when he criticised Kelsen’s pure 
theory of law for not taking this possibility into account and made conscious that the 
survival of a republic is dependent upon its ideal of embedded criticism (Tjalve, 2008,  
p. 5). The enforcement of constant and common guiding of the political needed, as 
Morgenthau pointed out in later years, strong political leadership (Tjalve, 2008, p. 114-
6). Political leaders, Morgenthau hoped, would be able to provide channels of dissent, 
while having the greatness of mind to transcend their own particular conditionality in 
their decision-making. Yet, leaders needed not only to monitor public opinion, but 
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should also provide visions that could stir up public opinion in the first place  
(Morgenthau, 1957a, p. 7-11; 1959d, p. 5-8). Morgenthau (1962c, p. 18) argued this 
could provide a solution for the ideological takeover of the political which would have 
made any contradicting idea suspicious from the beginning. Morgenthau’s yearning for 
a strong political leadership can also be seen in his scepticism of direct democracy. Pub-
lic policies, like diplomacy, should remain in the hands of political leaders since ideally 
they would be able to find less biased, more nuanced, and hence sounder decisions than 
would be possible in a direct democracy. The public opinion, as Morgenthau stressed in 
the “radio-university” (Funk-Universität) broadcasting programme of the RIAS (radio 
in the American sector of Berlin), would tend to think too simplified in moral and legal 
categories of good and bad which could potentially result in too superficial political de-
cisions (1957b, p. 5). 
This does not mean that Morgenthau was objecting to a democratic republic. 
Morgenthau, however, defined democracy as a noocracy legitimised by the people, 
hence, as ‘... the government of an elite with the consent of the people’ (HJM-Archive 
28). Following Morgenthau, it would be the patriotic task of citizens to be aware of the 
decisions taken and scrutinise them critically because ‘[t]he right to dissent derives from 
the relativistic philosophy of democracy. That philosophy assumes that all members of 
society... have equal access to the truth, but none of them has a monopoly in it’ 
(Morgenthau, 1970a, p. 40). From this follows that Morgenthau hoped, on the one hand, 
that citizens would gain tolerance in the sense that they would become aware of their 
own potential fallibility and that public opinion could create a pluralism of views, all 
convinced of their truthfulness. On the other hand, as Morgenthau remarked for the 
Weimar Republic, there would need to be the awareness of the temporality of one’s and 
others’ convictions. Policies, deriving from such convictions, would be power relations, 
but they would have to be accepted as temporal in the sense that they would have been 
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sustained by a majority and could be changed as soon this majoritarian support vanished. 
This emphasises that ‘[a] notion of patriotism as dissent ... rests on dedication to the 
perpetual process of contestation over the substance of policies, and yet absolute respect 
for the immutability of political procedures’ (Tjalve, 2008, p. 125-6). Yet, this kind of 
patriotism would require well-educated citizens, capable of self-reflection and empathy, 
actively engaged in the political and social life enabling them to experience and con-
tribute to the pluralism of views, which is why Morgenthau was a strong supporter of 
education throughout his life. 
This conviction that the society would need the political understood as civic en-
gagement so that it will not be usurped by ideologies already existed when Morgenthau 
was still in Europe. Yet, Morgenthau became only fully aware of the total nemesis – 
physically and morally – totalitarianism can cause after the Second World War. This 
retrospective comprehension is manifested in his autobiographical sketch in which 
Morgenthau remarked that the work in Sinzheimer’s office consisted of ‘... interesting 
and sometimes fascinating intellectual exercises. But they were marginal to the crucial 
issues with which society had to come to terms. What was decisive was not the merits 
of different legal interpretations but the distribution of political power’ (1984, p. 9). Still, 
Morgenthau tried to engage in the political sphere within the realms he, as a lawyer who 
just had finished his doctoral thesis, could reach, as a series of articles in the  
Frankfurter Zeitung, a then prominent liberal newspaper, on reforms of the jurispruden-
tial study suggest (HJM-Archive 95). At that time, he already anticipated that the politi-
cal sphere of the Weimar Republic was in danger of being replaced by the racist ideol-
ogy of national-socialism, while the majority of the mandarin intellectuals, as noted 
above, remained indifferent. This was demonstrated to Morgenthau at a soirée  
Morgenthau was invited to by Karl Neumeyer while visiting Munich in 1935. All guests 
were critical towards national-socialism, yet, ‘[t]hey all argued against the Nazis from 
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their own personal point of view.’ And Morgenthau added that after mentioning to them 
the story of the murder of an acquainted Jewish lawyer they replied as follows: ‘“Don’t 
talk to us about this. We don’t mix in politics ... It doesn’t interest us”’ (Postscript, 1984,  
p. 363-4).  
After the enormous success of his textbook Politics among Nations in 1948,  
Morgenthau’s popularity rose to a level which made him a sought-after commentator 
and Morgenthau was eager to fill in this role. Morgenthau wrote for numerous newspa-
pers, like the New York Times and Washington Post, and liberal magazines, like  
Commentary, Worldview, and The New Republic commenting on topics, such as the 
Vietnam War, the rise of China, and student protests in the late 1960s. Furthermore, he 
supported the public’s capacity to follow the opinion making process by instructing the 
wider public on a local level. He worked, for example, for the Keneseth Israel Beth  
Shalom Congregation in Kansas City, while at the local university from 1939-1943, and 
the Adult Education Council of Greater Chicago until the late 1960s (HJM-Archive 3; 
91). During this time, Morgenthau also gave more than 60 public lectures and talks per 
year throughout the United States which clearly indicates his enormous efforts (HJM-
Archive 153). Morgenthau also actively engaged in the public opinion creation by par-
ticipating and heading countless civil rights associations, such as the Academic  
Committee on Soviet Jewry from 1969-1979 (HJM-Archive 2). Certainly, the interest to 
facilitate the emigration of Soviet Jews can be explained through his own experiences of 
being an emigrant (Mollov, 1997, p. 561-575). Largely forgotten today, however, is the 
enormous efforts he undertook to criticise and argue against the righteousness of the 
Vietnam War. At that time, he was probably its most eminent critic and was engaged in 
several associations that fought against it. As it will be later discussed in detail, 
Morgenthau considered the Vietnam War as a civil war, in which the USA only took 
part because it was in fear that Vietnam would fall into the hands of communism. 
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Morgenthau tried to convince the public of the catastrophe that would necessarily fol-
low after starting to wage war, but he remained largely unheard (Rafshoon, 2001, p. 55-
72). Indeed, when he was heard, he was often threatened for his civic engagement, as it 
was the case when he argued for nuclear disarmament and Germany’s acceptance of the 
Oder-Neiße-border with Poland (HJM-Archive 39; 185). Yet, this could not stop 
Morgenthau from his civic engagement and participation in the public opinion making 
process and proves that he was actively engaged in the political sphere. He had once 
witnessed how quickly a republic can be turned into a totalitarian state and he tried to 
prevent this from happening again in the future.   
 
3.6 Conclusion 
The intention of this chapter was to contextualise Morgenthau within the field of the 
German mandarin intellectuals in which he was socialised and point out that this so-
cialisation is crucial to elucidate the foundations of his Weltanschauung. It was dis-
closed that Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung rested on “social group formations”, as 
Mannheim called it; in Morgenthau’s case the heterodoxy of mandarin intellectuals, and 
as intellectual creations that were identified in the concepts of ideology, alienation, and 
the dissidence. Certainly, building this fundament was not a coherent, teleological proc-
ess and its development experienced breaks and inconsistencies, as the temporal occu-
pation with Marxism and psychoanalysis reveal. Yet, by the time Morgenthau was 
forced to leave Europe, he had developed a firm basis of his Weltanschauung that re-
mained stable after his emigration to the United States. Of course, Morgenthau’s life in 
the United States affected him. Inventions like nuclear weapons, developments, such as 
the Second World War, the Cold War, and the Vietnam War, and experiences like his 
outstanding career in a different form of academia, left their marks. However, these 
marks did not call his Weltanschauung into question, but rather reassured it, as the next 
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chapters will show. Therefore, other than recent scholarship claims (e.g. Guzzini, 2004, 
p. 547), this chapter identified guiding concepts of his socialisation within the Weimar 
mandarin intellectuals and they remained the basis upon which he founded his academic 
career in the United States, as Neacsu (2010, p. 69) also recently noted. 
It was also remarked that Morgenthau’s socialisation has to be understood as the 
condensate of the entity of the German mandarin intellectuals. This means Morgenthau 
cannot be pinned down to one particular scholar, like Weber, Schmitt, and Freud, al-
though some scholars were certainly more influential, like Nietzsche, Simmel, and even 
Mannheim. All of them remained constant companions from Morgenthau’s early study 
years until the end of his life. Morgenthau began his academic career within the hetero-
dox part of the mandarin intellectuals, remained there throughout his career despite his 
success, and its representatives contributed most to the development of his Weltan-
schauung. The constant mutual personal and intellectual exchange he had with them 
centred his thoughts on principal intellectual debates of that time. These debates were 
conceptualised in this chapter under the terms of disenchantment of the world, alien-
ation, and the power of dissent. As it was shown, Morgenthau, however, did not solely 
echo these debates, but developed his own, unique, and critical stance. He remained for 
example sceptical about the major ideologies and criticised the non-identification of the 
importance the political has for the well-being of a society and in particular for a repub-
lic. Indeed, these ramified fundaments of Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung, made it not 
only difficult for other scholars to label him (Vasquez, 1979), but also Morgenthau him-
self had problems answering questions about which camp he would be classified in, as 
demonstrated in a letter to Sandra Frye from 25th November 1964: ‘I think as far as 
method is concerned, I am a conservative. As for the objectives of politics are con-
cerned, I think I am a liberal’ (HJM-Archive 20). These remarks point out that one 
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should do away with labelling and rather focus on the comprehensiveness of the con-
texts Morgenthau developed his Weltanschauung. 
Now that its fundament has been elaborated, the next three chapters will follow pre-
cisely this task of understanding Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung by elaborating his on-
tology, epistemology, and political and civic engagement.   
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Chapter 4.  Under an empty sky: Hans Morgenthau’s ontology 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Having established the field and core concepts upon which Morgenthau developed 
his Weltanschauung, the task remains to elucidate its components. As elaborated in 
chapter two, the methodology this part of the analysis rests upon is Bourdieu’s concept 
of habitus which was subdivided into ontology, epistemology, and political agency. To 
begin this part of the analysis, this chapter intends to unravel Morgenthau’s ontology. 
The previous chapter has shown that the development of Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung 
was notionally, intellectually, and personally accompanied by various scholars who can 
be subsumed under the term life-philosophy and, hence, scholars like Nietzsche and 
Simmel reappear as thought-provoking sources in Morgenthau’s ontology. In order to 
give evidence that Morgenthau’s ontology possessed in his fundamental beliefs continu-
ity throughout his life, as also confirmed by Morgenthau’s former student David  
Fromkin (1993, p. 84), his entire oeuvre ranging from the late 1920s till the late 1970s 
will be referred to.49  
In particular, Morgenthau’s personal experience of ideologies and its effects fostered 
the development of his basic principles of politics. Ideologies created a ‘veil of illusion’ 
(Nietzsche, 2000, p. 46), covering the ‘disenchantment of the world’ (Weber, 2004, p. 
30), by providing a telos in life, be it historical, spiritual, or biological, and, thereby, 
claiming a coherence where there was none. Morgenthau fundamentally opposed this 
view, as the elaboration of his main ontological principles, power and the political, will 
reveal.  
Conscious of this anti-ideologism, it will be asked which concepts were crucial for 
Morgenthau’s ontology? Identifying power and politics as these concepts is nothing 
new: other authors have acknowledged it before (e.g. Tsou, 1984; Mollov, 2002; Hacke, 
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2005; Scheuerman, 2007a). What is new, however, and what this chapter aims to ex-
plain, is the normative profoundness both concepts had for Morgenthau since so far the 
elaboration of Morgenthau’s ontology has remained perfunctory. Just like Mannheim’s 
notion of Weltanschauung anticipated, it also contains a specific world postulate, an in-
tention of how the world should be (1952, p. 185). It will be emphasised in the course of 
this chapter that this is also the case with Morgenthau. Power and politics are normative 
concepts for Morgenthau containing elements of how the interactions of people ought to 
be. Although the complexity of Morgenthau’s notion of politics had received a first ap-
propriate elaboration in Frei’s monograph (2001), it sank back into oblivion and was at 
best exclusively related to Schmitt (Koskenniemi, 2000; 2004; Brown, 2007;  
Scheuerman, 2007b; critical: Brown, 2004). Only recently was this complexity recon-
sidered (Neacsu, 2010). Likewise, the distinctive normative orientation of Morgenthau’s 
notion of power was until today never fully elaborated and quite often even misunder-
stood, as remarked in chapter two. More often than not, Weber’s notion of power was 
imposed on Morgenthau’s notion reducing it to a fraction of its meaning (Coser, 1984; 
Pichler, 1998; Shilliam, 2007; 2009; Turner, 2009; Turner and Mazur, 2009).  
The elaboration of Morgenthau’s ontology will begin with what Morgenthau (1949a, 
p. 2) considered as his analytical starting point: the individual (Chapter 4.2). The an-
thropological condition of politics allowed Morgenthau to perceive human beings to be 
in a tragic position (Lebow, 2003, p. 308). Two conflicting drives, one existential and 
the other one assertive, to which any person would succumb, requires human beings to 
socially interact, although these drives would have the ability to destroy this interaction. 
Therefore, these drives need to be constrained. Next, the elaboration of Morgenthau’s 
concept of power, his central ontological concept, will reveal that he distinguished be-
tween two types of power (Chapter 4.3). First, he noted the animus dominandi which he 
identified as the prevalent empirical concept due to the absence of constraining values. 
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Second, however, Morgenthau promoted a different, normative concept of power with 
the intention to replace the former in order to re-establish societies based on humanistic 
values. Finally, this chapter will deal with the collective level, societies, and the role of 
the political for them (Chapter 4.4). This will include Morgenthau’s thoughts on the de-
velopment and composition of societies. Furthermore, Morgenthau considered the po-
litical realm as central since this realm with power as its ultimate component would al-
low re-establishing values in order to prevent the extinction of social beings and eventu-
ally human beings.  
 
4.2 The tragedy of hedonism  
4.2.1 Hunger and the interest of existence 
The mind of human beings is for Morgenthau determined by two basic drives (Smith, 
1986, p. 136). Being aware of these drives will be important for the following elabora-
tion of Morgenthau’s concept of power since it will help to distinguish between the two 
notions he applied. In its most coherent elaboration, an unpublished manuscript from 
1930, Morgenthau acknowledged that the basic human fact is ‘the impulse of life striv-
ing to keep alive, to prove oneself and to interact with others’ (1930c, p. 5; my transla-
tion).50 Hence, these two dominating drives are the drive for self-preservation (Selbster-
haltungstrieb) and the drive to prove oneself (Bewährungstrieb) (Morgenthau, 1930c,  
p. 15).51 
Morgenthau found a similar argument in the works of his ‘early love’ (Jugendliebe) 
(Frei, 1994, p.102): Nietzsche. In the Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche introduced the  
Dionysian principle as one of the major human traits. Just like Morgenthau’s drives, the 
Dionysian signifies the passionate and creative urges in life that one wants to follow 
with relish (Kaufmann, 1968, p. 128-9; Nietzsche, 2000, p. 19-23). Yet, in his elabora-
tion of these drives, Morgenthau primarily relied on Freud and the newly established 
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discipline of psychoanalysis. Schuett (2007, p. 59) recently stressed that the drive for 
self-preservation would resemble Freud’s ego-instinct whereas Morgenthau’s drive to 
prove oneself would be similar to the libido, the Eros, or sexual instinct. These two 
drives can be subsumed as “hunger” and “love”, as Freud noted: ‘... I took as my start-
ing-point a saying of ... Schiller that “hunger and love are what moves the world”’ 
(1961b, p. 117). Indeed, Morgenthau argued similarly: 
‘If the striving for the preservation of one’s life is caused by a deficiency, he is, 
figuratively speaking, a child of hunger. If he is striving to balance or avoid a 
lack of energy, then this striving to prove oneself is caused by a surplus of en-
ergy seeking release. This finds, again speaking figuratively, one of its most 
characteristic expressions in love’ (1930c, p. 5-6; my translation).52 
What Schuett, however, failed to point out is that these drives are situated in what Freud 
called, the Id, as previously elaborated, hence, in what Nietzsche called Dionysian and, 
therefore, inherent in every human being. The intention of both drives would be to in-
crease one’s pleasure and the foremost drive is the one for self-preservation  
(Morgenthau, 1930c, p. 77).  
In his 1930 manuscript, Morgenthau pointed out that the drive for self-preservation 
would be the basic principle of life. It would signify one’s yearning for survival and 
would be manifested in the pursuit of food or in modern times the aspiration of money 
as a substitute for acquiring food (Morgenthau, 1930c, p. 5, 15). Furthermore, it would 
also contain other vital interests, such as shelter and security and the means to achieve 
them, like marriage or a secure work place (Morgenthau, 1947a, p. 165). In this later 
publication, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, Morgenthau expanded the drive of self-
preservation which he perceived until then primarily as a self-centred principle of life, 
to the concept of selfishness which was more focused on exchange with other people. 
Selfishness would prohibit completely unselfish behaviour because taken to the extreme 
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this would mean risking one’s own life (Morgenthau, 1947a, p. 164). Indeed, unselfish-
ness would require a certain amount of selfishness since otherwise not even the slightest 
philanthropic achievement could be realised. This dilemma is summed up in a letter to 
John Masek from 13th May 1959, in which Morgenthau remarked that ‘... frequently in 
history men with good intentions … have done great harm to their nation’ (HJM-
Archive 38). 53  This necessity of selfishness indicates the first human tragedy. For 
Morgenthau, therefore, tragedy was a ‘quality of existence, not a creation of art’ (1948c). 
Furthermore, this statement shows that Morgenthau applied this individual drive of 
self-preservation, just like Freud, to the collective level of interstate relations. Indeed, in 
his doctoral thesis Morgenthau (1929a, p. 119-30) utilised both drives on this level by 
considering them to be questions of honour (Ehrfragen). The term honour seems some-
what out-dated today and Morgenthau dropped this ambiguous term shortly thereafter 
for the more technical classification of ‘questions politiques de première classe’ and 
‘questions politiques de deuxième classe’ (1933, p. 33-4). The drive of self-preservation, 
political questions of the first order, is presented in his doctoral thesis as interests of ex-
istence (Lebensinteressen) and, indeed, this terminology is the one Morgenthau settled 
for when he reused it in Politics among Nations stating that ‘[t]he main signpost ... to 
find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest de-
fined in terms of power’ (1985, p. 5). Returning to the interest of existence, Morgenthau 
(1929a, p. 98) comprehended this interest as the preservation of all the constitutive ele-
ments of a state, such as questions of sovereignty, the legal order, and also questions 
concerning the position of a state among other states. Yet, in his book from 1933, 
Morgenthau remarked that these questions would be of relative permanence and, return-
ing to his manuscript from 1930, in fact, they resemble a necessity caused by natural 
law (1930c, p. 65). This highlights that Morgenthau, despite acknowledging its primacy, 
considered the drive for self-preservation less important for his concept of power and, 
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indeed, politics since ‘[t]he desire for power ... concerns itself not with the individual’s 
survival, but with his position among his fellows once his survival has been secured’ 
(1947a, p. 165).  
To conclude, the drive for self-preservation was for Morgenthau an important ele-
ment of the human psyche. Indeed, this drive, being the precondition of the drive to 
prove oneself, enjoyed Morgenthau’s classification as the primary drive of life since it 
would be concerned with its preservation. Yet, due to its permanence, the drive of self-
preservation would be less important for politics than the drive to prove oneself. This 
elucidates that Morgenthau’s concept of power is by no means to be seen in the  
Hobbesian tradition as a means of self-preservation (Good, 1960; p. 612; Murray, 1996, 
p. 84; Frei, 2001, p. 127) for what Morgenthau was repeatedly unjustly criticised (e.g. 
Tucker, 1952; Forndran, 1997, p. 47; Hartmann, 2001, p. 24-5; Hall, 2006, p. 1161). 
 
4.2.2 Love and the interest to prove oneself 
As mentioned in the previous section, there is a second fundamental human drive. 
The drive to prove oneself is crucial for one side of Morgenthau’s ontological concept 
of power and despite or, indeed, due to this centrality, this drive led to widespread con-
fusion. Its importance for politics is caused by its categorical relation to other people, 
although the drive of self-preservation is of a higher vital reference since it would be 
concerned with one’s preservation.  
For Morgenthau, the intention of the drive to prove oneself was to make oneself 
aware of one’s own life and thereby become aware of one’s own strengths and capabili-
ties. This drive would be manifested in the effect on the other gender, but also games, 
artistic and academic expressions. Hence, ‘everywhere where the human being strives to 
show “what he can”’ (Morgenthau, 1930c, p. 6; my translation)54 is the drive to prove 
oneself its origin. It would be entirely directed to gain and increase pleasure and in par-
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ticular, challenging situations would promise the highest pleasure since they would re-
quire overcoming obstacles by mastering non-routine situations (Morgenthau, 1930c,  
p. 26-7). Only then one’s identity could be assured through the appraisal of others and 
would provide a surplus of pleasure (Morgenthau, 1930c, p. 31-2). Two issues require 
further discussion in the analysis of Morgenthau’s drive to prove oneself.  
First, this drive would be excessive. Neither the potential gain of pleasure nor the ob-
jects to which it could be directed would know any limit (Morgenthau, 1930c, p. 70). In 
his doctoral thesis, Morgenthau remarked that by considering this drive on the national 
level any question would become interesting for this drive since they ‘are seized at ran-
dom, irrespective of the actual content ...’ (1929a, p. 126-7; my translation).55 This ex-
cess signifies the second tragic aspect of human life. Satisfaction of one’s pleasure 
could be aspired, but, due to its limitlessness, never be achieved. Only a few times the 
pleasure principle would have reached its near achievement for which Morgenthau 
(1945b, p. 13; 1947a, p. 166) had chosen the love of Don Juan and Faust’s thirst for 
knowledge as examples. More than 15 years earlier, Morgenthau (1930c, p. 71) also in-
cluded in this list the political aspirations of Alexander the Great and Napoleon. How-
ever, these would have been exceptions and their aspiring would have also failed since 
vanitas (transience) took hold of Don Juan, Faust, Alexander, and the current of the 
Berezina washed away Napoleon’s ambitions. A further tragedy reflected in the drive to 
prove oneself would be, following Morgenthau (1930c, p. 75-7) and Freud (1961b,  
p. 117), that its extreme limitlessness would get into conflict with the drive of self-
preservation and eventually could mean one’s life is endangered as well as the lives of 
others. 
The second issue is related to the misperception this drive caused when Morgenthau 
(1945b) introduced it to American political science. There, he referred to this drive by 
employing Augustine’s diction of the animus dominandi, the lust for power, inherent in 
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every human being, a terminology which he considered for the rest of his academic ca-
reer (Morgenthau, 1947a, p. 167). This reassured Schuett (2007, p. 61-2), but also  
Ashley Tellis (1995, p. 40) and to a certain extent Frei (2001, p. 125-8), that the drive to 
prove oneself would be the concept behind Morgenthau’s notion of power. Yet, the pur-
pose why Morgenthau introduced this concept to the American academia has to be 
borne in mind. Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, where Morgenthau elaborated the 
animus dominandi most thoroughly, was a critique on the American ideology of liberal-
ism, manifested in the dominance of positivism in American social sciences. In the 
chapter The moral blindness of scientific man, Morgenthau criticised that ideologies, in 
this case liberalism, bereave human beings of values upon which political power would 
have to rest and which would have to be implemented to re-establish them. Hence, 
Morgenthau did not endorse but instead criticised a society whose lack of values would 
cause people to fall back to its animal-like state. This is why Morgenthau eventually 
abandoned Freud. Not that he disagreed with him for elaborating these basic human 
drives. On the contrary, as it was mentioned, Morgenthau applied them also in his later 
works, but Freud could not provide the normativity Morgenthau (1984, p. 14) aimed to 
establish.  
To sum up, Morgenthau, referring to Nietzsche and predominantly Freud, perceived 
the human being to be determined by two fundamental drives: the drive of self-
preservation and the drive to prove oneself. In their urge to devote oneself to hedonism, 
both drives would cause human existence to become tragic, as for various reasons 
pleasure could never be fully achieved. However, human beings are by no means only 
slaves to their drives as otherwise there would be little difference to animals, although 
they are in danger of being turned into animals, due to the absence of values to constrain 
these drives. Hence, and this will be analysed next, for Morgenthau normative postu-
lates were important for politics and society. ‘Man is a political animal by nature; he is a 
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scientist by chance or choice; he is a moralist because he is man’ (Morgenthau, 1947a,  
p. 145) and Morgenthau argued that this moralism has to manifest itself in the compre-
hension of the concept of power.56 
 
4.3 Morgenthau’s dual concept of power 
4.3.1 The animus dominandi: Morgenthau’s sole concept of power? 
Recapitulating the last section, students of International Relations are inclined to ar-
gue that Morgenthau’s concept of power is essentially the drive to prove oneself and is 
therefore synonymous with Freud’s sexual instinct, as Schuett (2007, p. 60) does. In-
deed, also Scheuerman (2009a, p.52-3) pays tribute to the influence of psychoanalysis 
on Morgenthau’s development of power. Certainly, there is a kernel of truth in it, as 
mentioned, and Morgenthau employed the figure of animus dominandi, ‘the desire for 
power’ (1947a, p. 165), in a few of his academic writings. In the 1960s, for example, 
Morgenthau (1962c) devoted an entire article to the relation between love and power 
and as late as the 1970s he referred to this lust for power (1970c, p. 69; 1972, p. 31; 
2004, p. 53). Hence, a cursory reading would endorse Schuett’s assessment and see that 
a fraction of Morgenthau’s concept of power resembles Freud’s sexual instinct. As the 
remainder of this chapter will point out, however, Morgenthau’s concept of power was 
not the animus dominandi, but fundamentally opposed to it on normative terms  
(Fromkin, 1993, p. 82).  
Before this argument is further elaborated, we have to return to the Freud-claim for 
the moment since there is some truth in it. This element of truth lies in the fact that the 
lust for power was considered by Morgenthau as prevalent in his times and as shown in 
Morgenthau’s statement, ‘je constate simplement ce que je vois’ (1936, p. 5), he was 
aware of the necessity to deal with this concept analytically. Hence, Morgenthau ac-
cepted it as an empirical concept of power. This concept would allow it to be related to 
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Weber’s notion of power. Indeed, despite the fact that Frei (2001) argued not to overes-
timate Weber’s influence on Morgenthau, there is strong agreement within International 
Relations that Morgenthau owes this concept to Weber (e.g. Pichler, 1998; Barkawi, 
1998; Turner, 2009; Turner and Mazur, 2009). Weber defined power as ‘… the prob-
ability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his 
own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests’ 
(1978, p. 53).57 If the human being would solely be guided by a lust for power, meaning 
that he/she would constantly aim to acquire power, people would, indeed, try to take 
any chance to dominate others, as Weber wrote. This means power would be sought re-
gardless if there is legitimation for it or not because its aspiration is inherent in human 
nature. As Morgenthau argued in his doctoral (1929a) and postdoctoral thesis (1934a), 
at least on the international level, there would be no societal restrictions to hinder peo-
ple from seeking to fulfil their lust for power.  
Since Morgenthau did not endorse this concept, but understood it only as empirically 
prevalent in his times, it illustrates that he did not consider power simply in terms of 
military or economic capabilities for which he was later denounced. As the elaboration 
of the drive to prove oneself already suggested, Morgenthau (1930c, p. 41) made clear 
that power is not to be confused with force. Force may be applied to achieve power, but 
power should be of ‘durchgehende[r] Geistigkeit’ (constant spirituality) (Morgenthau, 
1930c, p. 43). In Politics among Nations Morgenthau was even more precise by remark-
ing that ‘[p]olitical power is a psychological relation between those who exercise it and 
those over whom it is exercised. It gives the former control over certain actions of the 
latter through the impact which the former exerts on the latter’s minds’ (1985, p. 32). 
Also late in his life Morgenthau (1970a, p. 436) referred back to this Weberian-Freudian 
concept of power. This conceptualisation of power entails three strategies of how to deal 
with it. In Politics as Vocation, which Morgenthau has apparently read enthusiastically 
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(Shilliam, 2007, p. 312)58, Weber noted that ‘[w]hen we say that a question is “politi-
cal” ... we always mean the same thing. This is that the interests involved in the distri-
bution or preservation of power, or a shift in power, play a decisive role in resolving 
that question’ (2004, p. 33). Frei (2001, p. 130) has remarked that Morgenthau already 
referred to these strategies in his doctoral thesis (1929a, p. 59), but only in 1933 did he 
become explicit. Power ‘... peut viser à maintenir la puissance acquise, à l’augmenter ou 
à la manifester’ (Morgenthau, 1933, p. 43).59 Hence, due to human nature, the aspiration 
of power would require one to keep, increase, and eventually demonstrate their power. 
Almost 15 years later, Morgenthau exerted exactly the same scheme noting that ‘[a]ll 
politics ... reveals three basic patterns ... either to keep power, to increase power, or to 
demonstrate power’ (1985, p. 52). Morgenthau agreed with Weber, therefore, on how 
this lust for power is socially embodied. 
From this follows that it is reasonable to argue that Morgenthau employed a concept 
of power that can be referred back to Freud and Weber. However, this is only one side 
of Morgenthau’s concept of power. In fact, Morgenthau considered this kind of power 
as empirically verifiable throughout his life and argued that this is the power to refer 
back to when analysing contemporary politics, but there ought to be a different kind of 
power which will be elaborated next. Frei (2001, p. 131-2) argues that, although 
Morgenthau (1933, p. 9; 1985, p. 53) pointed out several times that this concept of 
power is only provisional, Morgenthau gradually transformed its tentativeness into a 
constant since he did not alter this concept anymore.60 However, it was not his concept 
of power that turned into a constant per se, but for Morgenthau modern societies would 
have transformed from ideological tentativeness into a constant. Therefore, he had to 
refer analytically back to this brute concept of power (Morgenthau, 1929a; 1934b). This 
in the end is the final tragic aspect of human life since, as Morgenthau explained in a 
letter to Michael Oakeshott from 22nd May 1948, ‘[m]an is tragic because he cannot do 
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what he ought to do’ (HJM-Archive 44).61 This implies that in a world bereft of values 
where ideologies blurred the people’s minds, humans would be bound to follow the life-
threatening animus dominandi. This suggests his initial deep-rooted reluctance to give 
his consent for a second edition of Politics among Nations (HJM-Archive 121). Only 
after Morgenthau had realised this ideological constant due to the rise of communism he 
finally agreed to its publication.   
 
4.3.2 Power: Morgenthau’s agent of a world postulate 
4.3.2.1 The nihilism of life and its liberation through will 
The last section has shown that Morgenthau empirically acknowledged a brute con-
cept of power, the animus dominandi, which essentially renders people as slaves to their 
own drives and can be traced back to Freud and Weber. However, its acknowledgment 
should not lead to temptation to argue that Morgenthau also would have endorsed it 
normatively. On the contrary, he disagreed with the animus dominandi and promoted a 
normative concept of power that aimed to transcend power politics of his time (Nobel, 
1995, p. 66). ‘To say that a political action has no moral purpose is absurd’, Morgenthau 
noted since ‘political action can be defined as an attempt to realize moral values through 
the medium of politics, that is, power’ (1962a, p. 110). Such a concept would help to 
overcome human nihilism which he considered as the hotbed of ideological devotion 
and, therefore, Morgenthau’s power would enable to commission citizens to the estab-
lishment of the common good.  
In the elaboration of Morgenthau’s normative concept of power, a student of his 
work is bound to acknowledge the initial influence of Nietzsche. Morgenthau followed 
several of Nietzsche’s concepts in his development of power: eternal recurrence, the 
Übermensch, and will to power. The most fundamental is Nietzsche’s insistence of the 
eternal recurrence of events and objects. In Thus spoke Zarathustra Nietzsche noted that 
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‘[e]verything goes, everything returns; the wheel of existence rolls forever. Everything 
dies, everything blossoms anew; the year of existence runs on forever … Everything 
departs, everything meets again; the ring of existence is true to itself forever’ (1969,  
p. 234). Just like Benjamin’s notion of ‘homogeneous, empty time’ (1999, p. 252), 
Nietzsche employed a concept of time and space that contradicted any teleological life-
stories and provided Morgenthau with strong arguments against ideological temptations.  
Yet Morgenthau was also aware that this nihilism of life would be, at least in the be-
ginning, a great disappointment to humans since it ‘… offers with each answer new 
questions, with each victory a new disappointment, and thus seems to lead nowhere. In 
this labyrinth of unconnected causal connections man discovers many little answers but 
no answer to the great questions of his life, no meaning, no direction’ (1947a, p. 176). 
Countless combinations of actions and reactions would provide a myriad of ever recur-
rent moments which evolve without pre-prescribed purpose or aim. However, 
Nietzsche’s concept does not imply surrendering to the nihilism of life, but overcoming 
it. In a later work, which remained unpublished during his lifetime, Nietzsche accentu-
ated that ‘[t]he unalterable sequence of certain phenomena demonstrates no “law” but a 
power relationship between two or more forces’ (1968, p. 336). This means that these 
returning moments would not only have to be agonised, but one could choose to affirm 
and endorse them. Nietzsche argued that the awareness of nihilism should lead to amor 
fati (2003, p. 157), the embracing of one’s destiny since endorsing such recurrences 
would mean relating these initially meaningless moments to oneself and, thereby, by 
even altering them ever so slightly, transform them into significant situations. This posi-
tive attribution would enable people to overcome their surrounding nihilism since, as 
Lee Spinks mentions, they could recognise that ‘life is an eternal movement of becom-
ing’ (2003, p. 131). 
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However, the acceptance of the amor fati denotes a dolorous affair since, as Georg 
Lukács noted in an early work, it would cause a ‘transcendental homelessness’ (1963,  
p. 41). As this is hard to endorse, transcendentally sheltered people or, in Nietzsche’s 
words, ‘the ultimate man’ (letzter Mensch) (1969, p. 45) would succumb to ideologies 
because they would provide a carefree, clearly structured life by monopolising accepted 
ideas of reason, virtue, justice, and even pity or happiness. The price to be paid would 
be the renunciation of one’s subjectivity. Only a few people, Nietzsche believed, would 
be apt to counteract this intellectual subordination. The super or over-man (Über-
mensch) is its ideal typification and Neacsu (2010, p. 99) recently emphasised the im-
portance of this concept for Morgenthau. The Übermensch has long suffered from the 
instrumentalisation of nationalistic thinkers who overemphasised biological or racist 
interpretations. However, Nietzsche also intended to present with this notion the intel-
lectual conception of a positive ability and will to recognise and overcome the surround-
ing nihilistic world. Through self-restraint, self-reflection, and self-assurance, Nietzsche 
argued, he/she would be able to refer the ever-recurrent moments on oneself and, 
thereby, could create new values. Morgenthau deplored the absence of the qualities of 
an Übermensch in Science: Servant or Master? This is of particular value since 
Morgenthau (1972, p. XXI) based the first part of the book on a manuscript he had writ-
ten in the 1930s.62 This demonstrates the stability of Morgenthau’s fundamental beliefs 
throughout his life. Regarding this absence, Morgenthau noted:  
‘[t]his meaningless and aimless activity may convey the superficial appearance 
of an abundant dynamism trying to transform the empirical world. In truth, how-
ever, it is not the pressure of creative force but flight from his true task that 
drives man beyond himself through action. In the intoxication of incessant activ-
ity, man tries to forget the question posed by the metaphysical shock. Yet, since 
the noise of the active world can drown out that question but cannot altogether 
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silence it, complete oblivion, which is coincident with the end of consciousness 
itself, becomes the unacknowledged ultimate aim’ (1972, p. 48-9). 
Becoming an Übermensch would however offer its bearers total liberation since 
‘[w]illing liberates: that is the true doctrine of will and freedom’ (Nietzsche, 1969,  
p. 111). It would liberate people of reactionary forces, such as ideologies and other su-
pernatural teleological visions of life, that would control reality and life in order to af-
firm the status quo; an argument that was endorsed by Morgenthau, as the last chapter 
demonstrated. The Übermensch would also liberate from ostensible eternal dichotomies. 
This would be the case because these dichotomies would not have universal meaning, 
but would be created to legitimise cultural habits and policies (Nietzsche, 1969, p. 84-6). 
An example of Morgenthau’s refusal of such ostensible absolute, yet simplifying di-
chotomies is stipulated in a letter to Bryon Dobell, then editor of the Book World, from 
9th July 1968 which deserves to be quoted at length since it not only reflects on the ni-
hilism of life, but also provides insight into Morgenthau’s political agency to be dis-
cussed in chapter six: 
‘[N]ot being God, I am unable to pass judgement on student dissent in terms of 
“good” or “bad”. What the students revolt against in the universities is what they 
are revolting against in the world at large. That world, thoroughly secularized 
and dedicated to the production of consumer goods and weapons of mass de-
struction, has lost its meaning. The university does not raise, let alone answer, 
the existential questions the students ask about themselves and their world. That 
world is also thoroughly mechanized and bureaucratized. Thus it diminishes the 
individual who must rely on others rather than himself for the satisfaction of his 
wants, from the necessities of life to his spiritual and philosophical longings’ 
(HJM-Archive 43). 
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From this quotation, the scholar of International Relations can infer that politics was for 
Morgenthau a social realm in which people would not have to succumb to structural ob-
ligations manifested in dichotomies of good and bad, right and wrong, or friend and foe, 
as Schmitt had argued, but people could follow their interests and participate in the 
creation of their own life-world. 
Therefore, this liberation would have been the requirement to actively create life-
worlds and value systems by ascribing meaning to recurrent moments. Morgenthau re-
flected on this meaning-attribution by considering the counterpart of life: death. Death 
would be a form of liberation, as Morgenthau elaborated in his manuscript Der 
Selbstmord mit gutem Gewissen (1930b), thereby picking up the thought of one of 
Nietzsche’s aphorisms in the Gay Science and returned to the thought much later in  
Science: Servant or Master?63 Morgenthau argued that death ‘… is the very negation of 
all men experiences as specifically human in his existence: the consciousness of himself 
and of his world, the remembrance of things past and the ambitions of things to come, a 
creativeness in thought and action that aspires to … the eternal’ (1972, p. 144). Yet, 
Morgenthau argued that even for humans who disapproved religious discourses of eter-
nity or ideological promises of immortality, death would signify no end of liberation. 
He saw one explanation in the pieces of reminiscence, be it in the polis or the oikos, 
they would leave behind as results of their efforts to actively give meaning to life. Fur-
thermore, even death itself could become a liberating experience since, by committing 
suicide with a good conscience, people would be enabled to master their biological 
death by choosing place, time, and tenor of their own death (Morgenthau, 1972, p. 144-
5). This proves that Morgenthau endorsed Nietzsche’s concepts of eternal recurrence 
and the Übermensch to describe his life-world and criticise his contemporaries about 
their deficiencies. By doing so these concepts mark the basis of his concept of power.  
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4.3.2.2 Power as a liberating end: Morgenthau’s pledge for normativity  
Morgenthau not only endorsed Nietzsche’s concepts of eternal recurrence and the 
Übermensch as primary requirements of his normative concept of power, but also fol-
lowed to a certain extent in his elaboration Nietzsche’s will to power. This will to power 
is essentially the Übermensch’s aspiration to discern. To be able to understand the nihil-
ism and to overcome it by attaching value to initially insignificant moments, hence, by 
alluding one’s surrounding world to oneself, the will to power finds its expression. 
Nietzsche remarked that ‘[m]an first implanted values into things to maintain himself – 
he created the meaning of things, a human meaning … Only through evaluation is there 
value: and without evaluation the nut of existence would be hollow’ (1969, p. 85). 
Morgenthau picked up this ‘facteur psychologique, la volonté de puissance’ (1933,  
p. 43) in the 1930s by relating it to the vocation of a scholar (1934b, p. 11) and even as 
late as the 1970s, he acknowledged that homo faber would enable humans to imbed ‘... 
his biological existence within technological and social artefacts that survive that exis-
tence. His imagination creates new worlds of religion, art, and reason that live after their 
creator’ (1972, p. 146).64 Clearly, Morgenthau pointed out on this occasion that human 
beings would be capable of producing their life-worlds, giving evidence that disguised 
in Morgenthau’s notion of the homo faber is essentially Nietzsche’s will to power, un-
derstood in terms of desire to overcome (Reginster, 2007, p. 35). Hence, it would be the 
strenuous efforts to master one’s vocation by overcoming the obstacles and resistances 
that pave the way to true recognition and mastery which, eventually, would lead to joy, 
but also identity. Yet, it takes an Übermensch to vanquish such a resistance. The ulti-
mate man is not apt enough for Nietzsche. The will to power is ‘a will to overcome, 
overthrow, dominate, a thirst for enemies and resistance and triumph’ (Nietzsche, 1996b, 
p. 29). This conceptualisation of power was endorsed by Morgenthau, as the following 
passage of Science: Servant or Master? reveals:  
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‘Thus the scholar seeking knowledge seeks power; so does the poet who en-
deavours to express his thoughts and feelings in words. So do the mountain 
climber, the hunter, the collector of rare objects. They all seek to assert them-
selves as individuals against the world by mastering it. It is only when they 
choose as their object other men that they enter the political sphere’ (1972,  
p. 31).65 
Thus far, Morgenthau followed Nietzsche in his elaboration of the concept of power. 
Yet, Simmel (1995, p. 361-2) noted in his piece on Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, for 
which he was highly praised by Morgenthau (Frei, 2001, p. 100), that the former’s con-
cept of power would have accentuated the individual, indeed particular individuals, but 
would have ignored social relations. Even though Morgenthau seemingly endorsed 
Nietzsche’s individualism by observing that ‘[m]an is the victim of political power by 
necessity; he is a political master by aspiration’ (1947a, p. 153), his general assessment 
resembles Simmel’s view since in Morgenthau’s manuscript on metaphysics, he criti-
cised Nietzsche for promoting the will to power for its own sake. Morgenthau did not 
endorse Nietzsche’s view of a pre-existing reality which would consider the will to 
power and its achievement as the highest ethical value in itself. On the contrary, the will 
to power would have to be implemented in order to create a metaphysics, since ‘there is 
nothing more senseless for the human conscience than a morale which is indifferent to 
the dissolution of human society’ (Morgenthau, 1937, p. 88; my translation).66 Power, 
as a political concept for Morgenthau, needed to be relational and normative in the 
sense that it would have to contain a commitment to establish values and mores upon 
which society could rest. Throughout his academic career Morgenthau insisted on this 
normative concept of a political theory and power as its ultimate criteria (HJM-Archive 
10). What makes it even more remarkable was that this aspect was either overlooked or 
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misunderstood by subsequent interpreters (HJM-Archive 79; Morgenthau, 1947a,  
p. 178; 1959b, p. 19; 1971b, p. 77; 1972, p. 42).  
It is in this sense that Morgenthau’s concept of power resembles Arendt’s notion, as 
Rohde (2004, p. 98) implies though he pays little attention to this important exchange of 
ideas. Arendt and Morgenthau, who got to know each other in the 1950s while occa-
sionally having lunch together at the University of Chicago faculty club, intensified 
their friendship during the 1960s due to their common disapproval of the Vietnam War, 
culminating in an affectionate obituary from Morgenthau on the occasion of Arendt’s 
death (Morgenthau, 1976a; Young-Bruehl, 1982, p. 383-9). In fact, their friendship 
went so far that Arendt’s biographer Young-Bruehl characterised them as ‘thinking 
partners’ (1982, p. XV), a privilege both rarely offered. This thinking partnership also 
affected Morgenthau’s normative notion of power. Since Morgenthau never coherently 
elaborated it, Arendt’s concept, which she stipulated in her study On Violence in 1970 
and for which Morgenthau sent her affirmative remarks after the study received disap-
proving reviews (Young-Bruehl, 1982, p. 424-5), will be drawn upon as a heuristic de-
vice.  
For Arendt ‘[p]ower corresponds to the human ability not just to act but act in con-
cert. Power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a group and remains in 
existence only so long as the group keeps together’ (1970, p. 44). Hence, power would 
signify the consent of people to temporarily come together in a collective of speech and 
action by creating institutions, laws, and norms (Arendt, 1970, p. 41). Power was, there-
fore, for Arendt (1970, p. 51), just like for Morgenthau (1929a, p.74; 1933, p. 43), not a 
means, but an end in itself which explains that both scholars, in agreement with Weber, 
distinguished between power and violence. It is an end since only through its achieve-
ment would it be possible in a society to create the good life (Morgenthau, 2004, p. 30) 
which ‘… is a life that is led by justice, which is also indicated by the general concep-
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tion of politics ... that the philosophy of politics is really a subdivision of ethics’ 
(Morgenthau, 2004, p. 56). In a letter to Edward Dew from 22nd August 1958,  
Morgenthau became a bit more explicit regarding what he meant with a good life. This 
would have been ‘the preservation of life and freedom in the sense of the Judeo-
Christian tradition and … of Kantian philosophy’ (HJM-Archive 17). In a lecture on 
Human Rights about 20 years later, Morgenthau (1979, p. 25) largely repeated this defi-
nition. This absence of a clearer definition of, or investigation in, the good life in 
Morgenthau’s work demonstrates that it was a flexible concept in which the particular 
content would be based on a consensus of interests of the involved people. The integrity 
of human life and dignity were considered by Morgenthau as its basic elements. It 
would be especially the task of rulers, the statesmen, or, to speak in Nietzsche’s term, 
the Übermensch, to have such a broad telos in mind since communities would be led by 
them towards the good life or bonum commune (common good), as Morgenthau (2004, 
p. 106) also called it. As Morgenthau noted in one of his lectures on Aristotle ‘[t]he vir-
tue of a good ruler is identical with a good man. Because the good ruler, having to pre-
side over a human society of which all human beings are members, must promote … the 
telos of man as such …’ (2004, p. 91). As chapter six will indicate, the implementation 
of such a concept of power was for Morgenthau a real concern since he considered the 
underlying values destroyed what is necessary for any society to achieve the bonum 
commune. 
To conclude, the elaboration of Morgenthau’s concept of power has proven two 
points. First, power was for Morgenthau primarily a normative concept. He did not 
promote a concept of power that was based on brute human drives, be it for self-
preservation or to prove oneself, but only considered its reliance as prevalent in his life-
time. Since ideologies had destroyed old values and mores that had held societies to-
gether previously, Morgenthau argued for a positive kind of power that realises one’s 
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own nihilistic existence and by overcoming it, liberates people to take action again. 
Power then becomes a collective affair through which societies are formed and manifes-
tations of this power, such as institutions, are created that strive for the bonum commune 
with values and mores as normative guidelines. Second, the elaboration of  
Morgenthau’s concept of power has also shown that his ontology was not pessimistic 
per se, but Morgenthau critically analysed the distorting effects ideologies had on mod-
ern societies and its implications for the applied concept of power as the ultimate crite-
rion of political action (Raskin, 1984; Shinn, 1984). 
 
4.4 The tragedy of society and the necessity of politics 
4.4.1 Sociation: the relational construction of societies  
The final section of this chapter will bring the aspects thus far dealt with – the indi-
vidual and power – together on the collective level and will analyse how Morgenthau 
conceived its interplay. This interplay will primarily consider the political realm since it 
is here where power comes into play and where the possibility arises to construct socie-
ties.  
Morgenthau (1947a, p. 145; 2004, p. 105) agreed with Aristotle that a human being 
would be a zoon politikon that is a political animal for whom it is a conditionality to 
form societies. As previously elaborated, especially the drive to prove oneself, but also 
to a certain extent the drive of self-preservation, require people to interact with others in 
order to find satisfaction. Morgenthau found a kindred spirit here in Simmel who ac-
cepted Aristotle’s notion likewise. Simmel defined society as a condition, ‘… where 
several individuals act in reciprocal orientation. This reciprocal orientation always 
comes into being due to specific drives or for the achievement of particular ends’ (1908, 
p. 4; my translation). 67  This shows that reciprocal orientations (Wechselwirkungen) 
were for Simmel the constitutive factors of societies, which is why he also preferred to 
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speak of sociation (Vergesellschaftung) rather than society. Sociation would signify, 
and in this aspect Simmel’s argumentation resembles Nietzsche’s notion of eternal re-
currence, the countless ways of how the individuals’ desire to live together and interact 
would be expressed depending on their interests (Simmel, 1908, p. 5).68 Morgenthau 
employed a similar argument when he defined politics as the social realm where an ‘in-
terest defined in terms of power’ is at stake (1985, p. 5). Further evidence for  
Morgenthau’s intellectual cadence with Simmel is to be found in Morgenthau’s con-
templation about the study of international relations for the Foreign Policy Association 
on 1st December 1976: 
It ‘… is not primarily a scientific but a humanistic enterprise. This is so because 
it mainly focuses on man’s relations with other men. It is concerned with man as 
a political animal, opposing or cooperating with other men similarly defined. 
The actions and reactions … to [be understood] are … unique occurrences. They 
happened in this one way and never before or since. [Yet], they are similar; for 
they are manifestations of social forces. Social forces are the product of human 
nature in action. Given the identity of human nature in time and space, social 
forces, under similar conditions, will manifest themselves in a similar manner’ 
(HJM-Archive 21). 
This quotation shows that Morgenthau conceived societies to be human constructs 
whose shape, as Morgenthau (1930b, p. 42; 1945b, p. 10) already remarked earlier in 
the 1930s and 1940s, would be influenced by spatial and temporal aspects. Indeed, 
Morgenthau also followed Simmel in the explanation why societies would be human 
constructs because in his lectures on Aristotle, Morgenthau (2004, p. 78-9) paid tribute 
to him for having elucidated this artificial character of societies. Simmel manifested this 
construction when remarking that there would be different degrees of sociation depend-
ing on the involved interests. This may range from ephemeral unions as would be the 
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case on a promenade or with people congregating in a hotel lobby, to families and states 
(Simmel, 1908, p. 5). 
Morgenthau’s comprehension of societies as dynamic constructs dependent on the 
particular social conditions of the people who create them already gives a first hint that 
Morgenthau did not promote the nation-state as the sole and unitary actor on the inter-
national scene as seems to be common knowledge in various (text-)books on Interna-
tional Relations (e.g. Hoffmann, 1998; Krell, 2000). Morgenthau considered the nation-
state as one, albeit contemporary form of society and, as will be elaborated in chapter 
six, this did not mean Morgenthau would have been an advocate of this ‘blind and po-
tent monster’ (1962a, p. 61). 
 
4.4.2 Wither simplifying dichotomies: Morgenthau’s infinite concept  
of the political 
For Morgenthau, the core of any process of sociation was the political. As early as 
1930, Morgenthau (1930c, p. 2) emphasised that this would be the case because politics 
would be the realm in which diverse human interests would collide out of which even-
tually dominant social institutions69 such as the basic societal elements would emerge. 
Since ‘carriers of all societal forces are always … individuals’ (Morgenthau, 1930c,  
p. 4; my translation)70, politics as the balancing of individual interests was for Morgen-
thau even a presupposition of society. A similar argument was made in Schmitt’s 1932 
version of The Concept of the Political in which he remarked that the political would be 
a prerequisite of the state (1996, p. 19, 37). As Scheuerman remarked, this congruence 
is due to amendments Schmitt made to his previous essay with the same title from 1927 
after Morgenthau had sent him a copy of his doctoral thesis. Before, Schmitt pursued a 
concept of power politics that would be unrestricted by normative influence and could 
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be distinguished from other societal realms, like economics (Scheuerman, 2007a,  
p. 510).    
However, this discovery does not inform the student of International Relations about 
Morgenthau’s concept of the political and if there truly was such a close correlation to 
Schmitt, as implied by recent scholarship. Indeed, in the course of this Morgenthau-
Schmitt discourse it was argued that a ‘hidden dialogue’ between Schmitt and  
Morgenthau would have taken place (Scheuerman, 1999). As previously mentioned, 
Schmitt considered ‘[t]he specific political distinction to which political actions and mo-
tives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy [foe]’ (1996, p. 26). However, 
Morgenthau, having agreed with Schmitt that the term political is the core of society, 
repudiated Schmitt’s conceptualisation and, therefore, overemphasising or interpreting 
this relationship positively, is misleading. This repudiation is manifested in  
Morgenthau’s La notion du politique from 1933 and in the undated and unpublished 
manuscript Einige logische Bemerkungen zu Carl Schmitt’s Begriff des Politischen 
which Morgenthau, in consideration of the references, must have written in 1934 or 
1935.71  In these works, Morgenthau not only criticised Schmitt for his lack of morality, 
but he also criticised his analytical framework since he disagreed with Schmitt’s reduc-
tion of the political to the dichotomy of friend and foe as tautological. He argued that 
love and hate would be human traits that are expressed in personal beliefs and tastes, 
but would not be sufficient to distinguish the political realm (Morgenthau, 1933, p. 52-
3). The distinction between friend and foe would be politically tautological because 
friends and foes could be of political value (wertvoll) as much as both could be politi-
cally of no value at all (wertlos) (Morgenthau, 1934-35, p. 5). What is more,  
Morgenthau would have agreed with Kleinschmidt’s assessment that this generally sig-
nified Schmitt’s approach and the problem with it. Schmitt would have decided at his 
sole discretion since he would have assessed existing norms in correspondence to the 
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‘meta-standard’ (2004, p. 17) of his own values, which is why Morgenthau (1932) 
claimed that this dichotomy would not be relevant for scholarly purposes to distinguish 
politics from other social aspects. 
A first attempt of Morgenthau to define the political can be found in his doctoral the-
sis. There, he argued that ‘[t]he concept of the political has no once and for all fixed 
substance. It is rather a feature, a quality, a colouring which can be attributed to any 
substance … A question which is of political nature today, can be bereft of any political 
meaning tomorrow … (Morgenthau, 1929a, p. 67; my translation). 72  Hence,  
Morgenthau (1933, p. 30) considered politics not as the individuals’ relations out of 
which society is constituted, but as a quality adhering to these relations which, therefore, 
would be affected by temporal and spatial alterations. At this stage, however,  
Morgenthau left aside the concept of the political since his focus of scholarly interest 
was international judicature. Therefore, he concluded that the political would require 
further elaboration since it would be physically indeterminable (Morgenthau, 1929a,  
p. 68-72). One year later, in Über die Herkunft des Politischen aus dem Wesen des  
Menschen, he returned to this unresolved problem. There, he took up the sociological 
notion of politics from his earlier book. In this manuscript Morgenthau argued that poli-
tics would be a ‘quality that has to be sought in the minds of involved individuals’ 
(1930c, p. 4; my translation).73 Politics would not be constituted through the societal 
framework, hence political institutions, but through the interactions of people pursuing 
their interests in a common realm. Morgenthau continuously referred to this definition 
of the political when considering for instance ‘[t]he aspiration for power being the dis-
tinguishing element of international politics, as of all politics …’ (1985, p. 37) and also 
late in his life Morgenthau (1972, p. 31) repeated this definition. As the premier elabo-
ration of Morgenthau’s concept of power had revealed, politics can potentially consist 
of any of the two kinds of power: empirical and normative.  
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However, as his biographer Frei notes, Morgenthau intended to promote a ‘dynamic 
and critical approach’ (2001, p. 124) with his work which is why he already stressed in 
his elaboration of the political that normative power would be an end to re-establish a 
value-system which would also enable one to constrain empirical power. This would 
have been necessary because Morgenthau considered the animus dominandi as being 
open to a ‘malicious exegesis’ (böswillige Auslegung) (1929a, p. 129). To stress his dis-
tinction and indicate his preference, Morgenthau paid particular attention to the diction 
in his German and French writings. Morgenthau (1930c, p. 9; 1934b, p. 33) employed 
the term Kraft rather than Macht to signify the political as a strife for power. Whereas 
the latter implies a dominating influence, the former constitutes energy or the ability to 
act. A more modern English term for the German Kraft would be empowerment. This 
difference of meaning is further supported by their etymology and certainly Morgenthau 
intended to emphasise the normative claim of his concept of power by using a term sig-
nifying a positive ability to create rather than dominate.74 Likewise, in his French publi-
cations Morgenthau (1933, p. 43) spoke of puissance, instead of pouvoir. Both terms 
have a similar meaning like the German Kraft and Macht. We can only speculate why 
Morgenthau did not distinguish in his American writings anymore between these two 
concepts, but only used the term power. It did, however, contribute to Morgenthau’s 
misinterpretation.  
 
4.4.3 Meeting under an empty sky or the loss of values in modern societies  
Roger Shinn characterised Morgenthau in a short piece for Worldview as a ‘Realist 
and Moralist’ (1970, p. 9), and indeed he was. As elaborated, Morgenthau was realistic 
enough to have realised that due to the loss of values in modern societies people would 
fall back on their drives and give themselves away to an unhindered lust for power 
(Morgenthau, 1948a, p. 99). But Morgenthau was also moralistic enough to argue for a 
121 
 
concept of power that aimed to re-establish the lost values in the realm of politics. 
Hence, it is the intention of this final part of Morgenthau’s ontology to elaborate those 
values Morgenthau was arguing for. Recent scholarship intended to demonstrate that 
Morgenthau would have had a universalistic, teleological understanding of values (Pin-
Fat, 2005, p. 221-6; Cozette, 2008, p. 18-20; Neacsu, 2010, p. 33). However, this inter-
pretation fails to distinguish between the two sets of values Morgenthau was writing 
about. Although both sets of Morgenthau’s values refer to value experiences (Werter-
fahrungen) which would get accepted through the collective memory, Morgenthau dis-
tinguished between values on the individual and collective levels. First, values on the 
individual level, which will be termed here personal values, were for Morgenthau the 
requirement to establish values on the collective level. These personal values would 
have been etic in the sense that Morgenthau considered them as intrinsic to human be-
ings. Second, collective values were emic for Morgenthau as they would have been spa-
tially and temporarily conditioned. In a lecture on human rights at the end of his life, 
Morgenthau (1979, p. 4-5) disagreed with a simple universalism promoting Western 
human rights as universal goals, as it would have been the case in the United States. 
Two questions will have to be answered: What were those values? How did he consider 
their embodiment? 
For Morgenthau, values had a vital normative and social function. It would be their 
task to constrain the human drives and, therefore, secure the survival of any society 
which is why there could be no universal values, but only values which would be fol-
lowed within a specific culture. ‘[T]he common roof of shared values and universal 
standards of action’ (Morgenthau, 1985, p. 359) would provide society members with 
certainty, sense of belonging, but also compassion and the willingness to integrate be-
cause ‘norms [as the reification of values] became the most reliable weapon of the hu-
man society to protect themselves against the mischief anti-social behaviour can cause 
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them’ (Morgenthau, 1935, p. 19; my translation). 75  Therefore, Morgenthau refuted  
Immanuel Kant in his post-doctoral thesis La Réalité des Normes for having separated 
the realm of is and ought and banished them to the ‘Elysian fields’ (1934a, p. 12). Al-
though there would be a difference between these realms, both would have to be set into 
context because neither could there be an empirical world without values, nor would it 
be possible to have values indifferent to reality. Therefore, Morgenthau aimed to bring 
back values and norms as their empirical embodiment to the ‘réalité terrestre, la réalité 
de hic et nunc’ (1934a, p. 12) for the sake of humanity. Indeed, this is where  
Morgenthau’s criticism on the Nuremberg Trials stemmed from. Not that Morgenthau 
did not want to bring such war criminals like Wilhelm Keitel (head of the German High 
Command of Armed Forces), Karl Dönitz (Grand Admiral and last head of the German 
Reich), and Hans Frank (Governor-General of the occupied Polish territories) to trial, 
but Morgenthau (1962a, p.377-9) questioned the validity of turning a punitive trial into 
one of divine justice. 
Despite Morgenthau’s distinction between emic collective values and etic personal 
values, interpretations of Morgenthau’s thought often missed this distinction, not least 
because he referred to both of them as values. Still, we can attempt to distinguish them. 
In an early manuscript, Morgenthau (1937, p. 114) noted that due to the destruction of 
objective moral order the soul of the individual would have to be looked at in order to 
find the essence of these lost values. Referring to the essence of values, Morgenthau ar-
gued for the universality of personal values that would allow the creation and suste-
nance of collective values in order to constrain human drives. Morgenthau found these 
values in the German-Jewish symbiosis Arendt considered to be partly rescued in the 
United States by referring to its representatives as ‘conscious pariahs’. German-Jewish 
émigré scholars would have offered personal values such as humanity, humour, pursuit 
of freedom, open-mindedness, and sensitivity to injustice (Arendt, 1978, p. 65-6). From 
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an obituary of Arthur Schlesinger (1980) we know that Morgenthau’s personality com-
prised these values. Yet, this claim for re-establishing these values was less motivated 
by religious reasons, as Mollov (2002) implied. Although Morgenthau was engaged in 
Jewish community work in the sense of lived spirituality, such as teaching at a Jewish 
congregation in Kansas City, as previously noted (HJM-Archive 91), but these personal 
values would provide a ‘firm standpoint’ (festen Standpunkt) (Morgenthau, 1932, p. 27) 
to make value judgements, as Morgenthau demanded it for German Staatslehre. Hence, 
they would allow people to establish a set of collective values each society would have 
to create by themselves and critically, yet open-mindedly, reflect on the values of other 
societies. 
The values Morgenthau had in mind for Western societies were European values, as 
he called them in Der Selbstmord mit gutem Gewissen (1930b, p. 41-52), even though 
he refrained from a clear definition. Therefore, this thesis turns to Frei’s biography in 
which he argued that an elaboration would have not been necessary then because 
Morgenthau’s contemporaries would have been aware of what was meant with Euro-
pean values and their ‘Christian, cosmopolitan, and humanitarian elements’  
(Morgenthau, 1985, p. 269). To illustrate these European values, the sociologist 
Helmuth Plessner, a coeval of Morgenthau, is consulted. Plessner elaborated on them in 
Die verspätete Nation (The belated nation) which was originally published in 1935. 
Plessner depicted European values as the fundamental human rights, rationality and 
progress through education, the interplay of intellectual scepticism and tolerance, and 
democracy (Plessner, 1959, p. 29-31; Frei, 2001, p. 167).76 In short, these values refer to 
the humanist liberal tradition of the German-Jewish Bildungsbürgertum. Indeed, 
Morgenthau (1961a) was as a humanist, which is manifested in his analysis of the lost 
German-Jewish symbiosis before the Second World War at the Leo-Baeck-Institute.77 
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These European values would have been intended to be re-established in the Western 
World, but these are not values Morgenthau would have claimed to be universal.  
Morgenthau saw the loss of these values in his own academic environment; a topic 
which is still noteworthy today. In the 1930s he published several articles on the reform 
of juridical education in the Frankfurter Zeitung (HJM-Archive 95), most revealing, 
however, is his analysis of the problem of the American university system, published in 
the Swiss newspaper Neue Zürcher Zeitung from 10th January 1938. There, he argued 
‘that the technological progress is bought with the loss of cultural substance’ (HJM-
Archive 96; my translation).78 His solution was to leave aside an education that would 
have aimed at immediate usefulness and, instead, create a general humanistic education 
focusing on fundamental ideas and cultural goods inherent to humankind. Only people 
with such an education would be intellectually and morally capable of fulfilling their 
later roles and tasks in society and eventually establish a new humanistic metaphysics. 
Morgenthau returned to this argument in the 1950s, when he expressed growing concern 
with the development of political science and International Relations in particular into a 
positivistic science (Morgenthau, 1952a; 1959c; 1974b). He even argued to resurrect 
this humanistic kind of education, what he perceived to have existed in German univer-
sities until the early 20th century, in a letter to the editors of the New York Times, pub-
lished in the issue from 23rd August 1966 (HJM-Archive 43). 
In his post-doctoral thesis, Morgenthau also considered the realisation of values in 
the form of norms. Any kind of norm consisted for Morgenthau of two elements: the 
‘disposition normative’ and the ‘élément validité [sic]’ (1934a, p. 25). The former ele-
ment would signify the content of the norm and refers to the aspired attitude or behav-
iour. However, the content of a norm would not be sufficient to claim validity, let alone 
that people would follow it and thereby allow the norm-setter to influence their behav-
iour (Morgenthau, 1934a, p. 32). Therefore, a second element would be necessary as a 
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means to effectively achieve validity. Morgenthau argued that it is essentially any form 
of sanction that would make people follow a norm. Not that people could also follow a 
norm voluntarily, being convinced of its righteousness, but usually people’s interests 
would clash with the norm, which is why the potentiality of physical or mental sanc-
tions would have to be present. The justification for considering sanctions as sufficient 
means to enforce norms, brought Morgenthau back to his elaboration of the human 
drives. In La Réalité des Normes Morgenthau noted that ‘it is precisely the fear of a dis-
pleasure which is the most appropriate means to provoke the desired reaction through 
the norm’ (1934a, p. 46; my translation).79 Hence, Morgenthau returned to the principle 
of lust he had found in Nietzsche and Freud, and which he had elaborated into the prin-
ciple to prove oneself. Morgenthau alluded here to a paradox: people in fear of losing 
possibilities to increase pleasure or being exposed to displeasure would follow the 
norms and thereby restrict their lust, resulting in giving away the possibility to achieve 
even more. In other words, the fear of losing the possibility to increase lust altogether 
would be stronger than the incentive to increase lust even more. Nevertheless,  
Morgenthau believed only sanctions would make people succumb to norms, since oth-
erwise, as Morgenthau noted in one of his first American publications, it remains ‘… a 
mere idea, a wish, a suggestion, but not a valid rule’ (1940, p. 276). 
Finally, for Morgenthau, norms could have taken three forms of sanctions. First, 
people would get sanctioned through morality, which he considered to be the most fun-
damental norm because the individual’s conscience would act as the ‘tribunal intérieur 
dans l’homme’ (Morgenthau, 1934a, p. 59). The second kind of norms, mores, would 
act as a sanction on the collective level through spontaneous and arbitrary reactions of 
the society they exist in. This public opinion, however, would bear the risk, due to its 
arbitrariness, that the effectiveness of sanctions would get distorted since it was poten-
tially neither controllable, nor just (Morgenthau, 1973, p. 54-5). Finally, legal norms 
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would be norms that fulfil what mores could not achieve. They would offer controlled, 
and at best just, forms of sanctions since they would succumb to a normative regulation 
(law) if their norms are infringed (Morgenthau, 1934a, p. 69-88).  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that Morgenthau’s ontology possessed a profoundness 
that most studies so far have not grasped and the few who have even went so far as to 
consider it an example of transcendentalism (Rengger, 2005; 2007; Neacsu, 2010). 
American scholars in particular, stemming from a different intellectual tradition, faced 
Morgenthau’s transcendental ontology with discomfort since they recognised ‘some-
thing almost continental’ (Good, 1960, p. 615) in it. 
It was pointed out that the very basis of this ontology is the human being and his/her 
tragic existence. Religious and political certainties had vanished for various reasons, 
leaving people behind bereft of their beliefs and identities, making them susceptible for 
the distorting views ideologies promised. This development destroyed the values 
Morgenthau considered as vital for the viability of societies. Since these values are 
missing as regulatory bodies, the human drives of self-preservation and to prove oneself 
broke through unhindered. The existence of these drives, whose elaboration  
Morgenthau had found in Freud and Nietzsche, convinced him that humans are in a 
tragic position for several reasons: not only are these two drives conflicting and hinder-
ing each other in their fulfilment, but they also cause selfishness and its limitlessness 
ends in the impossibility of their complete realisation. Finally, and this is certainly the 
greatest tragedy, due to the lack of values, these drives prohibit humans to do what they 
ought to do and potentially cause a society’s downfall.  
This final tragedy highlighted that Morgenthau had two kinds of power in mind. The 
first one, the animus dominandi, which is essentially his drive to prove oneself and 
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which he further elaborated by referring to Weber, was for Morgenthau an empirical 
concept that he considered as prevalent and, therefore, had to be taken into considera-
tion analytically to grasp reality. Yet, he argued for a second kind of power which he 
employed as a normative concept. With this kind of power, which he had based upon 
Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence, the Übermensch, and will to power and which is in strik-
ing similarity to Arendt’s concept of power, Morgenthau aimed to re-establish the val-
ues he perceived to have been lost in modern societies. The disenchantment of the world 
elucidated the nihilism of life. Nevertheless, Morgenthau argued that this had to be ac-
cepted and positively transformed to get engaged into and create a good, value-based 
life. However, Morgenthau was aware that transcendental homelessness, to use 
Lukács’s term, was the high price to be paid for its achievement. Hence, power was for 
Morgenthau both the destroyer and creator of social life. 
The realm in society where both kinds of power, empirical and normative (as dis-
cussed above), are applied was for Morgenthau the political. The elaboration of 
Morgenthau’s concept of the political pointed out that he considered it as the quality of 
interpersonal relations that are subject to changing interests. From this follows that 
Morgenthau, in agreement with Simmel and in anticipation with for example Benedict 
Anderson’s Imagined Communities, perceived societies as constructed out of these in-
terest-guided relations are in constant flux due to spatial and temporal changes which 
affect them. Hence, societies, for example the nation-state, are constructed and its con-
struction depends to a good degree on the embodiment of the political, in other words, 
the concept of power. Therefore, Morgenthau aimed to re-enchant the world (Neacsu, 
2010) by applying his normative concept of power that would enable the recreation of 
the lost values. It was noted that these values primarily were those he had experienced 
himself in the German-Jewish humanist, liberal tradition of the Bildungsbürgertum he 
grew up in. Values such as freedom, tolerance, humour, respect for oneself and others, 
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and certainly prudence were qualities he considered essential to save societies, and par-
ticularly democracies as chapter six will reveal, from extinction which they were threat-
ened to be if individuals only seek the fulfilment of their drives.  
Hence, throughout his life Morgenthau aimed ‘to speak truth to the power’ (1967a,  
p. 17) by revealing the devastating effects a misguided concept of power can have, by 
pointing out that humanistic values are vital for the survival of any society, and by pro-
moting a concept of power that enabled people to constructively and positively act to-
gether. Chapter six will reveal that modern societies in their blind following of an as-
sumed logical rationalism and belief in eternal progress through technological ad-
vancement were threatened to exactly implement what Morgenthau urged to prohibit 
and negate those qualities he argued to preserve; a danger at present as topical as 50 
years ago. Before this elaboration can take place, however, Morgenthau’s epistemology 
will be turned to in the next chapter as it helps to explain and more profoundly grasp 
certain strategies, perceptions, and actions of Morgenthau’s political agency.   
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Chapter 5.  Politics is art, not a science: Hans Morgenthau’s  
epistemology 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Other than Morgenthau’s ontology, his epistemological insights have so far been less 
extensively researched. This might explain why for a long time, at least well into the 
1990s, Morgenthau was almost exclusively considered to have been a positivist (e.g. 
Smith, 1997, p. 10). Indeed even today, some scholars try to maintain parts of this claim 
by noting that Morgenthau was neither a coherent positivist, nor a clear anti-positivist. 
This view is present, for example, in Rohde (2004) and in the works of Stefano Guzzini 
(1998; 2004). 
Hence, it is the intention of this chapter to reveal that such a claim owes its existence 
to a dogmatic understanding of the development of International Relations. There are no 
traces in the vast oeuvre of Morgenthau where he would have spoken in favour of posi-
tivism. Rather, it will be argued, Morgenthau aimed to establish, not unlike Dilthey in 
the century before him for the entire Geisteswissenschaften, a feasible and intelligible 
theory for political science based upon epistemological directions which stood in stark 
contrast to positivism. Morgenthau‘s intention is already visible in his manuscript Über 
den Sinn der Wissenschaft in dieser Zeit und über die Bestimmung des Menschen  
(Morgenthau, 1934b). However, it was particularly in the United States that  
Morgenthau had realised, like other like-minded scholars in International Relations at 
that time, who were also often of German origin, the necessity to establish a theory for 
International Relations to counter the ruling dogma of behaviouralism. 
The elaboration of his epistemological foundations will, furthermore, elucidate that it 
firmly rested on the earlier mentioned alienation as a source of self-reflection and re-
veals that Morgenthau’s epistemology was formed within the concerns that German 
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humanities troubled at that time. Morgenthau developed them along the line of the con-
troversy between historicism and historism. Essentially, this was a debate whether to 
accept the relativism of knowledge or truth claims, as emphasised in Stefan Berger’s 
definition:  
‘I deliberately use the term “historism” … rather than “historicism”... Whereas 
“historism” (… Historismus) … can be seen as an evolutionary, reformist con-
cept which understands all political order as historically developed and grown, 
“historicism” (Historizismus), as defined and rejected by Karl Popper, is based 
on the notion that history develops according to predetermined laws towards a 
particular end’ (2001, p. 28; emphasis in the original).80  
Hence, this debate dealt with the question whether historically determined knowledge is 
absolute or if it has to be relativised in terms of the particular historical contexts in 
which knowledge was constructed. The epistemology that Morgenthau exercised al-
lowed him to critically reflect on his and the position of others. Besides, it enabled him 
to critically question and uncover what could be consciously discernible and which 
processes and forces would shape social relations. Such an epistemology, geared by 
alienation, enabled Morgenthau to develop a method best called conceptual history (Be-
griffsgeschichte) as it allowed him to transcend trivial everyday occurrences and to 
identify general political concepts. Certainly, Morgenthau is to be criticised for not hav-
ing pointed out the centrality of alienation for his epistemology as it would have al-
lowed later students of Morgenthau’s work to more easily distinguish his core epistemo-
logical concepts. However, as with the previously mentioned European values,  
Morgenthau considered this as widely known. This wide acceptance of alienation as an 
epistemological source is to be remarked in Schütz’s The phenomenology of the social 
world, originally published in 1932, in which he argued that alienation would be the 
very essence of any social science (1967, p. 140-1).  
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In order to elaborate these arguments it will first be necessary to analyse  
Morgenthau’s attitude towards positivism (Chapter 5.2). This will contain a critical as-
sessment of major forms of positivistic sciences he encountered during his lifetime: le-
gal positivism in Europe and behaviouralism in the United States. This section will be 
finished with an analysis of the main concerns Morgenthau had with positivism: ration-
alism and empiricism. This leaves the task to elucidate the epistemological foundations 
Morgenthau rested his approach on. It will be pointed out that concepts of intersubjec-
tivity, temporality, and spatiality were crucial aspects Morgenthau considered for the 
construction of knowledge (Chapter 5.3). Finally, this will be followed by the elabora-
tion of his analytical framework to approach and understand politics (Chapter 5.4). It 
will be emphasised that this framework rested on ‘principles of politics’ (Morgenthau 
and Thompson, 1950) or ‘perennial problems’ (Morgenthau, 1955, p. 434; 1962a, p. 19). 
It will also contain a correlation of his conceptual history with intellectual forerunners 
of this approach, primarily to be found in Swiss representatives of art history, to give 
further evidence for Morgenthau’s intellectual coherence that rested upon Central Euro-
pean humanities and social sciences. 
 
5.2 The insufficiency of positivism 
5.2.1 Morgenthau’s dispute with legal positivism and behaviouralism  
5.2.1.1 Hans Kelsen and legal positivism  
Before analysing Morgenthau’s own epistemology and the concerns he had with 
positivism, it first has to be remarked what Morgenthau perceived to be positivism. For 
Morgenthau (1936, p. 1; 1940, p.201) a positivistic approach mainly concentrated on 
empirically verifiable objects and disapproval of metaphysics and is, therefore, to be 
understood similarly to what Hoffmann called, by referring to Ralf Dahrendorf, ‘applied 
Enlightenment’ (1977, p. 45). Often positivistic approaches would try to apply methods 
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of natural sciences for social scientific questions in order to establish a unity of science. 
For Morgenthau, therefore, positivism promoted a scientific method through deductive 
reasoning and the establishment of hypotheses. Since positivistic scholars concentrated 
on social objects that could be verified through observation, it was, finally, commonly 
believed that through the testing of knowledge via empirical means a stage would be 
achieved where law-like generalisations and absolute truth statements would become 
possible. Consequently, Morgenthau believed that positivism would be geared by an 
unflinching belief in progress.  
This section will argue that Morgenthau remained critical towards any positivistic 
thought throughout his career, as was recently ascertained by Behr (2010, p. 213-4). 
Morgenthau considered positivism largely as tautological and as a set of epistemologi-
cal perspectives that would present empirical trivialities concealed in scientific language 
(Tsou, 1984, p. 47). Furthermore, positivism was for Morgenthau a retarded, even 
hypocritical undertaking because it claimed to have deprived itself from the traditions of 
Western philosophical thought, but, as Morgenthau (1940, p. 246; 1944, p. 174) claimed, 
it would have been only a sign of self-denial because, as it will be further explained be-
low, knowledge construction would be influenced by its particular context. Finally, 
Morgenthau experienced positivism as a form of scholarship that would promote the 
status quo ‘… since it substitutes what is desirable for what is possible’ due to an indif-
ference to normative concerns (1970c, p. 69). In the worst case, therefore, positivism 
would run the risk of becoming the compliant agent of any ideology because the aspira-
tion of a “value-free science” would not be concerned with value based judgements and 
would eventually strengthen the status quo. The resulting unqualified relativism would 
lead, according to Morgenthau, to a situation in which any behaviour could be endorsed 
as long as it is in agreement with what is perceived to be of factual evidence. To elabo-
rate Morgenthau’s criticism on positivism his assessment of two major forms that he 
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encountered during his life, will be examined. First, Morgenthau’s attitude towards le-
gal positivism will be elaborated, before we will turn to his experience with behav-
iouralism. 
At the time Morgenthau made first steps into academic jurisprudence, legal positiv-
ism was the dominant tradition of German Staatslehre (Jütersonke, 2007, p. 103). 
Jellinek has been one of its most distinguished representatives, but legal positivism is 
mainly associated with Kelsen and the Vienna School. Kelsen played an important role 
for Morgenthau epistemologically and personally, as mentioned above. Morgenthau 
owed the successful start of his academic career to Kelsen, which resulted not only in 
great gratitude, but also a friendship-like relationship with Kelsen. Indeed, Morgenthau 
had sympathies for Kelsen’s work. While being a law clerk in Sinzheimer’s chambers, 
Morgenthau endorsed Kelsen’s critique of modern capitalism (Scheuerman, 2008, p. 32), 
which will be of further interest in the next chapter. He even acknowledged Kelsen’s 
legal positivism as an attempt to save public law from the crisis of European culture. In 
one of the first articles Morgenthau published in the United States, he noted that  
‘… positivism accepted the breakdown of the great metaphysical systems of the 
eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries and the resulting decadence of 
metaphysical jurisprudence as an established fact. It endeavoured to save the 
scientific character of jurisprudence by eliminating from it all metaphysical ele-
ments, thus separating it from the discredited doctrines of natural law’ (1940,  
p. 262).  
Further evidence that Morgenthau could comprehend Kelsen’s scholarship is given 
in his inaugural lecture at Geneva from 1932 and an article on positivism from 1936. In 
these papers, Morgenthau considered Kelsen’s legal positivism as a temporarily feasible 
solution for Staatslehre. The breakdown of all metaphysical beliefs and the subsequent 
cultural crisis made it necessary for Kelsen to withdraw from reality and the moral, po-
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litical, and economic issues that influenced the state. Morgenthau (1932, p. 11-3) was 
convinced that if this would not have been the case, Kelsen could not have succeeded in 
reclaiming universality for Staatslehre. In this sense, Kelsen’s pure theory of law was 
accepted by Morgenthau as an attempt to partition Staatslehre from the ever-
challenging social developments and, thereby, rescuing scholarly standards from turning 
into ideological henchmen. Thus, he regarded legal positivism as being more cautious 
than other types of positivism (Morgenthau, 1936, p. 10-4).  
This initial acceptance of Kelsen’s legal positivism, however, should not entrap the 
student of Morgenthau’s work to believe he would have endorsed Kelsen’s views. Quite 
the contrary, he only conceded to legal positivism a temporary right to exist until the 
cultural crisis would be resolved. Kelsen’s pure theory of law in Morgenthau’s assess-
ment would provide no answers to the traditional questions of German Staatslehre. Nei-
ther would Kelsen have been concerned with questions regarding the existence or value 
of governmental institutions and legal orders as well as their development and demise, 
nor would he have been analysing justifications of human forms of authority. For this 
reason, due to its lack of intention, it could not address these questions which  
Morgenthau considered to be the most fundamental to humankind. Yet, people, 
Morgenthau was convinced, would strive to get meaningful explanations and justifica-
tions about the society they live in. They would aspire to make sense of the concrete 
circumstances of the life they face, but legal positivism would only provide abstract ex-
planations of the legal framework (Sollordnung) to which the state would have been re-
duced to. For Morgenthau, however, this was the cardinal error of Kelsen’s legal posi-
tivism for it would omit the human element in public law. However, such a human ele-
ment would be inevitable ‘… as long as the formation of the public reality remains the 
subject of emotional contentions. Until then it is impossible to think about the state, 
whose existence is tied to one’s own destiny, without making judgements about and as-
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cribing meaning to public affairs’ (Morgenthau, 1932, p. 17; my translation).81 There-
fore, Morgenthau renounced Kelsen’s positivistic epistemology as not being able to de-
pict the real image of human affairs. As we will see now, the kind of positivism 
Morgenthau encountered after his emigration to the United States, behaviouralism, was 
in this sense even more problematic.  
 
5.2.1.2 The Chicago School and behaviouralism 
Following the definition provided by one of behaviouralism’s foremost advocate 
Robert Dahl (1961) and by Dwight Waldo (1950), who on behalf of UNESCO scruti-
nised political science in the United States, behaviouralism is the umbrella term for ap-
proaches promoting a unified method for the social sciences focusing on directly ob-
servable reality, applying deductive reasoning and believing in unlimited scientific pro-
gress. Such a definition does at first sound similar to general definitions of positivism, 
but in one important aspect behaviouralism differs from it. Quite different from legal 
positivists before the Second World War, behaviouralists argued against the value rela-
tivism of pure positivism, and aimed to achieve the ‘… realization of a science of lib-
eral politics’ (Gunnell, 1988, p. 80; emphasis in the original), thereby giving political 
science a practical purpose. For this, they not only received criticism from Morgenthau, 
but even Kelsen disagreed in this sense with behaviouralism (Guilhot, 2008, p. 286). 
Surprisingly, Morgenthau spent most of his academic career at the University of  
Chicago, the centre of American behaviouralism, as Morgenthau himself remarked in a 
newspaper article for the Neue Zürcher Zeitung which he wrote before coming to  
Chicago in 1938 (HJM-Archive 96). Soon after his arrival in Chicago tensions devel-
oped between what Morgenthau called the ‘Merriam fraction’ and him, not least be-
cause of Morgenthau’s critical assessment of the relations between liberalism, science, 
and politics in Scientific Man vs. Power Politics (Postscript, 1984, p. 370-1). Already 
136 
 
before the Second World War, Charles Merriam and Harold Laswell had established the 
politics department in Chicago as the foremost promoter of behaviouralism in the 
United States and after the War scholars such as Gabriel Almond fostered this image 
(Heaney and Hansen, 2006, p. 589). This explains why even years later Morgenthau ex-
pressed relief that he had received tenure a few weeks before Scientific Man vs. Power 
Politics was published.  
However, behaviouralism not only strived in Chicago, but gradually became the 
leading dogma in American political science (Guilhot, 2008, p. 297), which is why it 
also demonstrates Morgenthau’s increasing intellectual alienation to mainstream Ameri-
can political science. Three reasons are provided for this behavioural turn. The first 
practical reason was repeatedly noted by Morgenthau. Any topic for which no other dis-
cipline seemed apt would have been added to political science (Morgenthau, 1955; 
1959c; 1962a). This diversity and vastness in the political science curriculum was a sign 
of little acceptance of this new discipline in the academic world, as was the case with 
sociology before (Mannheim, 1964, p. 614-24). Through rigorous application of scien-
tific methods, behaviouralism promised for political science to become a respected 
member of the higher education curriculum. A second, geographical explanation was 
provided by Hoffmann and Ekkehart Krippendorff. Until the end of the First World 
War, the United States would have had little experience with the typical conflicts and 
problems that had influenced (international) policy making in Europe. Scientification 
seemed, therefore, an appropriate means to satisfy the liberal, democratic zeal that 
would have crept over American politics after having been involved in the First World 
War (Hoffmann, 1977, p. 42-3; Krippendorff, 1989, p. 31-3). Recently, Molloy came to 
a similar conclusion that ‘[w]ithout a tradition of international involvement, the Ameri-
cans were forced to rely on the Enlightenment ideology of reason and its 19th century 
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successor, positivistic science, as the key to effective, rational practice in international 
relations’ (2003, p. 72).  
A further explanation for the rise of behaviouralism would lie, according to David 
Kettler and John Gunnell’s assessment, in the numerous arrivals of émigré scholars to 
the United States in the 1930s and 1940s and their increasing influence in the discipline. 
In the decades after the Second World War émigré scholars contributed to an increase in 
articles concerned with political theory in the American Political Science Review  
(Kettler, 2006, p. 533-4). To counter this rise of ‘traditional political theory’ (Kettler, 
2006, p. 531) behaviouralism would have turned into a ‘conservative rebellion’ in order 
to save the traditional liberal values of American political science as many of these émi-
gré scholars represented a different kind of scholarship that focused on historical analy-
sis and, due to their experience with Nazi Germany, could not share American optimism 
(Gunnell, 1988, p. 73; 2006, p. 484-5, specifically on Morgenthau: Rosecrance, 1981,  
p. 749). Indeed, this explanation is in line with a recently proposed argument that Inter-
national Relations Theory as a discipline during the 1950s and 1960s was a ‘separation-
ist movement’ (Guilhot, 2008, p. 282) for many of these émigré scholars, but also like-
minded American scholars, like Thompson or William Fox. Furthermore, outside of In-
ternational Relations, émigré scholars contributed to the criticism of behaviouralism, as 
Voegelin’s The new science of politics (2000), which originated out of the Walgreen-
Lectures at the University of Chicago, exemplarily demonstrates. Morgenthau approv-
ingly acknowledged this similar research interest in a letter to Voegelin on 10th June 
1953 (HJM-Archive 60). This helps to explain why Morgenthau (1955, p. 450) criti-
cised during this time the separation of political theory from political science. Although 
Morgenthau was very engaged in this “separationist movement”, what Morgenthau ac-
tually wanted to achieve was to bring an anthropologically oriented theory into Ameri-
can political science. This is the case because he argued that any science would need to 
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be theoretical because its task would be to systematise events whose analysis goes be-
yond the common sense. Political theory would be essential to political science as it 
would be its task to distinguish these political elements which would be valid regardless 
of time and space from those elements which are situationally conditioned (Lebow, 
2003, p. 248-9). Behaviouralism, however, had deprived itself from this task by seem-
ingly cutting off its ties not only from Western political thought, but also from contem-
porary political issues.  
For Morgenthau this would make behavioural approaches sterile and they would 
provide no academic value, which coincides with Louis Hartz’s argument that ‘[i]t is 
only when you take your ethics for granted that all problems emerge as problems of 
technique’ (1955, p. 10).82 Until the late 1960s Morgenthau hoped his efforts would 
succeed and the behaviouralist movement would vanish, as noted in a letter to Michael 
Carder from 7th September 1966: ‘… I am inclined to think that the recently fashionable 
types of research such as systems theory, game theory, and behaviouralism will decline 
because of their sterility which is now increasingly being recognised. Conversely, I 
would anticipate a revival of interest in the traditional types of historical research and 
intellectual analysis’ (HJM-Archive 9). A similar hope was expressed by Morgenthau 
three years later in a letter to Rosemary Galli from 3rd January 1969 (HJM-Archive 24). 
Ultimately, however, Morgenthau and his fellow colleagues’ aspirations and ambitions 
failed since behaviouralism became the dominant approach in political science in the 
second half of the 20th century (Guilhot, 2008, p. 300).  
Two further objections arose for Morgenthau in his discussion of behaviouralism. 
First, Morgenthau (1944) criticised the trend towards applicability in social sciences, 
eventually resulting in attempts of social planning. This quest for certainty, which 
‘…explains the rage for premature theoretical formulation, the desire to calculate the 
incalculable … the crusade to replace discussions of motives with such more objective 
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data as word counts and vote counts, the crowding of strategic research …’ (Hoffmann, 
1977, p. 57), particularly concerned Morgenthau. Without acknowledging one’s own 
intellectual standpoint and promoting an alleged value-freeness that, nevertheless, 
aimed to foster liberalism, political science would be endangered to uncritically serve 
the liberal status quo. Hence, Morgenthau recognised here a similar danger that had al-
ready disturbed him about legal positivism in the 1930s. And as Hoffmann’s remark of 
the ‘kitchens of power’ (1977), what Krippendorff calls the ‘Kissinger-syndrome’ 
(1989)83, shows, Morgenthau’s fear was not made up out of thin air. Finally, the intel-
lectual sterility and focus on immediate applicability of science further promoted opti-
mism in the USA where, as mentioned earlier, optimism was already strong due to lib-
eralism (Shimko, 1992). Again Hoffmann’s assessment is most elusive. We read: 
‘There is … the profound conviction … that all problems can be resolved, that the way 
to resolve them is to apply the scientific method assumed to be value free, and to com-
bine empirical investigation, hypothesis formation, and testing and that the resort to sci-
ence will yield practical applications that will bring progress’ (Hoffmann, 1977, p. 45). 
As a Jew who had experienced the rise of fascism in Europe, who was forced to emi-
grate twice, and who had experienced the destructiveness of science in the wrong hands, 
Morgenthau could not endorse the almost naïve optimism of his American colleagues. 
This disaffirmation, for example, underlies Morgenthau’s criticism of American foreign 
aid. In a lecture given at the Naval War College in 1957 and a newspaper-account in the 
Globe and Mail more than ten years later from 27th July 1969, Morgenthau disagreed 
with an American foreign aid as it would base its efforts on the assumption that the 
American way of living would be superior to others and that foreign aid would increase 
the standard of living in the recipient-countries, which in turn would create democracy 
and finally peace (Morgenthau, 1958a, p. 7; HJM-Archive 186).  
140 
 
To sum up, this section elucidated Morgenthau’s largely negative relation to positiv-
ism throughout his career. He dismissed any approach based on a positivistic epistemol-
ogy because such approaches did not adhere to basic academic standards. Thereby, this 
analysis has established that any claim that Morgenthau endorsed positivism is devoid 
of any foundation. What follows is an analysis of the main criticism Morgenthau made 
against positivism as an epistemological approach.  
 
5.2.2 The perils of science: rationalism and empiricism  
In his critical position towards positivism, Morgenthau brought forward two aspects 
– rationalism and empiricism – which deserve further elaboration. As this section will 
demonstrate, Morgenthau was not fundamentally opposed to these two aspects. On the 
contrary, he also employed them in his epistemology and considered them as vital as-
pects of sound scholarship, but Morgenthau’s understanding of the purpose and scope of 
rationalism and empiricism was diametrically opposed to the one of positivistic scholars.  
As elaborated, political science in the United States has been dominated by and, indeed, 
owes its existence to the urge for practicability. Morgenthau (1962a, p. 113-26) was 
also aware that the Second World War only intensified this urge through an increasing 
personal interchange between academic, governmental, and military institutions; a con-
cern that had reached the wider public in Dwight D. Eisenhower’s presidential farewell-
address in 1961 in which he called this interconnection the “military-industrial com-
plex”. Its aim was, not least in a state of emergency such as war, to increase the reliabil-
ity of predictions by removing factors of uncertainty. Various scientific approaches saw 
the light of day during this time, characterised by an optimistic outlook due to an un-
critical belief in progress which would enable concise planning (Morgenthau, 1944,  
p. 181-5). In Great Britain, the strife for social planning got so contagious that Mann-
heim also occupied himself with this topic after his emigration (Blokland, 1984; Ziffus, 
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1988). For Morgenthau, it seemed that rationalism would provide the authorisation for 
this belief in progress because  
‘… the world is governed by laws which are accessible to human reason. In the 
last analysis, there exists fundamental identity between the human mind and the 
laws which govern the world … It is this identity which enables man to under-
stand the causes of events and, by creating causes through his reasonable action, 
to make himself master of events’ (1947a, p. 11).   
Morgenthau argued here, as Neacsu (2010, p.78-9) pointed out, that rationalism would 
seemingly allow the construction of an accurate model of the world and its social forces 
which would guarantee its internal coherence as it would have been believed that human 
beings are capable to act in full rational determination. This kind of rationalism, 
Morgenthau was convinced, would have led to the belief of having reached a ‘… 
mythological level of absolute certainty and predictability …’ (1944, p. 179).  
Morgenthau was critical towards the promises of rationalism to effectively simplify 
and mechanically analyse the social world because it is ‘complicated [and] incongruous’ 
(1947a, p. 10). Indeed, Morgenthau has to be seen here in the wider context of the state 
of the discipline during this time. Power, as the central concept of politics, was intro-
duced by Morgenthau and other émigré scholars to distinguish themselves from the ra-
tionalism of American political science (Guilhot, 2008). Morgenthau’s article Education 
and World Politics from 1955 shows this attempt by first elucidating the failures of ra-
tionalism, before pointing out the philosophical basis of political science and finally in-
troducing the concept of power as central for the analysis of political science.84 Yet, at 
least for Morgenthau, this was not a criticism of rationalism per se, but of the way it 
would have been perceived and employed. Molloy recently turned to this aspect in 
Morgenthau’s thought. We read: ‘Where rationalism provides merely an illusion of con-
trol over knowledge … rationality is an effective approach to knowledge, it is what 
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makes knowledge possible in international relations …’ (Molloy, 2004, p. 3). This is 
possible as the social world ‘… is not devoid of a measure of rationality if approached 
with the expectations of Macbethian cynicism’ (Morgenthau, 1944, p. 184). What 
Morgenthau wanted to show here is that although in theory there would be uncountable 
contingencies, it would still be possible to detect perennial problems of politics, which 
decrease the possible number of these contingencies and thereby anticipate potential 
trends (Morgenthau, 1970a, p. 242-3). Carefully applying this kind of rationality would 
allow political practitioners to approximate potential solutions in consideration of the 
specific configuration of each problem. Therefore, Morgenthau argued similarly to 
Mannheim that ‘[p]olitics is an art not a science, and what is required for its mastery is 
not the rationality of the engineer but the wisdom and the moral strength of the states-
man’ (1947a, p. 10).85  
The second aspect that Morgenthau criticised about positivistic approaches was em-
piricism. As Morgenthau’s former student Lebow (2003, p. 248) remarks, in particular 
this dimension would have concerned Morgenthau. Like with rationalism, Morgenthau 
did not criticise empiricism per se, but the kind of empiricism endorsed by positivists 
identified particularly by two devices: reductionism and quantification (Morgenthau 
1970a, p. 243; 1970c, p. 69). Morgenthau saw reductionism symbolised in the applica-
tion of, what he called, ‘method of the single cause’ (1944, p. 174-5; 1947a, p. 95-105). 
He employed this term to characterise social scientific efforts to mimic natural sciences 
by developing an approach based on deductive-nomological reasoning implying that in 
the social world the development of one particular effect could be explained through 
one particular cause. Approaches based upon this method would also have been poten-
tially factor and regression analysis and correlation, all of which were used for the first 
time in Chicago (Heaney and Hansen, 2006, p. 589). Morgenthau criticised positivistic 
political science in its inability to predict and its recourse on explanation. This reduc-
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tionism was particularly disquieting for Morgenthau (1971b, p. 77) as, like Voegelin 
(Henkel, 1998, p. 17-8), he propagated an encyclopaedic scholarship in the sense that 
political science would have to rest on a large stock of historical and philosophical 
knowledge that would allow analogies to be drawn.  
The discomfort Morgenthau caused with his rejection of reductionism among politi-
cal scientists is to be noticed in a contemporary critique on Morgenthau’s work, where it 
was presented as lacking rigorous scientific standards. ‘Science is not a reality. It con-
sists of theories or hypotheses whose truth or reality has to be established by critical ex-
periment or testing’ (Wasserman, 1959, p. 67). However, Morgenthau made clear that 
any such approach would be bound to fail because the contingencies would be so nu-
merous that one cause could lead to numerous effects and the cause itself could have 
sprung from numerous effects. Nevertheless, the application of the method of the single 
cause inspired the formulation of social laws. Following Morgenthau, they would have 
been formulated under hypothetical assumptions irrespective of complex and incongru-
ent actual social relations. Therefore, despite their dogmatic claim for universality and 
practicability, the best these laws could do is to ‘present a series of hypothetical possi-
bilities, each of which may occur under certain conditions and which of them will actu-
ally occur is anybody’s guess’ (Morgenthau, 1944, p. 176; 1949a, p. 1).  
The second device of empiricism Morgenthau criticised is quantification. In his arti-
cle Power as a Political Concept Morgenthau (1971b, p. 69-70) dismissed quantifica-
tion because in his estimation not even in the areas of political science that would allow 
a certain quantification, like voting habits, would it lead to satisfying results. Further-
more, as Molloy (2004, p.4) has remarked, Morgenthau would have criticised quantifi-
cation for its fragmentary character. This is the case as approaches relying on quantifi-
cation would only depict at best the factual appearance of the social world because they 
would not ask for the development, reasons, and implications of this factual reality. Yet, 
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for Morgenthau these kinds of questions would constitute the essence of a sound social 
science (Morgenthau, 1944, p. 244-5; 1970c, p. 67-71). In Science: Servant or Master? 
Morgenthau accused positivism that it had ‘… lost sight of the very existence of the un-
knowable’ (1972, p. 62), the reflexive character of the human being, due to the quantifi-
cation and its subsequent claim to accurately depict social reality. This claim was for 
Morgenthau the peril of empiricism, and this statement deserves to be quoted at length 
due to its forcefulness:  
‘Facts have no social meaning in themselves. It is the significance we attribute 
to certain facts of our sensual experience, in terms of our hopes and fears, our 
memories, intentions, and expectations, that create them as social facts. The so-
cial world itself, then, is but an artefact of man’s mind as the reflection of his 
thoughts and the creation of his actions’ (1962b, p. 110). 
To counter this uncritical confidence in quantification, Morgenthau proposed the 
concept of ‘higher practicability’ (1955, p. 455; 1959c, p. 131-2). With higher practica-
bility Morgenthau meant to establish those concepts that would be lacking in quantifica-
tion: to shed light on the development, reasons, intentions, and implications of factual 
reality. This surplus of knowledge would lead to an enhanced understanding of the 
world and save political scientists, like social scientists in general, from becoming a 
mere chronologist of the status quo by transforming them to their actual right to exist: to 
become able to critically assess the one existing social world and thereby pointing to-
wards a different, potentially better social reality.  
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5.3 The development of Morgenthau’s epistemological foundation in 
the interplay of German historism and historicism  
5.3.1 The particularity of being and the limitations of knowledge 
So far Morgenthau’s critical view towards positivism has been elaborated, but this 
does not yet explain his own epistemology. Morgenthau’s intellectual development took 
place at a time when German humanities were heavily debating knowledge production, 
which can be classified along the lines of historism and historicism. Morgenthau was 
influenced by this debate during his studies in Munich, where he attended lectures by 
Hermann Oncken and Heinrich Wölfflin, both of whom contributed to this debate  
(Jaeger and Rüsen, 1992, p. 141). He acknowledged their importance late in his life 
(Morgenthau, 1984, p. 5; Postscript, 1984, p. 344) and also emphatically mentioned 
Oncken in a letter to Thomas W. Robinson from 3rd November 1969 (HJM-Archive 49).  
That these scholars and their insights had a lasting influence, an effect which was 
largely overlooked in International Relations, has further been remarked by Morgenthau 
(1970a, p. 251)  when he classified his approach to knowledge as historical.86 As this 
chapter will show, Morgenthau developed an epistemology that took an intermediary 
position between historism and historicism. His foundations, which will be discussed 
now, were primarily influenced by historist assumptions, while his epistemological im-
plementation, to be discussed in chapter 5.4, found intellectual stimulation in histori-
cism due to the fact he applied general concepts to distinguish politics from other schol-
arly fields. 
In his engagement with this intellectual dispute Morgenthau learned that human be-
ings would be tied to a particular culture and even specific social groups. This means 
that humans would be in their very existence dependent on the constant mutual interplay 
with other humans and through this interplay they would develop their identity and 
world-view. Morgenthau (2004, p. 105) agreed with Aristotle that a human would be a 
146 
 
zoon politikon; through this common interplay a particular social and political life-world 
would be created in which humans could follow their aspirations. This institutionalised 
meaning of the social world would in turn influence their meaning-construction, i.e. the 
way people perceive and understand the social world. Therefore, as Morgenthau men-
tioned, they would become ‘both the creature and the creator of history and politics …’ 
(1958b, p. 17). This, what Thomas Luckmann and Peter Berger (1966, p. 23) defined as 
intersubjectivity in the late 1960s, was in its essence for Morgenthau already in Europe 
accessible through his knowledge of Simmel and Schütz’s work.87 
Simmel employed the term “reciprocal orientation” (Wechselwirkung) to identify the 
mutual interaction of people (Abel, 1959, p. 473; Kaern, 1990, p. 83-5). Indeed, recip-
rocal orientation was society’s constitutive factor for Simmel, because a society would 
come into being only ‘where several individuals act in reciprocal orientation. This recip-
rocal orientation always evolves out of a peculiar drive or reasons’ (1908, p. 4; my 
translation).88 Defining society as the entity of these reciprocal orientations and stress-
ing its dynamic character, Simmel intended to point out that a social unity in the empiri-
cal sense would only be conceivable because there would be different degrees of this 
orientation which would make it possible to distinguish different societies. To stress this 
dynamic character of societies Simmel (1908, p. 29) employed the above mentioned 
term sociation. Therefore, the dynamics of reciprocal orientation could lead to forms of 
sociation with varying intensity, ranging from the interactions of people in a hotel lobby 
to members of a nation-state (Simmel, 1908, p. 4-10).89  
Whereas Simmel primarily conceived society in spatial terms, Schütz also added a 
temporal aspect to society. For Schütz, there would be four social worlds: first, the 
worlds of the predecessor and successors.90 None of these worlds would be accessible 
for the human being: the former would already be in the past and could only be seen as 
an observer, whereas the latter would still be indefinite and one would only have the 
147 
 
possibility through their participation in the present world to contribute to the constitu-
tion of the future world of predecessors. Second, there would be two worlds of the pre-
sent: the social world of the contemporaries and of the fellow men. ‘[L]iving with my 
fellow men, I directly experience them and their subjective experiences. But of my con-
temporaries we will say that, while living among them, I do not directly and immedi-
ately grasp their subjective experiences but instead infer … the typical subjective ex-
periences they must be having’ (Schuetz, 1967, p. 142-3). The social world of the fel-
low men would be the realm of temporal and social coexistence and, therefore, the 
realm of everyday-life. The social world of the contemporaries, however, would only 
allow indirect experience. This is the case that although their social world would also be 
characterised by temporal coexistence, there would be no immediate spatial overlap 
which would hinder its accessibility due to cultural, social, or political restrictions 
(Luckmann, 1993, p. 321; Natanson, 1998, p. 10).  
A further refinement, more thoroughly incorporating spatial and temporal aspects, 
was suggested by Simmel’s pupil, Mannheim, in his essay The problem of generations 
(1952, p. 276-320). He distinguished between three concepts subdividing socio-historic 
space. First, he identified “generational locations” which, like Schütz’s social world of 
contemporaries, acknowledged that the social world would consist of multiple cultural 
entities. This in turn was further divided by Mannheim into ‘generation[s] as an actual-
ity’ (1952, p. 303). The members of these “generational associations” would share, like 
in Schütz’s fellow men, ‘a common fate or sensibility’ (Kettler and Loader, 2004, p. 
163) that would distinguish them from other groups. Finally, Mannheim also introduced 
the concept of ‘generation-units’ (1952, p. 306), where even though actual generations 
would share a common fate and sense of common problems, they would possibly re-
spond differently. Hence, there would be different units within each generation, such as 
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political parties, that would respond differently to problems and issues (Kettler and 
Loader, 2004, p. 163-4).  
This emphasises that the scholars who particularly contributed to the intellectual so-
cialisation of Morgenthau argued that societies would not only be human constructs that 
are subject to change, but the reciprocal orientation of humans would have also led in a 
dialectic process to the establishment of a temporally and spatially divergent nexus of 
societies. Simmel, for example, argued that there are several capacities which would 
enable society as an ‘objective form of subjective souls’ (1908, p. 21; my translation).91 
Here, however, merely one capacity is of interest. For Simmel, an individual would be 
capable of understanding their inner-life because he/she would live through it every day. 
Yet, complete knowledge of the individuality of others would be impossible because 
one could not know their inner-life exactly (Simmel, 1908, p. 24). However, people ap-
proximate and anticipate thoughts and feelings of others through a typification of one’s 
own experiences. This would be possible as these typifications would be tested and re-
vised in the dialectic process of everyday life situations. The more often people would 
have to test their typifications, the more closely they could approximate others’ inner-
lives, and the more coherent their relation would get. Schütz generally agreed with 
Simmel due to his ‘… underlying idea has proven fruitful and is still utilized. This is the 
notion that all concrete social phenomena should be traced back to the modes of indi-
vidual behaviour and that the particular social form of such modes should be understood 
through detailed description’ (1967, p. 4). However, he disagreed that empathy would 
be sufficient enough to constitute particular societies. Schütz claimed that empathy 
would also require a common expressive basis that would allow perceiving, understand-
ing, and transmitting the objectifications of social reality and their meaning-context in a 
similar way, i.e. signs which he defined as ‘… art-objects which are interpreted not ac-
cording to those interpretive schemes which are adequate to them as objects of the ex-
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ternal world but according to schemes not adequate to them and belonging rather to 
other objects’ (1967, p. 118). They could be verbal, but also para-, extra-, or non-verbal 
and would help to structure everyday life by distinguishing different realms of societies.  
From this follows that through the reciprocal orientation of human beings, common 
inter-subjective schemes of experience would develop. This, what Assmann called “col-
lective memory”, would be shared through Schütz’s signs, like texts, rituals, or monu-
ments, and transmitted through a common sign-system, usually language, which in turn 
would permit the reciprocal orientation. It would guide the way people perceive, under-
stand, and structure the social world. This understanding was the basis for Morgenthau, 
like for other scholars of German humanities at that time, to highlight that also knowl-
edge, as a mental result of this reciprocal orientation and expression of the collective 
memory, would be limited in its scope and depth because there is no absolute super-
temporal structure through which reality could be judged. Hence, Morgenthau was in-
fluenced by an academic environment that held the belief that knowledge was created in 
delimited groups within specific contexts and out of particular experiences. This would 
make knowledge liable to change, but also significant due to its particular relevance. 
Early on, Morgenthau came into contact with this kind of thought in the works of 
Dilthey and Jacob Burckhardt, whose significance for Morgenthau will be further elabo-
rated later in this chapter. Dilthey, whose intellectual stimulation Morgenthau acknowl-
edged in a letter to Samuel B. Magill from 5th January 1962 (HJM-Archive 39), had a 
holistic notion of an epoch and spoke in this context from a ‘life-horizon’ (Dilthey, 2002, 
p. 198; emphasis in the original). Hence, every epoch would be focused on itself and 
would create its own aspects of knowledge which would be true only in the specific 
context. Equally, Burckhardt, like his successor in Basel and later professor of  
Morgenthau in Munich, Wölfflin, spoke of a particular ‘spirit of the age’ (Zeitgeist), 
which would define the way and content of people’s thoughts (Sigurdson, 1990, p. 428; 
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Young, 2002, p. 117). Burckhardt and Wölfflin also stressed the temporal aspect of 
knowledge and argued for its changeability.  
A further source for Morgenthau’s view that knowledge would be related to a spe-
cific time and place might have been Weber as he stressed, next to the temporality, also 
the spatial context of knowledge, as Stephen Turner and George Mazur (2009, p. 486-8) 
recently remarked. Weber wrote in his Methodology of the Social Sciences that 
‘“[c]ulture” is a finite segment of the meaningless infinity of the world process, a seg-
ment on which human beings confer meaning and significance’ (1949, p. 81). This leads 
Turner and Mazur to argue that for Weber scholarship could be referred back to choices 
of value which would be situated in a particular cultural context. Therefore, social sci-
ences would be, other than natural sciences, subject to the culture they were created in 
and would be abandoned if they would not reflect the social reality of this culture any-
more. It is assumed that Morgenthau’s stance on this subject was intensified through the 
study of Weber, although the causal relation between Morgenthau and Weber that 
Turner and Mazur aim to establish is mistaken. The evidence they claim to have found 
in Morgenthau’s work is not a reference to Weber, but Morgenthau had Mannheim in 
mind when he spoke of a German sociologist (Turner and Mazur, 2009, p. 487-8).92 
Mannheim, who made a first contribution to the historism-historicism-debate in 1924, 
revived the issues of this debate in 1929 with the publication of Ideology and Utopia, 
the same year that Morgenthau published his doctoral thesis. This book, as was the case 
with Mannheim’s presentation at the Congress of German Sociologists the year before 
(Kettler, Meja, and Stehr, 1984, p. 76), was emphatically received by German scholars 
such as Marcuse and Arendt (Kettler, Meja, and Stehr, 1990, p. 1445). Also,  
Morgenthau remarked in a letter to Charles McClelland from 16th March 1949 that  
Ideology and Utopia ‘will pay re-reading, and you will probably find, as I have, that the 
oftener you read it, the more it will help you in your thinking on political problems’ 
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(HJM-Archive 53). It certainly paid off for Morgenthau who primarily gained his in-
sights on the temporality and spatiality of knowledge from Mannheim. This can be seen 
in a quotation of which Turner and Mazur think that Morgenthau was referring to  
Weber. We read: ‘political thinking is … “standortgebunden”, that is to say, it is tied to 
a particular situation’ (Morgenthau, 1962a, p. 72-3; emphasis in the original).93 Stand-
ortgebundenheit des Denkens (situationally conditioned knowledge) is a term not em-
ployed by Weber, but was introduced by Mannheim. 94  This essentially meant for 
Mannheim that the production of knowledge would be tied to a particular time and 
space in history and could only claim validity then and there (Mannheim, 1985, p. 74-8; 
Pels, 1996, p. 39). Morgenthau agreed with this assumption, as not only the above-
mentioned quotation reveals. With the situationally conditioned knowledge, more than 
Burckhardt and Wölfflin’s Zeitgeist and Dilthey’s Lebenshorizont, Morgenthau had 
found a concept that acknowledged the particularity of knowledge, but also left room 
for the acceptance that knowledge would be created in a historical process that would 
take former stages of knowledge into account. This is what Morgenthau had in mind 
when he remarked in his lectures on Aristotle in view of his own situationally condi-
tioned knowledge that ‘I haven’t come down from heaven to this chair and started to 
teach … obviously my mind has been formed by certain experiences. And naturally 
those experiences are part of my intellectual composition’ (2004, p. 137). In his article 
Power as a Political Concept Morgenthau gave further evidence for the situationally 
conditioned knowledge as one of his basic epistemological concepts. There, he re-
marked that ‘… in a particular culture and a particular period of history, there is likely 
to be one perspective which for theoretical and practical reasons takes precedence over 
the others’ (Morgenthau, 1971b, p. 74).  
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5.3.2 The relativism of truth 
Scholars committed to the approximation of truth, yet operating on the epistemologi-
cal premises elaborated above, are often faced with charges of being relativistic. 
Morgenthau, therefore, had to deal with this problem. This charge of relativism was also 
brought forward against Mannheim who considered relativism as an acceptance that 
‘there are no standards and no order in the world’ and that ‘everybody and nobody is 
right’ (1985, p. 254). Goldmann (1994, p. 269) observed that Mannheim had in fact a 
simplistic understanding of relativism. Yet, Morgenthau (1959c, p. 129) operated on a 
similar understanding of relativism, and both Mannheim and Morgenthau developed 
their epistemological concepts to counter this claim. Mannheim’s answer to relativism 
was relationism which stated that ‘… every assertion can only be relationally formu-
lated’ (1985, p. 270). Relationism for Mannheim basically meant a positive interpreta-
tion of the spatial and temporal condition of knowledge. Objective truth could be found, 
although not in the absolute sense, but for the particular moment in time and place out 
of which knowledge was created. This would be the case because criteria of right- and 
wrongness would be employed by the people involved in this knowledge construction. 
Truth, therefore, would have to be put into relation with its particular context and for 
this specific instance it could claim absoluteness due to its general acceptance  
(Mannheim, 1985, p. 253-4).  
It is unknown to what extent Morgenthau endorsed Mannheim’s concept of relation-
ism, but he certainly agreed with its implications (Morgenthau, 1971b, p. 77). One such 
implication is that the scholar would have to thoroughly study the context of his/her re-
search object to be able to understand it and to draw the right conclusions from it. Cer-
tainly, Morgenthau’s sense for alienation helped him to fulfil this task more easily than 
other scholars since due to his ability to compare he had the possibility of understanding 
the wider context while acknowledging different nuances. However, Morgenthau not 
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only considered the context of the research object, but also ways to obviate the herme-
neutic circle, as Mannheim’s pupil, Elias (2006), had demanded it in his study on 
time.95  
This realisation of the contextual peculiarity was, however, no particular new insight 
to Morgenthau as it was a much debated question in German humanities. In 1916 for 
example, Simmel gave a talk at the Berlin section of the Kant Society entitled Das 
Problem der historischen Zeit (The problem of historic time) with which Morgenthau 
was familiar.96 Simmel (2003, p. 294) argued that every occurrence is bound to a spe-
cific place in time (Zeitstelle). Indeed, only when an occurrence is related to a particular 
context, it would become historical and only then would it get a specific place in the 
flux of time. The wider implications of Simmel’s remark for Morgenthau’s epistemol-
ogy will be discussed shortly, but first it has to be questioned how such an understand-
ing of an occurrence’s context is supposed to be achieved. Morgenthau stood in the 
hermeneutical tradition which he had found in the writings of Dilthey. Dilthey intro-
duced the triptych of experience, expression, and understanding (Erleben, Ausdruck, 
Verstehen) in order to disentangle the process of understanding. Experience was the ba-
sis for Dilthey and would be created out of what Simmel later called reciprocal orienta-
tion of human beings. The expression is the manifestation of experience and the basis of 
understanding, as without an external symbolisation, access to the inner experience 
would be impossible. The realisation of this inner experience through the dissection of 
external expressions is, according to Dilthey, understanding. Academic understanding, 
and this is the kind of understanding Morgenthau was interested in, would require put-
ting oneself into an existing expression and reconstructing it from its onset onwards. 
This would require that the scholar knows as much as possible about the context of the 
expression, in other words its subjective and objective conditions. The better the context 
would be known, the greater would be the chances for the scholar to arrange the frag-
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ments in a coherent and meaningful correlation. Absolute understanding and knowledge, 
however, is to be aspired, but would never be achievable (Tuttle, 1969, p. 8; Linge, 
1973, p. 540-6; Thielen, 1999, p. 91-102). 
However, Mannheim’s relationism was not sufficient enough for the kind of episte-
mology Morgenthau had in mind. If he would have followed Mannheim’s concept of 
the ‘free-floating intelligentsia’ (1985, p. 75-88; Loader, 1997, p. 225-9), for which he 
would have been “qualified” due to his own vita, he would have run the risk of arriving 
at the same problems he had identified with methodological quantification. The free-
floating intelligentsia meant for Mannheim that certain unattached intellectuals would 
have the possibility to transcend their own limitations of knowledge, acquire the differ-
ent situationally determined forms of knowledge, and combine it into a coherent ensem-
ble. Morgenthau (1984, p.14), however, already declined the prospects of this concept 
in the 1930s because he believed it would provide no epistemological insight and was 
running the risk, as he pointed out for quantification, to produce a ‘… pretentious col-
lection of trivialities’ (1962a, p. 27). Therefore, Morgenthau needed to go a step further, 
for which Simmel’s above-mentioned lecture must have been an early intellectual 
stimulant. 
Morgenthau fostered an epistemology that was guided by criticality and cognitive 
scepticism for which a critical examination based upon an awareness of the spatiality 
and temporality of knowledge would have only been part of the process. Morgenthau, 
furthermore, argued that knowledge would only become meaningful if it is theoretically 
justified as ‘[s]cience [as the task of creating knowledge] is theoretical or it is nothing’ 
(1955, p. 451).97 This means that the research-interest of the scholar would also rest on 
a spatial and temporal conditionality and would affect the research questions, which 
would be pursued and the way the cognitive interests would be guided. Morgenthau’s 
contemporary, Schütz, elaborated this issue further. Considering an action on the level 
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of the observant, Schütz argued that this would consist of three stages: project, action, 
and act. First, there would be the project. This preliminary stage would model the an-
ticipated action based upon the intended outcome, disadvantages, and advantages. After 
laying the reflective basis, the observant would be capable of executing the project.  
This process was called the action by Schütz. Finally, after having completed the ac-
tion, it would turn into the act. Only this final stage could be attached with a meaning by 
the observer as this would be the only truly accessible part. The project and even the 
action would remain at least in the entirety incomprehensible for the scholar, as Dilthey 
had anticipated earlier (Schuetz, 1967, p. 57-72; Srubar, 1988, p. 101-3). This means for 
the scholar that only through the reflection of past experiences and retrospective mean-
ing-allocation would it be possible to gain understanding of actions, as Morgenthau 
(1970a, p. 257) also stressed. Like the observant’s action, the scholar would undertake 
an action and would be, according to Schütz (1967, p. 86-96), dependent upon two gen-
eral motives in his action. Schütz distinguished the in-order-to and because motive in 
disagreement with Weber’s understanding of motives which he considered as insuffi-
cient (Peritore, 1975, p. 137-40; Endreß, 2006, p. 70-1). The former would arrange the 
project in a means-end structure towards an anticipated goal. This means the project 
would start with the intended outcome and from there would subdivide the intended ac-
tion towards the beginning. The latter motive would find its incentive in the past. The 
because motive would be, therefore, a disposition of action whose origin would lie in 
the past.  
This emphasises that the scholar aiming to understand a particular research situation 
would be, not least due to his/her particular spatial and temporal conditionality, in 
his/her meaning-construction subject to particular interests. The awareness of one’s own 
position was for Morgenthau the crucial aspect of his epistemology. As Morgenthau 
stated in the 1950s:  
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‘The content of theory, then, must be determined by the intellectual interest of 
the observer. What is it we want to know about politics? What concerns us most 
about it? What questions do we want a theory of politics to answer? The replies 
to these three questions determine the content of political science; and the replies 
may well differ, not only from one period of history to another’ (1955, p. 453; 
1959c, p. 130).  
It is in this sense that Morgenthau tried to solve the issue with relativism while aiming 
to approximate truth. Absolute truth was for Morgenthau neither possible, nor did he 
aspire to achieve it. He strived for truth, but as the following quotation reveals, he ar-
gued for an objective truth, which would gain its significance in the relation between 
research object and scholar. This means that knowledge could only claim legitimacy in 
its particular context, but never in an absolute sense transcending space and time. We 
read in Education and World Politics: 
‘A theory of politics, domestic or international, must search for the truth about 
matters political. In that search it is subject to a purely pragmatic test. Does this 
theory broaden our knowledge and deepen our understanding of what is worth 
knowing? If it does, it is good; and if it does not, it is worthless, regardless of its 
a priori assumptions’ (Morgenthau, 1959c, p. 129-30; similar: 1955, p. 453).  
Hence, truth and its founding constituent, knowledge, would be spatial and temporal 
constructs whose relevance would be tied to this specific time and space. For  
Morgenthau, therefore, it was satisfying if knowledge would be rationally constructed 
because then it could enhance the stock of knowledge. From this follows that  
Morgenthau did not endorse “grand theories”, which culminated in the neo-neo-debate 
during the 1980s, because in their positivistic theorising they abnegated the condition-
ality of knowledge. 
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This, finally, puts also the question of re-issuing Politics among Nations in a new 
perspective and reveals an epistemological implication for his own work. It was noted 
earlier that for several months Morgenthau refused to issue a second edition of Politics 
among Nations because he argued that it had served its needs (HJM-Archive 121). Behr 
recently convincingly reasoned that also Morgenthau’s thought has to be seen as spa-
tially and temporally determined, hence, ‘historically and politically contingent’ (2010, 
p. 215). This means for Politics among Nations, which he wrote as a counter-ideology 
to fascism, that Morgenthau presumably only agreed to republish the book when he 
considered communism to be the new world-threatening ideology (Morgenthau, 1971c; 
Mollov, 1997).  
 
5.4 Conceptual history as epistemological guideline  
5.4.1 Historical patterns and perennial problems of politics 
Shortly after Morgenthau’s death, Norman Graebner (1984, p. 67) noted that 
Morgenthau would have considered the distinction of specific from general aspects of 
the social world as the primary concern for social scientists. Despite this early insight, 
Morgenthau’s concern for, as he called it, ‘perennial problems’ (1955, p. 434; 1962a,  
p. 19) or ‘general principles’ (Morgenthau and Thompson, 1950; Morgenthau, 1962a,  
p. 55), were either neglected or misinterpreted by scholars of International Relations as 
a sign of his positivistic epistemology. Only recently Behr (2010, p. 215-6) pointed out 
the specific role such concepts had for Morgenthau and in which way they would have 
to be considered. This makes it even more necessary to carefully elaborate the impor-
tance concepts would have had for Morgenthau’s epistemology and trace back their in-
tellectual development. This section will aim to find answers to the following questions: 
What were those general principles Morgenthau spoke of? Who or what can be regarded 
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as intellectually stimulating for the development of Morgenthau’s epistemological im-
plementations? 
Generally, Morgenthau’s six principles of realism are considered his major principles. 
These principles are, however, prone to be misunderstood if a contextualisation of 
Morgenthau’s work is missing as it is the case with Tickner (1991). Besides, much more 
revealing about Morgenthau’s epistemological framework are those numerous articles 
he devoted to the study of political science and/or International Relations throughout his 
career. For Morgenthau since the time of his doctoral dissertation, power was the con-
cept that primarily shaped politics, what he elaborated as late as the 1970s in Power as a 
Political Concept (1971b). As Morgenthau (1945b, p. 15) had learned from Burckhardt, 
politics could be turned into an absolute evil. Certainly, for most parts of his life politics 
was an absolute evil and that made it even more important for him to find alternative 
pathways. Yet, power was only the most central of these principles, others, which are all 
related to power in one way or another, were for Morgenthau ‘… legitimacy, authority, 
freedom, forms of government, natural law, sovereignty, revolution, tyranny, [or] ma-
jority rule’ (1955, p. 434; 1962a, p. 19).98 These concepts in turn would produce a set of 
questions with which political science would have to deal:  
‘Why is it that all men lust for power; why is it that even their noblest aspira-
tions are tainted by that lust? Why is it that the political act, in its concern with 
man's power over man and the concomitant denial of the other man's freedom, 
carries within itself an element of immorality and puts upon the actor the stigma 
of guilt? Why is it, finally, that in politics good intentions do not necessarily 
produce good results and well-conceived plans frequently lead to failure in ac-
tion, and why is it, conversely, that evil men have sometimes done great good in 
politics and improvident ones have frequently been successful?’ (Morgenthau, 
1955, p. 450). 
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On the same page Morgenthau remarked that these questions would be of a philosophi-
cal nature and would have to be addressed if a ‘scientific understanding of politics’ is 
aspired. To achieve such an understanding, however, an epistemological framework 
would be necessary to be able to elaborate the shape of these questions at specific in-
stances. Only if this takes place ‘[b]y detecting in the international relations of different 
cultures and historic periods identical responses to identical challenges, we are able to 
develop certain theoretical propositions about international relations that are true regard-
less of time and place’ (Morgenthau, 1962b, p. 167).99 This approach resembles what is 
today known as conceptual history and Morgenthau considered these above-mentioned 
concepts as valid for the political realm regardless of time and space. Through the ap-
plication of a heuristic device – Reinhart Koselleck’s conceptual history –  
Morgenthau’s own procedure can be elucidated.100  
Koselleck (2010, p. 58) accentuated that concepts would be essential as otherwise 
experiences could not be made, categorised, let alone understood. Only concepts would 
allow people to make use of past experiences so that one’s own behaviour could be af-
fected positively or negatively, depending on the experience. Morgenthau also stressed 
the importance of a concept for guiding people’s lives, when he frequently argued that it 
functions like a map:  
‘A central concept, such as power, then provides a kind of rational outline of 
politics, a map of the political scene. Such a map does not provide a complete 
description of the political landscape as it is in a particular period of history. It 
rather provides the timeless features of its geography distinct from their ever 
changing historic setting. Such a map, then, will tell us what are the rational pos-
sibilities for travel from one spot on the map to another, and which road is most 
likely to be taken by certain travelers under certain conditions. Thus it imparts a 
measure of rational order to the observing mind and, by doing so, establishes 
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one of the conditions for successful action’ (1955, p. 456; similar: 1959b, p. 17; 
1959c, p. 132; 1971b, p. 75).  
Hence, Morgenthau also argued that a central concept would be required in order to 
make sense of past experiences which would allow to anticipate and understand the pre-
sent and, therefore, to act rationally under the current conditions. These conditions, 
Koselleck (2002, p. 24-6) was convinced, would be largely determined by the employed 
language, which was endorsed by Morgenthau as a letter from his son, Matthew, sug-
gests (Morgenthau, 2009). Morgenthau always chose his words carefully and observed 
their cultural determination. Certainly, the success of Morgenthau’s aspirations is ques-
tionable because using a terminology like power, (national) interest, and animus  
dominandi invites misinterpretation. Still, language would be dependent on changing 
conflicts, class interests, friend- and foe-images (Koselleck, 2010, p. 56), and in short 
from emotions and interests that drive out of a specific culture. Language would consti-
tute a selection regarding the concepts. Even though without concepts experiences could 
not be made because language would be the primary factor of transmitting past experi-
ences, language would predetermine the creative and explanatory power of concepts 
because it would restrict the way concepts can be thought of. The reference to language 
emphasises that, although Morgenthau argued for a central concept in politics, this 
would not mean that the content of this concept would be universal. On the contrary, 
power as the central concept would differ depending on the time and culture in which it 
was used. Therefore, Morgenthau’s six principles of realism are, in Behr’s words, “po-
litical and historical contingent”, as previously noted. Early reviewers, however, missed 
this point. For Barrington Moore ‘the major weakness of this study [Politics among 
 Nations] lies in its shaky psychological underpinning. With no empirical evidence be-
yond the questionable parallel with animal societies, the author assumes that the drive 
for power is both strong and universal’ (1949, p. 327). The lack of scientific rigour was 
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criticised, furthermore, in a review in the New York Times Book Review which led 
Morgenthau to defend his work as ‘… a systematic, analytical treatise on international 
politics …’ in a letter to the editors from 23rd October 1948 (HJM-Archive 161). Such 
misinterpretations might have been the reason behind Morgenthau’s decision to add the 
six principles of realism to the second issue of Politics among Nations. At least in the 
correspondence with his publisher, Morgenthau indicated that people in whose verdict 
he trusted, suggested for him to do so to accentuate its character as a textbook (HJM-
Archive 121). Two aspects further define this relation of conceptual universality and 
particularity. 
First, political science was like a ‘spotlight’ (Morgenthau, 1959c, p. 130) because 
even though a political scientist would try to illuminate all of politics, the meaning of 
concepts would shift due to the ever-changing focus of attention or circumstances. This 
implies, however, that meaning and reality would never be identical. Although they 
would be related to each other, both would constantly change with different pace 
(Koselleck, 2010, p. 67). This different pace is what Morgenthau criticised about inter-
national law in the 1930s when he argued that Staatslehre and international law would 
be sterile and could not keep up with the changing reality. As Heiner Schultz has em-
phasised, there are four ideal-typical changes: it would be possible that neither change 
happens which would be unlikely because this would lead to achievement of eternal 
truth statements. More likely would be that either meaning, reality, or both change so 
that meaning and reality would diverge, always resulting in an adjustment of meaning 
(Schultz, 1979, p. 43-74). Morgenthau was in this sense convinced that ‘[g]enuine po-
litical thinking is action’ (1972, p. 59). Using concepts to scholarly understand the so-
cial reality would not only change the circumstances of the scholar, but also the political 
world because politics would be the inter-subjective realm and if one person would be 
changed the entire political realm would be changed. Yet, despite these constant 
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changes there would be a certain amount of stability due to its repetitive structure. Fol-
lowing the historian Fernand Braudel, this is what Koselleck called ‘longue durée’ 
(2002, p. 124; 2010, p. 59) and would be necessary because otherwise change could not 
be perceived. Events would be in their singularity unique but conditions for these events 
would be to a certain extent universal. Only this universality allows constructing con-
cepts in the first place. This repetitive, transcendental character of concepts is summed 
up by Morgenthau: 
‘Underlying all area research must be the awareness that all the specific manifes-
tations of a particular culture contain an element of universality, however undis-
coverable or improvable it may be in a particular instance. Area research, then, 
must take into account an element that transcends the limits of any particular 
area. More than that, it is this transcendent element that makes area research 
possible in the first place. For if we could not assume that, while investigating a 
foreign area, we should find not only things that are strange but also things that 
are familiar, we would not be able even to try to understand a foreign area and 
would face it uncomprehendingly’ (1959c, p. 133; similar: 1962a, p. 65).  
Second, all concepts would have what Koselleck called a ‘temporäre Binnenstruktur’ 
(temporal internal structure) (2010, p. 68). Any concept could in theory have three func-
tions and in practice it could be assumed that a concept fulfils all three functions; some-
times more or sometimes less pronounced. Concepts would be a means to create expec-
tations. Any concept would contain elements of past meanings of this concept and its 
employment would express expectations for the future. For the same reason,  
Morgenthau (1972, p. 15-6) was not convinced that scholarship could be value-free, but 
would always contain a normative element. Academic concepts would always be pre-
figurative and this pre-figuration in turn would be intended by the past realities that had 
shaped the meaning of the specific concepts. 
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What does this mean for the application of a conceptual history? Despite the univer-
sal aspects of concepts, which would allow certain generalisations, the actual embodi-
ment of concepts would be dependent on the context and the network of concepts the 
particular concept is situated in (Koselleck, 2010, p. 101-2). Hence, concepts would 
contain an etic and emic element which would enable the scholar to identify particular 
political situations while analysing them in their framework of culture, time, and lan-
guage. The scholar would have to be aware of the aspects that shaped the meaning of a 
concept and the intentions and aspirations which were connected to its usage. This, 
however, would require, as Kari Palonen notes, a ‘Verfremdungseffekt’ (2002, p. 102; 
emphasis in the original): in other words the ability to alienate oneself, which was con-
sidered by Morgenthau highly, as chapter three has shown, in order to free oneself from 
one’s own understanding of concepts, its meaning, and usage.  
 
5.4.2 The development of Morgenthau’s conceptual history: the  
intellectual influence of art history 
Turner and Mazur (2009, p. 484) mention that Morgenthau occasionally stressed his 
refusal to engage in methodological discussions due to their alleged fruitlessness. If this 
was the case then it was probably more a sign of intellectual modesty or coquetry of 
Morgenthau as he consistently got engaged in such discussions. To mention just one 
example of this engagement, Morgenthau participated in a symposium of the  
Rockefeller Foundation in 1954 in order to discuss Theoretical Aspects of International 
Relations with amongst others Fox, Niebuhr, Walter Lippmann, and Paul H. Nitze 
(Thompson, 1955). His remarks allow the student of International Relations to relate 
them to the intellectual sources that Morgenthau’s epistemological implementations 
found stimulation in. 
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Morgenthau famously stated in Scientific Man vs. Power Politics that ‘politics is an 
art’ (1947a, p. 10), as previously noted, and Morgenthau not only meant this figura-
tively. It is curious to see that this relation has been so far almost completely overlooked 
in International Relations, although Morgenthau made reference to art history in his 
autobiographical fragment and during the interview with Bernard Johnson. The influ-
ence of other scholars he mentioned, such as Weber, Schmitt, and Sinzheimer, were ex-
tensively researched. After leaving the University of Frankfurt in 1923, Morgenthau 
came to Munich to study law, but ‘… instead [took] courses whose subject matter and 
… whose professors interested me’ (Morgenthau, 1984, p. 5). One of these subjects was 
art history and his professor was the Swiss, Wölfflin. Leaving Wölfflin aside for the 
moment and, first, drawing the attention to Wölfflin’s lecturer at the University of Basel, 
Burckhardt, one remarks that Morgenthau was first of all influenced by him. This was 
the case because Morgenthau got acquainted with Burckhardt’s work through the study 
of Nietzsche. Nietzsche had also briefly worked in Basel and personally and intellectu-
ally admired Burckhardt (West, 2007, p. 40-1).  
Burckhardt repudiated against the belief that history represented a teleological proc-
ess and favoured an unattached continuum (Große, 1999, p. 538; West, 2007, p. 38). 
Therefore, Burckhardt argued against the study of history as the analysis of a given set 
of facts, a ‘quagmire of facts’ (1930, p. 4; translation Jurgen Große )101, as he called it in 
his Griechische Kulturgeschichte, which led to the aspiration of a teleological, yet limit-
less process. This shows (recalling the quotation from Morgenthau’s The perils of  
empiricism) ‘facts have no social meaning themselves’ (1962c, p. 110), and that 
Morgenthau’s insight was derived amongst others from the study of Burckhardt. Facts 
would have to be distilled and the recurrent, constant, and eternal would have to be 
sought. Burckhardt exemplarily elaborated this understanding of history in his posthu-
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mously published Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen which was only partly translated 
into English as Reflections on History (1943).  
In this work Burckhardt identified three great Potenzen (forces): the state, religion, 
and culture. According to Burckhardt, these three forces would have shaped the struc-
ture of the world through their interplay. Hence, it was Burckhardt from whom  
Morgenthau had learned that there would be recurrent patterns whose identification 
would help to meaningfully analyse the social world due to their guiding character. 
From Wölfflin, however, Morgenthau was able to acquire a further aspect. Wölfflin es-
sentially agreed with his teacher Burckhardt, but developed Burckhardt’s thoughts fur-
ther. Like him, Wölfflin repudiated against the thought that history would be a mere 
collection of facts (Kultermann, 1993, p. 177), but wanted to find the characteristics of 
an epoch or entire culture. This would enable the art historian to distinguish them from 
other epochs or cultures. Wölfflin aimed to achieve this with his formalistic approach. 
In Morgenthau’s words this approach can be classified as ‘… the theory of “prefigura-
tion”, covering not only form but also content. Thus he [Wölfflin] accounted for 
changes in style … in terms of the transformation of fundamental forms rather than of 
mere chronological sequence’ (1984, p. 5).102 Wölfflin distinguished between several 
dichotomies with which it would be possible to distinguish the different epochs. These 
dichotomies were: linear – painterly; plane – recession; closed – open; multiplicity – 
unity; and absolute – relative clarity (Kultermann, 1993, p 178; Hatt and Klonk, 2006,  
p. 77). Morgenthau employed in his characterisation of Wölfflin’s approach the term 
prefiguration for a good reason. He pointed out that Wölfflin considered these dichoto-
mies as central concepts because he believed that these categories would be recurrent in 
art works of all time (Hatt and Klonk, 2006, p. 72).  
Despite their recurrence, Wölfflin did not argue that they would remain the same. 
The meaning of these conceptual dichotomies would be subject to change, reflecting the 
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changing cultural and social realities. Entire dichotomies could be disregarded and other 
categories could become more pronounced. This is due to the changing Zeitgeist, as 
Wölfflin pointed out in Principles of Art History: ‘[I]t remains no problem to discover 
the conditions which, as material element – call it, temperament, Zeitgeist, or racial 
character – determine the style of individuals, periods, and peoples’ (1950, p. 11). This 
view that each time period would have its particular forms of life, politics, morals, art, 
and science, summed up in the term Zeitgeist, was borrowed from Burckhardt  
(Sigurdson, 1990, p. 428). Hence, both Wölfflin and Burckhardt argued for central con-
cepts as epistemological guidelines and Morgenthau’s own epistemology received 
stimulation from them as a young student.  
At the end of his studies in Munich, Morgenthau (1984, p. 6-7) attended a seminar on 
Weber’s political and social philosophy by one of Weber’s friends, Karl Rothenbücher. 
It was then that Morgenthau first got acquainted with Weber and since then Morgenthau 
was ‘… influenced by Max Weber’, as he reassured Martin Bodilsen in a letter from 3rd 
May 1976 (HJM-Archive 7). This influence Weber had on Morgenthau’s intellectual 
development has been the topic of numerous studies, but often, as for example in Peter 
Breiner’s works, the relevance of Weber was either over-estimated or one-sidedly 
elaborated (2002, p. 14; 2004, p. 141-2). The chronology of Morgenthau’s intellectual 
development suggests that Weber might have been an important source of confirmation 
for his belief in the conditionality of knowledge and political order. The initial source 
for Morgenthau was, however, the work of Burckhardt and Wölfflin. Still, Weber’s 
ideal-type103 must have convinced the young Morgenthau to have found an appropriate 
analytical tool to serve his epistemological concerns, although Turner and Mazur (2009, 
p. 490) rightfully note that Morgenthau never used the term ideal-type.  
‘An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of 
view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present 
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and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged ac-
cording to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical 
construct (Gedankenbild) (Weber, 1949, p. 90; emphasis in the original). 
Hence, the ideal-type is a concept that ‘…selectively present[s] some aspects of so-
cial life, particularly social action, for the purpose of making them more fully intelligi-
ble by re-describing them in terms of clarified concepts’ (Turner and Mazur, 2009,  
p. 490). Like the concepts of his predecessors, Weber’s ideal-type is a device that would 
help to understand social reality and to distinguish the antagonism of interests within the 
social reality by stressing certain recurrent factors. Williams (2004, p. 641-6) demon-
strated that Morgenthau applied this central concept or ideal-type to the entire political 
sphere by making power its distinguishing factor. The following lengthy quotation of 
Morgenthau reveals that he used the concept of power to distinguish politics from the 
rest of the social realms. Morgenthau acknowledged this as a one-sidedness, but as a 
necessary undertaking in order to be able to rationally analyse politics because a central 
concept would allow to make sense of the numerous, disparate elements that would 
make up the social world: 
‘By making power its central concept, a theory of politics does not presume that 
none but power relations control political action. What it must presume is the 
need for a central concept which allows the observer to distinguish the field of 
politics from other social spheres, to orient himself in the maze of empirical 
phenomena which make up the field of politics, and to establish a measure of ra-
tional order within it. A central concept, such as power, then provides a kind of 
rational outline of politics, a map of the political scene. Such a map does not 
provide a complete description of the political landscape as it is in a particular 
period of history. It rather provides the timeless features of its geography distinct 
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from their ever changing historic setting’ (1955, p. 455-6; similar: 1959c, p. 132; 
1971b, p. 75; emphasis added). 
The image of a map Morgenthau employed here, however, points to the influence of art 
history due to the fact that Burckhardt also referred to the image of a map to character-
ise his approach (Fernie, 1995, p. 14). Weber might have provided a more coherent 
elaboration for Morgenthau, but his ‘Weberian legacy’ (Williams, 2004, p. 641) goes in 
fact beyond, and past, Weber.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
The intention of this chapter was to elucidate Morgenthau’s epistemology. It has 
been emphasised that its development took part in the German controversy between his-
torism and historicism and, due to the dominant behaviouralism in American political 
science, Morgenthau’s efforts aimed to bring forward a more sound epistemological ap-
proach. Morgenthau’s epistemology was in its acknowledgement of temporal and spa-
tial conditionality contrary to positivistic attempts to bring forward a “grand theory”. 
This acknowledgement made Morgenthau even before his emigration to the United 
States call his approach realistic.  
In order to elaborate Morgenthau’s epistemology his attitude towards positivism was 
analysed. It has been pointed out that throughout his career he remained sceptical about 
the promises such scholarship offered in the forms of legal positivism and behavioural-
ism. Particularly an ill-informed rationalism and empiricism fostered Morgenthau’s 
criticism of positivism. Indeed, in the United States he became one of the foremost 
promoters of International Relations Theory as a counter-movement primarily made up 
of German émigré scholars.  
Furthermore, it has been elaborated in the second part of this chapter that  
Morgenthau developed his epistemology in response to German humanities, which were 
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enmeshed in the struggle between historism and historicism. Most influential in the de-
velopment of Morgenthau’s epistemological foundation have been scholars such as 
Mannheim, Simmel, Schütz, and Weber revealing the wide spectrum in which his intel-
lectual socialisation took part. Morgenthau combined aspects of both, at times conflic-
tive strands in an original way in his own epistemology which essentially argued for the 
spatial and temporal determination of knowledge and truth. This would be the case for 
both observer and observant and Morgenthau, therefore, argued to approximate truth 
through a critical elaboration of the interplay of the scholar’s focus, language, and cir-
cumstances with the one of the research object. This would lead, according to  
Morgenthau, to a knowledge-construction which is more veridical than any epistemo-
logical claim of the universality of truth because the scope of a truth claim is limited to 
the particular situation of the scholar.  
Finally, Morgenthau constructed his central concept in his conceptual history, power, 
and the subsequent concepts not as law-like generalisations and did not consider these 
concepts as accurate pictures of reality. He utilised them as analytical devices to locate, 
first, the political realm within the broader social sphere and, second, to understand the 
specific peculiarities of this realm. To typify the meaning of his approach, Morgenthau 
once again referred back to the world of art.  
‘The difference between the empirical reality of politics and a theory of politics 
is like the difference between a photograph and a painted portrait. The photo-
graph shows everything that can be seen by the naked eye. The painted portrait 
does not show everything that can be seen by the naked eye, but it shows one 
thing that the naked eye cannot see: the human essence of the person portrayed’ 
(1955, p. 456, similar: 1963b).  
Essentially, Morgenthau hoped that this approach would allow him to grasp the in-
terests and intentions of political actions and consequently be better able to understand 
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them. The enumeration of empirically verifiable facts seemed for Morgenthau not being 
able to depict the social world accurately. The last quotation, finally, also reassures the 
argument brought forward that Morgenthau was largely influenced in his approach by 
art historians, Burckhardt and Wölfflin, and found reaffirmation by studying Weber. 
Hence, politics and the analysis of politics were for Morgenthau a complex art, rather 
than subject to the structural procedure of science.  
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Chapter 6.  We live in a dream world: Hans Morgenthau’s  
political agency 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The final chapter of this thesis will deal with Morgenthau’s political agency, which 
was informed by the public role Morgenthau assigned to the scholar. In contrast to 
Morgenthau’s concept of power this aspect of his Weltanschauung has only recently 
received greater academic interest. Muriel Cozette contends that Morgenthau argued for 
a scholarship that agitates as the ‘conscience of time’, providing a ‘corrective’ (2008,  
p. 11-2; emphasis in the original) for (international) politics. The same year, Tjalve 
identified Morgenthau’s quest as an ‘embedded criticism’ (2008, p. XIV), equally re-
vealing that Morgenthau would have understood scholarship as a conscious, (self-
)critical, but positive and open-minded civic engagement, identified as a conscious pa-
riah (as discussed in chapter three). An important aspect of this pariah-ness was his con-
cept of alienation because, as Morgenthau learned in Europe, it was the outsider who 
became the insider (Peter Gay) meaning in particular that people on the fringes of soci-
ety could appreciate its achievements since they would be most threatened to lose them. 
This pariah-ness showed Morgenthau that, first, civic engagement would mean criticis-
ing the status quo in a positive, constructive manner. Second, being an outsider, 
Morgenthau gained a deeper understanding of the political context due to his personal 
experiences and ability to draw analogies. Not least because of this claim, Morgenthau’s 
realism was later classified as either ‘critical’ (Cozette, 2008; Scheuerman 2009b) or 
‘evaluative’ (Spegele, 1996; Lang, 2007). This discussion will not be repeated here, but 
it will suffice to let Morgenthau speak to stress the public engagement Morgenthau pur-
sued for himself in his role as a scholar:  
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‘The intellectual in general, and the political scientist in particular, to be true to 
their mission, must be committed in a dual way. They must be committed to the 
objective truth, and they must be committed to the great political issues of the 
contemporary world. They must descend into the political arena not on behalf of 
government or any other political interest but on behalf of the objective truth as 
they see it’ (1966b, p. 79). 
In contrast to Cozette’s account, this chapter will focus on the actual political agency of 
Morgenthau, hence we will follow him in his descent into the political arena, rather than 
on the philosophical and personal motivation for it as that was discussed in a previous 
chapter. Consequently, it will have a wider scope than Tjalve’s work since it not only 
takes his political, but also his socio-economic concerns into account.  
Before elaborating Morgenthau’s political agency, we have to recall that it was in-
formed by his normative world postulate. This normativity served in Morgenthau’s po-
litical agency as a guideline to explain and/or criticise contemporary political and social 
affairs, while the experiences he had also allowed him to test, solidify, or rectify his 
normative world postulate. Morgenthau’s world postulate was informed by the Euro-
pean values he spoke about in some of his unpublished German manuscripts (1930b; 
1934b). These values were attributed by recent scholarship to the Judeo-Christian heri-
tage (Murray, 1996; Frei, 2001; Mollov, 2002), to Aristotle and his claims for a telos 
(goal) in life and phronesis (prudence) as the most important virtue (Lang, 2007; 
Molloy, 2009), and even to the American founding fathers (Russell, 1990) were drawn 
upon to explain them. All of these explanations bear truth in them as they all represent 
aspects of Morgenthau’s humanist consciousness.  
To detect Morgenthau’s political agency, we will, first, scrutinise the major de-
humanising concerns Morgenthau had with liberalism if the dangerous potential of ide-
ologies is to be confined. The first concern Morgenthau had was of a political nature 
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and deals with his repudiation of idealism (Chapter 6.2). The second criticism  
Morgenthau brought forward against modern liberal societies had a socio-economic 
character (Chapter 6.3). He argued against the acceleration and commodification of life 
in which he detected a threat for humans in their quest to become self-determined citi-
zens as well as threats for the environment and humanity in general. Both criticisms will 
be elaborated by, first, asking, what Morgenthau specifically understood by these kinds 
of concepts and, second, by analysing the consequences these societal developments 
would have had. Finally, the last section of this chapter will discuss the national interest 
and world community as solutions Morgenthau had in mind to alter these developments 
(Chapter 6.4). 
 
6.2 Liberal democracies and the threat of idealism 
6.2.1 Idealism as liberal irrationalism  
In International Relations, idealism often tends to get equated with liberalism. This is 
demonstrated for example in Ulrich Menzel’s account, who argued that the heyday for 
idealism had been the inter-war period highlighted by Woodrow Wilson’s “14 Points”, 
the establishment of the League of Nations, and British appeasement towards Nazi-
Germany. It would have been based on normative constructs that favoured peace, equal-
ity, solidarity, and disarmament. Power, exploitation, violence, and war, however, 
would have been considered as excrescences of evil. Behind these ideas was the belief 
that humans would be naturally good, peaceful, and most of all rational (Menzel, 2001, 
p. 66-7). In a Kantian tradition idealists assumed that humans would be rational actors 
who aim not to physically or mentally deplete the liberty of others in order not to face 
similar threats against oneself (Crawford, 2000, p. 5-6).  
Also, Morgenthau saw a correlation between liberalism and idealism since the latter 
signified for him an extreme, even degenerated liberal position that would not take hu-
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man nature into account. As early as 1930 Morgenthau noted that ‘[t]he Germans faith-
fully salute Wilson’s 14 Points as the declaration of a new era in international relations. 
This is the case because in international questions Germans are only all too happy to 
take the most extreme positions thinkable by considering the influence of an ideal con-
struct in the creation of reality as sacrosanct or as null and void’ (1930a, p. 171-2; my 
translation).104 Almost 30 years later at a lecture for the “radio-university” broadcasting 
programme of the RIAS in Berlin, Morgenthau took up this notion again that liberalism 
would not consider the anthropological condition of politics, thus turning into idealism. 
As before, Morgenthau (1957b, p. 1-3) elaborated this argument by referring to the ex-
ample of Wilson, but also to the League of Nations and its successor, the United  
Nations, labelling them a utopian approach to international relations. The diction in both 
examples demonstrates that Morgenthau considered an idealist outlook on international 
relations as irrational precisely because of its inability to consider human nature in its 
way of thinking. Referring to a utopia Morgenthau remained unclear as to whether he 
meant a positive eutopia or negative dystopia (Waschkuhn, 2003, p. 1-14). This might 
seem paradoxical, but is clarified by looking at a lecture Morgenthau gave months be-
fore he died in 1979. We read that 
‘… there exists of necessity a relativism in the relation between moral principles 
and foreign policy that one cannot overlook if one wants to do justice to the 
principles of morality in international politics … It is a relativism in time … 
when certain principles are applicable in one period of history and not applicable 
in another period of history, and … in terms of culture … in that certain princi-
ples are obeyed by certain nations, by certain political civilizations, and are not 
obeyed by others’ (1979, p. 4). 
This quotation shows that Morgenthau argued that the policies idealism promoted, 
which he did not necessarily oppose as expressions of value and which seemed to be 
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rational within the idealistic framework of thought which were in fact not. Morgenthau 
considered them as flawed because idealism would not take into account that human 
behaviour is geared by the drive for self-preservation and the drive to prove oneself. 
These drives create emotions, desires, passions, and fears and are in turn influenced by 
the situational factors of time and culture (chapter five above). Any thought that would 
not take these human conditions into account and would operate from an ostensible uni-
versal-rational basis would become irrational in the sense of providing an unrealistic 
outlook on the world. To illustrate this, it is most revealing to elaborate Morgenthau’s 
relationship with Ichheiser, an émigré scholar just like Morgenthau.  
The intention to explain parts of Morgenthau’s thought by reference to a scholar who 
spent a good deal of his adult life in a mental asylum and who, after being released after 
eleven years (Rudmin, 1987, p. 168), ‘had been reduced to a vegetable’ (Morgenthau, 
2004, p. 41) may seem odd.  Still, Morgenthau called him a friend during the same lec-
ture and even managed to get him a position in his Center for the Study of American 
Foreign and Military Policy in Chicago as a research assistant after his release (Bayer 
and Strickland, 1990, p. 701). In American foreign policy, idealism was particularly ex-
pressed in what Morgenthau termed “nationalistic universalism”. ‘This nationalism tries 
to impose a new order upon a fragmented and anarchical political world, and it does so 
by using its own national order as a universal model’ (Morgenthau, 1966a, p. 8). This 
concept will be of further interest below, but here it is important to note that  
Morgenthau argued similarly to Ichheiser in whose writings we find a concept called 
“unconscious nationalism”. This type of nationalism would be characterised by two ma-
jor features. First, like Morgenthau, Ichheiser argued that culture influences the way 
people feel about and perceive things.  
‘If, therefore, members of two groups influenced by two different cultures meet, 
both … take it for granted that they themselves see the things … “as they really 
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are.” When they find … that others see things differently, both reach the conclu-
sion that it is the other fellow who is unable to see the things “as they really are” 
and who has distorted conceptions about himself as well about others’ (Ichheiser, 
1951, p. 312-3).  
Eventually, this would lead to the creation of defence mechanisms in order to ensure 
one’s cultural outlook. Also the second aspect, limits of insight, would result in these 
defence mechanisms which would often be the cause of conflict. In intercultural com-
munication people have to deal with symbols and interpret them according to their tem-
poral and cultural background, which according to Ichheiser may happen in four ways. 
The first two would be unproblematic as they would occur consciously: identifying 
symbols and understanding their meaning or identifying symbols and being unable to 
understand their meaning. The second set, however, would be a cause of conflict: not 
identifying symbols and being, therefore, unable to understand their meaning or identi-
fying symbols, but misinterpreting their meaning (Ichheiser, 1951, p. 313). Being un-
aware of this selective process of perception, of which time, culture, and intercultural 
communication are just three influencing factors, Ichheiser (1966, p. 554-6) arrived at 
the conclusion that social perception would be either distorted as relevant information 
would be missing or at times even inexistent; an insight upon which Morgenthau also 
operated. 
People would often simply be unaware of their own situational determination of 
knowledge, in other words of the anthropological conditionality of their thought and 
action, and, therefore, would arrive at conclusions that seem within their own outlook 
rational, but may not do so from a different outlook. What Morgenthau called idealism 
was, therefore, a liberalism that had lost sight of its own particularity and universalised 
its once transcendental political ideals into immanent objective truths. Ichheiser, in 
agreement with Morgenthau, reminded that ‘…not the generalizations but the exempli-
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fications are “the real thing”. Even if … all people were to agree with each other … that 
they are “against prejudices”, they might … find out that they refer … to entirely differ-
ent kinds of prejudices, and would therefore soon start again denouncing each other as 
being prejudiced.’ This resulted in ‘“being against prejudices” in general, does not 
mean actually anything in fact’ (1966, p. 557; emphasis in the original). Yet, as the next 
section will demonstrate, this is what Morgenthau perceived would have happened in 
American foreign politics.   
 
6.2.2 Between Scylla and Charybdis: hubris and homogeneity as political 
consequences of idealism  
This section will analyse the political implications of idealism on liberal democra-
cies105 as Morgenthau saw it. The first implication for Morgenthau was that liberal de-
mocracies would face the danger of hubris and self-centred moralism (Tjalve, 2008,  
p. 139-44). The second implication of this would be that liberal democracies would lose 
their ability to be self-reflective and consequently face the danger of becoming resistant 
to critique.  
In a 1974 piece for the New Republic, Morgenthau expressed concern about the  
Decline of Democratic Government, an issue which he had frequently addressed in ear-
lier stages of his career. In 1962, for example, Morgenthau brought together various ar-
ticles in the first part of his trilogy on Politics in the Twentieth Century under the head-
ing of the Decline of Democratic Politics (1962a). In this article for the New Republic, 
Morgenthau (1974c, p. 17) particularly argued that all democracies would suffer from 
the fact that fundamental political issues would not only be turned into political ideals 
and subsequently often codified, but that these fundamental issues would be withheld 
from any further public debate. Therefore, Morgenthau essentially argued that politics 
in liberal democracies would get deprived of the political in the sense that human inter-
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ests could not evolve anymore in the political realm. People in democracies would only 
have the choice to vote about minor issues, but not about those that would truly affect 
their social life-world. Even more so, Morgenthau argued that these political ideals 
would be reified from a transcendent nominal into an immanent actual condition. For 
Morgenthau, this would have meant that democracies face the danger of believing that 
political ideals, such as fundamental rights once they have been codified, would be con-
sidered as eternally established, rather than being the product of a continuously ongoing 
process. As he had put it almost two decades earlier, ‘… moral principles [upon which 
political ideals] rest can never be fully realized, but must at best be approximated 
through the ever temporary balancing of interests and the ever precarious settlement of 
conflicts’ (Morgenthau, 1957a, p. 9). Furthermore, such moral principles would always 
be the product of a particular historical setting which means that they would be related 
to a certain time and space and could change in a different setting (Morgenthau, 1979,  
p. 4).  
The result of this reification would be hubris, in the sense that one society would 
claim a political status of inviolability for itself, and in a reciprocal process also moral-
ism, understood as claiming a moral status of inviolability for itself. Although  
Morgenthau argued that all democracies would be in danger of succumbing to hubris 
and moralism, it was the United States he was particularly concerned with. Being the 
first modern democracy out of which a foundational myth of uniqueness (in contrast to 
absolutistic Europe) developed, the original ideals of the Federalists were gradually 
turned into manifestations of eternal truth (Morgenthau, 1952b, p. 3). As Robert Good 
put it: ‘First, the idealist becomes intoxicated with the world-embracing principles 
which are too vague and too general to provide guidance to policy … Second, the ideal-
ist dresses parochial interests in the garb of universal moral principles …’ (1960,  
p. 602). Hence, seemingly universal moral principles would become the criterion for the 
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conduct of politics because politics in the United States would have to meet the moral 
standards for good individual conduct rather than being interested in the public good 
(Morgenthau, 1957a, p. 7-9). 
This hubris and moralism was for Morgenthau particularly obvious in American for-
eign politics in which times of self-containment (‘isolationism’) would have contrasted 
with times where their sense of mission would have been internationally pursued (‘in-
ternationalism’, ‘Wilsonianism’) (1951a, p. 4; 1952b, p. 2), but which would be ‘broth-
ers under the skin’ (1951a, p. 29) because in both periods abstract moral principles 
would have been turned into standards of action for American foreign politics. This 
meant for Morgenthau that during times of isolationism, the United States would have 
retreated from international affairs even when their own interests were at stake because 
other states would not meet their moral standards. On the other hand, during times of 
internationalism the United States would have engaged heavily in international affairs 
because they would have considered their moral values as universally true and to be as-
pired by every other state. Both policies would threaten the existence of the United 
States as the former in its retreat would fail to make necessary decisions and the latter, 
quite practically, would not be able to live up to its standards. This would be the case 
because, first, the universal enforcement of these standards could not be ensured. It 
would overstretch the capacities of the United States; where the Founding Fathers 
would have aimed through their own existence to convince the world of American 
moral superiority by exemplifying what could be achieved if the common good would 
be truly aspired, the internationalism of the 20th century resembled a coercive hegemon 
by using force to convince others of their moral superiority. A second reason saw 
Morgenthau in conflictive interests. Since the United States would have pursued various 
interests on the international scene, it might happen that one or more of these interests 
would outweigh its moral principles. This, however, would lead to a loss of trust of 
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other states since these moral principles, previously presented as inalienable, would 
have to be renounced (Morgenthau, 1979, p. 5-6). Therefore, hubris and moralism 
would not only cause ‘political dilettantism’ (Morgenthau, 1950a, p. 834), but even 
threaten the existence of the United States (Gottfried, 2003, p. 23).  
Two examples will further stress this point. First, Morgenthau was critical towards 
the usefulness of foreign aid. He is reported to have argued that foreign aid is based 
upon an ‘ethnocentric arrogance’ (Winsor, 1969, p. 7) because it would be assumed that 
the economic and technological level of the Western world would be an asset to which 
all countries should aspire. However, there would be numerous goals which countries 
could aim to achieve. Indeed, the very distinction of advanced and developing countries 
would be reprehensible since it ‘… only makes sense in the absolute values we attribute 
to Western industrial and technological society’ (Winsor, 1969, p. 7). Rather,  
Morgenthau perceived the problems foreign aid recipient countries would face not as 
primarily economic, but political. As long as there would be an oligarchy profiting from 
the status quo within foreign aid recipient states, Morgenthau was convinced that for-
eign aid based upon universalised moral principles would fortify this as a morally unjust 
perceived situation, instead of changing it, despite the insertion of enormous amounts of 
money (Schatz, 1970, p. 247-8). Hence, the possibility to alter the political situation in 
these countries would lie within and not outside of themselves. Their citizens would 
have to come to terms with their situation, define a common good, and establish a po-
litical system which would aspire this common good instead of being the privilege of a 
small minority.  
Second, Morgenthau argued in a televised interview with the late William Buckley 
that there would be a ‘… lack of clarity as to what we are after in Vietnam’ (1967b,  
p. 2). This was the case, as Michael Cox (2007, p. 182-3) and Jennifer See (2001,  
p. 424) noted, since Morgenthau would have considered the Vietnam War not as a 
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struggle between communism and liberalism, but as a fight for independence from co-
lonial rule and a yearning for political and economic self-determination. This American 
misperception of the situation in Vietnam would have been based, according to Morgen-
thau, on the consequent implementation of the Truman Doctrine from 1947, which 
turned the struggle with the Soviet Union over global hegemony into a ‘moral crusade’ 
(1965a, p. 82) in which Soviet advancements had to be contained by all means. There-
fore, ‘… a concrete interest of the U.S. in a geographically defined part of the world 
[was transformed] into a moral principle of worldwide validity, to be applied regardless 
of the limits of American interests and … power’ (Morgenthau, 1965a, p. 83). In their 
misperception, the United States would have even gone so far to support the authoritar-
ian regime of Ngô Đình Diệm in order to contain communism and maintain the status 
quo (Morgenthau, 1965a, p. 32). However, thereby the United States would have de-
legitimised its universal claim to leadership, made Vietnam susceptible to communism 
as an alternate political and social system (See, 2001, p. 429), and, eventually, over-
stretched their hubris and moralism capacities.  
For Morgenthau, a second set of political consequences idealism would have caused 
was a lack of self-reflection and a refusal of critique. Treating transcendent political 
ideals as immanent standards of action, a society would have no interest in social 
change, but in the maintenance of the status quo since the argument would be raised 
that a status of perfection would have been achieved. Morgenthau stated in the Basler 
Nationalzeitung that ‘… politics, which desires stability, leads in the name of anti-
communism to the suppression of all manifestations of social unrest and to the oppres-
sion of reforms’ (Kränzle, 1976; my translation).106 Hence, such a society would have to 
enforce homogeneity which, first, stymies self-reflection and, second, would preclude 
the possibility of political criticism as this would mean to renounce the alleged status of 
perfection and, consequently, even to question one’s political ideals and self-
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understanding. Morgenthau saw this exemplified in Lyndon B. Johnson’s stance on 
public opinion during the Vietnam War as he had ‘… declared … criticism to be un-
helpful and even damaging’ (Morgenthau, 1965a, p. 50). Morgenthau (1974c, p. 15) 
found further evidence for this argument in Senator Joseph McCarthy and the “Red 
Scare” during which the professional and personal life of numerous citizens were de-
stroyed in the name of anti-communism. At a time when the Cold War had just begun 
and its outcome was still uncertain, hence a time when the immanence of America’s po-
litical ideals could become threatened, the refusal of critique, i.e. the anti-pluralism of 
political interests, had become so pronounced that its defence had become menacing for 
people who questioned the homogeneity.  
Morgenthau was convinced that in such a society there would be only two options 
into which citizens could direct their critique: apathy or violence. With the effects of 
both consequences which potentially causing the downfall of a democracy, Morgenthau 
had already experienced this during the Weimar Republic (chapter three above). For 
Morgenthau (1972, p. 104-5), political apathy meant a total retreat from politics. People 
would boycott elections, decrease their civic engagement, or even be unaware of basic 
political procedures. Political apathy could also mean for Morgenthau that people would 
get engaged in communities outside of the political realm in order to create a counter-
culture which ‘… makes him [the citizen] at home by giving meaning to his life and a 
chance for his abilities to prove themselves’ (1974c, p. 16), as he had witnessed in the 
Weimar Republic. The second consequence would be equally, if not more dangerous for 
the preservation of democracies because violence could be directly employed to usurp 
political power. Yet, Morgenthau argued that violence is a mere sign of political despair 
born out of the conviction that critique is not possible any longer and influence on po-
litical decision-making processes would be, therefore, inconceivable. Recourse to vio-
lence would at least allow the government to recognise a critique of the status quo 
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(Morgenthau, 1957a, p. 11; 1974c, p. 16-7). An example of violence due to political de-
spair was the student protests of 1968 in whose course Morgenthau became a ‘national 
figure’, as Arendt wrote to Mary McCarthy on 28th May 1968 (1995, p. 217). Students 
revolted, according to Morgenthau, because they would have been frustrated as there 
appeared to be no viable political alternative to the ruling government. They would have 
believed it would make no difference to vote for one party or another since truly rele-
vant political issues would not be at stake, which is why a change in government would 
not cause a different kind of politics (Morgenthau, 1968a, p. 9). Indeed, Morgenthau 
argued that in the course of history students in particular, as the young and educated 
stratum, would have been forced to direct their critique into illegal, violent outbreaks if 
rulers prohibited any legal form of criticism. This is why Morgenthau expressed sur-
prise in a letter to the editors of the New York Times from 16th August 1966 that German 
students had so far shown signs of political apathy rather than agitation (HJM-Archive 
43). Less than one year later in 1967, during the visit of the Persian Shāh, Mohammad 
Rezā Pahlavi, the student Benno Ohnesorg was shot dead by the police and German 
student protests broke out. 
Thus, due to the lack of acknowledgement of the anthropological condition of poli-
tics and the resulting turning of transcendent political ideals into immanent strategies of 
action that would have led to a refusal of critique, hubris, and moralism, Morgenthau 
had a special role in mind for scholars. In order to safeguard the undisputable societal 
achievements of liberal democracies and, as we will see, to prevent their downfall into 
totalitarianism, Morgenthau demanded that scholarship to take a position of (what was 
earlier identified) as embedded criticism or dissidence. This means that in striving for 
the common good, Morgenthau considered it as a patriotic task to critically reflect and 
scrutinise government decisions because ‘[t]he right to dissent derives from the relativ-
istic philosophy of democracy. That philosophy assumes that all members of society, 
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being rational, have equal access to the truth, but none of them has a monopoly of it’ 
(1970a, p. 40). If this critical inspection is missing, the government evidently would not 
follow the common good since a monopolisation of truth took place, as Morgenthau ar-
gued had happened in the United States. For Morgenthau, therefore, critical scholarship 
meant pointing out shortcomings and offering a different voice in an otherwise ocean of 
uniformity. For this, however, the scholar would have to be committed to truth in all 
conscience as he/she would have to provide guidelines for the public to facilitate their 
opinion-making. This attitude is demonstrated in Morgenthau’s assessment of the “Van 
Doren scandal”. Van Doren, a scholar at Columbia University, took part in a fraud dur-
ing a popular game show which was uncovered in 1959 (Cozette, 2008, p. 15).  
Morgenthau reacted furiously to this fraud because Van Doren had clearly breached this 
commitment to truth, which is why Morgenthau believed that a scholar like Van Doren 
‘… is not so much the corruptor of the code by which he is supposed to live as its de-
stroyer’ (1959e, p. 17; 1960a, p. 344).107  
However, Morgenthau was aware that this commitment would require a strenuous-
ness that might exceed human competencies which is why he referred to Nietzsche’s 
concept of the Übermensch. Hence, this kind of critical scholarship would demand a 
high price from its followers, as he elaborated for political science. Morgenthau noted 
that 
‘[a] political science which is true to its moral commitment ought at the very 
least to be an unpopular undertaking. At its very best, it cannot help being a sub-
versive and revolutionary force with regard to certain vested interests – intellec-
tual, political, economic, social in general. For it must sit in continuous judg-
ment upon political man and political society, measuring their truth, which is in 
good part a social convention, by its own. By doing so, it is not only an embar-
rassment to society intellectually, but it becomes also a political threat to the de-
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fenders or the opponents of the status quo or to both; for the social conventions 
about power, which political science cannot help subjecting to a critical – and 
often destructive – examination, are one of the main sources from which the 
claims to power, and hence power itself, derive’ (1955, p. 446-7). 
Certainly, this awareness is caused by the fact that Morgenthau had to pay this price 
several times during his life, as two examples will show. First, in a lecture Morgenthau 
gave in Bologna, Italy in April 1961, he spoke in favour of the acceptance of the “Oder-
Neiße-line” as the border between Germany and Poland, nine years before the German 
Chancellor Willy Brandt did so with his signature under the Treaty of Warsaw.  
Morgenthau argued for its acceptance because it would serve the interests of all in-
volved parties best (Morgenthau, 1961b, p. 6). This led to strong reactions in Germany, 
as highlighted in a newspaper clipping of the Südhessische Post from 26th April 1961. 
Furthermore, the Göttinger Arbeitskreis, a group of scholars from Pomerania, Silesia, 
and Eastern Prussia, which had arranged for Morgenthau’s lecture to be translated into 
German, called Morgenthau a scholar who ‘… does not know principles of foreign poli-
tics which are derived of an international morale or from an international law’ (Braun, 
1961, p. III; my translation).108 He even received critical letters in which Morgenthau, 
who was forced into exile twice, could read that he would have no idea about the pain it 
caused when forced to leave one’s homeland (HJM-Archive 34).  
A further example must have been even more difficult for Morgenthau to endure as 
he was one of the first and foremost critics of the Vietnam War (Myers, 1980, p. 3; See, 
2001, p. 419-20). However, soon after public criticism against the Vietnam War in the 
United States had increased, Morgenthau’s criticism was still not appreciated. Not only 
was he disapproved of by other critics, who had become more numerous after the failure 
of the TET-offensive in 1968109 (Cozette, 2008, p. 16) due to their moralistic reasoning 
in absolute terms, but he was also criticised by officials and his career threatened. In 
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“the week” section of the National Review from 15th June 1965, which stressed his role 
as an outsider, we read for example that ‘Professor Hans Morgenthau’s hyperactive role 
as a protester against our policy in Vietnam is embarrassing many of his friends, and 
may even be embarrassing to himself, who is not used to the kind of self-exposure he is 
submitting to or to the company he finds himself keeping’ (HJM-Archive 20). However, 
it did not remain at obloquy from the conservative press, but Morgenthau even lost his 
position as consultant in the Department of Defense (Morgenthau, 1967b, p. 5-6) and it 
is argued that, during the Johnson government, there was a “Project Morgenthau” in or-
der to discredit him (Cozette, 2008, p. 17). Finally, as several letters, public announce-
ments, and newspaper clippings in the Morgenthau-Archive in the Library of Congress 
indicate, even his candidature for the presidency of the APSA during the beginning of 
the 1970s was thwarted by people who resented to his stance on Vietnam (HJM-Archive 
4; equally: Lebow, 2003, p. 240). Morgenthau, however, was willing to pay this price 
because he considered this role of scholarship as a vital corrective for the perils that 
democracies may succumb to.  
 
6.3 Homo faber or animal laborans? Bringing the human back into  
liberal societies 
6.3.1 Acceleration and commodification of life 
Alongside the political implications of idealism resulting in de-humanisation, 
Morgenthau also perceived socio-economic implications that drastically transformed the 
life-worlds of people. Liberalism would also cause a de-humanisation in the economic 
sphere in the sense that freedom was considered more and more as an immanent, quanti-
fiable commodity and in its course any limit to personal freedom had been seemingly 
removed. This might sound paradoxical, but Morgenthau was convinced that this ‘unre-
strained and self-sufficient hedonism’ (1960b, p. 69) would threaten collective freedom 
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as a qualitative good providing equality, the security to create one’s life and, thereby, 
establish an identity in the sense of freedom from constant self-doubt. Collective free-
dom would provide the possibility of working towards the transcendent aims of a com-
mon good (Morgenthau, 1960b, p. 73). If a sole pursuit of individual freedom, however, 
would take place, as Morgenthau argued had happened in the United States during the 
20th century, it would endanger the collective freedom as the individual freedom of dif-
ferent persons might conflict due to their diverse interests. This in turn might threaten 
the individual drive for self-preservation because the freedom of one person would cre-
ate a menace for another.  
The dominance of individual freedom, hence the unrestricted evolution of the drive 
to prove oneself, and the resulting deprivation of a collective good has led to a devel-
opment in which the human as homo faber, ‘… the maker of tools, [aspired to transform 
him-/herself] into homo deus, the maker of worlds …’ (Morgenthau, 1972, p. 2; empha-
sis in the original). Morgenthau showed here that the individualisation in modern socie-
ties would have turned humans into egoists who presume to have lordship over the 
world rather than aspiring to construct it in the struggle for a common good. In order to 
be able to do so, humans would have employed science, particularly natural sciences 
(Morgenthau 1973, p. 47), to follow their quest to master the world. Morgenthau (1972, 
p. 15-6) reasoned that only in such a society in which metaphysical discourses of tran-
scendence had been replaced by an individually focused immanence, science could be 
perceived as “value-free” in which only questions of correctness and error are to be dis-
puted. Hence, it would not be of interest what ought to be known, but only what can be 
known (Morgenthau, 1972, p. 6-11). Anything which would promise to increase indi-
vidual freedom would be sought after, which is why ‘[w]e expect everything from sci-
ence: transformation of our natural and social environment, control of human behaviour, 
social planning … and the indefinite prolongation of human life’ (Morgenthau, 1972,  
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p. 2). Morgenthau’s realism was, therefore, an attempt to contradict arguments of social 
planning and historic optimism in general. Believing that human nature could be engi-
neered in a particular way was utopian for Morgenthau, because it would not consider a 
political anthropology based on the two human drives. For this utopianism Morgenthau 
criticised Niccolò Machiavelli in an early piece in Ethics. Machiavelli believed that 
through the application of rules of political conduct, as he had articulated in The Prince, 
hence through social planning, it would be possible to achieve the unity of the Northern 
Italian city states (Morgenthau, 1945a, p. 145).  
This growth of science leading to a technologised world, however, would have 
caused two effects – acceleration and commodification – that would have changed hu-
man life dramatically. It would have turned humans not into the autonomous master of 
the world, but heteronomous subjects. First, mechanisation and later technologisation 
would have led to the acceleration of life in three realms: military, transportation, and 
communication. It would be militarily now possible with the deployment of fewer peo-
ple to achieve greater and more precise destruction in less time. Indeed, with the devel-
opment of weapons of mass destruction, humans could even achieve their own extinc-
tion. Similarly, in the realm of transportation humankind would have achieved ever 
greater means of faster transportation which would be available to an increasing amount 
of people. The “American Dream” would have been based on the promise of unlimited 
individual mobility. It also meant, although Morgenthau did not explicitly refer to it, 
that an increasing amount of goods could be quickly transported to any place on earth. 
Finally, technologisation would have also led to faster means of communication. For 
Morgenthau (1973, p. 51-3), communication was the sector where the acceleration of 
life would be most obvious as the development of the telephone made it possible to 
communicate without any time delay. Morgenthau was aware that acceleration had posi-
tive effects as it would have enabled people to span time and space, especially through 
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the technological advancements in the transportation and communication sector, and 
eventually contributed to the technical realisation of a world community of which we 
will speak more about below. Still, Morgenthau was concerned about the de-humanising 
effects of technologisation which will threaten the environment, humans, and humanity 
altogether, as the next section will elaborate. 
The second effect can be classified as commodification of life. For Morgenthau this 
meant that a system of production was put into place in modern societies that would 
have existed for its own sake in which the strife for quantity replaced the fulfilment of 
genuine human desires. Through an artificial system of supply and demand, all aspects 
of life in a market society would experience reification and become part of this system 
of production. What Morgenthau criticised was that this aim for quantity exceeded hu-
man demand and an increase was only achieved through ‘artificial or imaginary obso-
lescence, advertising, and marketing’ (1960b, p. 70). Similar to what Simmel had identi-
fied as ‘shop-window quality of things’ (1997a, p. 257), as mentioned above,  
Morgenthau argued that production in market societies would have no intrinsic value 
other than creating a desire among humans to possess commodities. Morgenthau criti-
cised that companies measured their success by sales records which would have led to 
an uncritical implementation of what in microeconomics is called “economies of scale” 
(reducing the average cost of one production-unit) and “economies of scope” (reducing 
the average costs by producing more than one product). Companies would increase their 
“output” without considering the actual demand or purpose of a product. Therefore, 
there would be a constant succession of almost identical products to artificially instil a 
demand and keep or even increase the buying behaviour of people (Morgenthau, 1960b, 
p. 71). For Morgenthau, this artificial system of supply and demand would work be-
cause the promise of individual freedom had freed the drive to protect oneself from any 
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restraints, due to the lack of a metaphysical order, and humans could be manipulated to 
exhaust this drive in the constant acquisition of commodities.  
 
6.3.2 The threat for the environment, the human, and humanity 
The acceleration and commodification of life was the cause for the development of 
security-threats for the environment, the human, and humanity altogether, demonstrat-
ing the close intellectual relation Morgenthau had in this aspect with the Frankfurt 
School. Certainly, this was due to the close intellectual exchange he had with them dur-
ing the time of his doctoral thesis and which he intensified through personal ties with 
other émigré scholars, including Arendt.   
The first threat concerned the environment. Morgenthau was convinced that the sys-
tem of production in modern societies would not be oriented towards a transcendent end, 
particularly one that would consider the satisfaction of basic human needs, but repre-
sents a ‘meaningless growth’ (1972, p. 23). For Morgenthau this meant that the result of 
the production process, the commodity, would not represent an end in itself, but would 
have become part of a process in which quantity became the guiding principle. The 
commodity, therefore, would be bereft of any intrinsic purpose which would enable fur-
ther amelioration of the humans’ position to actively create their life-worlds through the 
satisfaction of one particular need (Morgenthau, 1960a, p. 215-22; 1960b, p. 69-74). 
This purposelessness would have required the creation of a consumer society which 
would eventually lead to a threat for the environment as the consumer society would 
turn into a ‘society of waste’ (Morgenthau, 1960a, p. 215; 1960b, p. 69; 1972, p. 23).  
It is likely that Morgenthau adopted this term from Arendt’s The Human Condition 
(1958) which she compiled out of a Walgreen Lecture Series at the University of  
Chicago. In any case, Morgenthau employed it in a similar way where he argued that a 
society in which goods would be produced and consumed for no other purpose than 
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producing and consuming ever more quantities, a society would squander its limited 
resources. Although this was not Morgenthau’s major concern and it would go too far to 
call him an environmentalist, it still shows that Morgenthau’s political agency was ho-
listic as he was concerned about any aspect that would negatively affect the human abil-
ity to get purposefully engaged in one’s life-world. This was highlighted when  
Morgenthau called on his fellow citizens to a sustainable stewardship of available re-
sources long before the first oil-crisis in 1973 raised global concerns about the environ-
ment and the Club of Rome published a first scientific study about the Limits of Growth 
in 1972. 
The modern consumer society was also criticised by Morgenthau for being immanent 
to the human being. Again we find a consistency here with Arendt in the concepts 
Morgenthau used to characterise this threat further demonstrating that Arendt played a 
vital intellectual role for Morgenthau in formulating his political agency. Of course 
other (émigré) scholars also criticised the modern consumer society, most notably 
members of the Frankfurt School, but the congruence of concepts suggests that  
Morgenthau had a strong thinking partnership with Arendt. From the early 1950s on 
Arendt, like Max Scheler earlier, distinguished between the homo faber and the animal 
laborans (1953, p. 323), which became popular after the publication of Arendt’s semi-
nal The Human Condition (1958). Like Arendt, Morgenthau considered the homo faber, 
the creative human, as a person who would produce and use tools to create a life-world 
and would be, therefore a symbolisation of a meaningful life. Since the homo faber 
would be able to identify his/her work as valuable due to its life-worldly significance, 
the homo faber would find self-assurance and identity in his/her work (Morgenthau, 
1972, p. 146). In the modern society, however, which would succumb to acceleration 
and commodification, the human would be turned into an animal laborans. In such a 
society humans would seek a comfortable life from the restlessness of the labour-
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process. This is the case because people would have to succumb to this process in which 
machines set the repetitive rhythm and the individual worker is detached from the prod-
uct he/she is working on (Arendt, 1958, p. 146-7). This labour-process would not allow 
for participation in creating one’s life-world through one’s own will and in doing so 
gain identity. The individual would take, therefore, recourse in a comfortable life which 
often expresses itself in the satisfaction of material desires. Therefore, ‘[m]odern man 
[is] diminished in his humanity and threatened with atomization by unintelligible and 
unmanageable anonymous social forces …’ (Morgenthau, 1972, p. 51).  
The result of this degrading process would be loneliness. This would not be the case 
for the homo faber, as Arendt wrote, because, although he/she would work in isolation, 
he/she would be able to add value to the life-world through the tools the homo faber 
would produce and use. Thereby, an active engagement with the life-world would be 
secured (Arendt, 1958, p. 139-40). The animal laborans, however, would not have such 
a capacity and consequently could not escape loneliness. The animal laborans would 
not only be incapable with his work to get engaged in society and achieve self-
fulfilment, but being part of the production and consumption process would demon-
strate to him/her that one would also be incapable of mastering one’s life-world and 
even more one would be replaceable (Arendt, 1953, p. 323). A second consequence 
would be, according to Morgenthau, an indulgence in mediocrity. Being part of the pro-
duction and consumption process in modern societies, mediocrity would be sufficient 
since one would only be responsible for one’s immediate task and any further effort 
would make no difference. A homo faber, however, could increase his stance in build-
ing a life-world and consequently the level of self-fulfilment directly as a result of his 
efforts. Efforts, therefore, would be like in a self-fulfilling prophecy, a positive effect on 
the strengthening of his/her identity because the more one would invest, the more suc-
cess one would have. The world of the animal laborans, however, ‘… compels its 
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members to live below their capabilities rather than exhausting them. It misdirects their 
energies and wastes the best of their talents’ (Morgenthau, 1960b, p. 79). In such a soci-
ety the aspiration for excellence, in the way Morgenthau understood it as critical schol-
arship, would not only be unnecessary, but quintessentially also a menace to be sup-
pressed because it could result in calling the foundation of their society into question by 
aiming for a different kind of society. These two consequences – loneliness and medioc-
rity – particularly led to Morgenthau’s concern that liberal democracies should be aware 
of the peril of totalitarianism, as it will be discussed in the next section. 
The final threat concerns humanity in general. For Morgenthau, the development of 
weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, caused a radical change in 
foreign politics. A first extensive engagement of Morgenthau with the question of nu-
clear weapons was provided at a lecture series in 1961-1962 entitled Reflections on the 
Nuclear Age. As Scheuerman has shown, Morgenthau was influenced in the develop-
ment of his thoughts on the consequences of atomic warfare by Karl Jaspers.  
Morgenthau had reviewed Jaspers’s The Future of Mankind upon request by Jaspers’s 
former pupil, Arendt (Scheuerman, 2009a, p. 146-8). Morgenthau incorporated the main 
argument of Jaspers in his thought that with nuclear weapons, humans for the first time 
would have been given the technical means to extinguish humanity altogether. That this 
was the case, however, dawned upon him much earlier, when the Soviet Union became 
the second atomic power in 1949, an ‘event of the greatest importance’ (Morgenthau, 
1950c, p. 24). From this time on violence would have ceased to be an appropriate means 
of politics, understood as coercive diplomacy110, because nuclear weapons could not 
serve the causes of attack or defence, but deterrence. During the Cold War employing 
nuclear weapons would have let to the extinction of all conflict-parties and to the doc-
trine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). Therefore, violence could no longer be 
employed to create a (new) political order (Morgenthau, 1960c, p. 5; 1970b, p. 38; 1973, 
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p. 51). This in itself would have less a foreign than an internal political consequence, as 
‘[t]oday all nations have one interest in common which transcends almost all others: the 
avoidance of a general war’ (Morgenthau, 1954, p. 83). But, as pointed out earlier, peo-
ple would not always act rationally, let alone in foreign politics, the realm in which hu-
mans could, due to the nation-state, follow their drives almost unhindered, as argued by 
Freud. The threat for humanity stemming from nuclear weapons, however, is not only 
the threat of extinction, but the kind of death humans would have to face. As  
Morgenthau elaborated in a striking episode at the end of Science: Servant or Master?, 
nuclear weapons cause a collective death and lead people into meaninglessness. Neither 
would there be people left to bemoan their death and remember them, nor would the ar-
tefacts which humans have created survive a nuclear strike (Morgenthau, 1972, p. 149). 
From this follows that nuclear weapons are the ultimate source of human threat caused 
by the modern production and consumption process. The production of nuclear weapons 
would not enable to pursue war to achieve a certain end since nuclear weapons could 
not be employed. Otherwise even “nuclear-weapon-states” could face complete destruc-
tion. Furthermore, nuclear weapons provide not increment value to conventional arms 
as their use would provide no benefit. On the contrary, the use of nuclear weapons al-
most certainly would decrease the benefits due to the mutual destruction (Morgenthau, 
1970a, p. 32; Scheuerman, 2009a, p. 141).  Still, the exploitation of the drive to prove 
oneself would make nation-states want nuclear weapons. 
 
6.4 Totalitarianism, the national interest, and world community 
6.4.1 The peril of totalitarianism  
Before finally elaborating on how Morgenthau suggested tackling the problems of 
modern democracies, it remains to be demonstrated which peril incited him to promote 
a critical public role for the scholar and act upon it, not least because in this constella-
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tion it has attracted little academic interest so far. The political and socio-economic con-
sequences of a de-humanised liberalism, hence idealism, leading to hubris and refusal of 
criticism as well as the acceleration and commodification of life, would run the risk of 
causing the contrary effect of liberalism: totalitarianism. 
Totalitarianism was for Morgenthau a total form of government which would influ-
ence all aspects of life because its main feature, the superiority of government, caused 
by the above elaborated crisis of liberal democracy, would be supported by an interac-
tion of democratic and despotic elements which would hamper its overthrow. In a dis-
cussion in the course of the fourth “Salzburg Dialogue on Humanism” (Salzburger  
Humanismusgespräch) Morgenthau remarked that just as in the case of fascism, totali-
tarianism would be democratic because it governed with the consent of the majority of 
the people (Schatz, 1970, p. 247). Yet, despite its public consent, totalitarianism would 
also be despotic as the government would rule with absolute power meaning that it 
would be in their often arbitrary ruling not restricted by any legal or moral norms 
(Morgenthau, 1972, p. 79-80; 1973, p. 48). Following Arendt in his assessment, 
Morgenthau considered totalitarianism to be a ‘new form of government’ (1972, p. 79; 
1977, p. 127) and there were two characteristics of totalitarianism making it a truly new 
form of government.  
First, totalitarianism would possess the material and technical means to completely 
eliminate criticism. The former means that it would have the suzerainty of violence. The 
possession of privately owned arms would be restricted if not prohibited at all, from 
which it follows that violence could legally be used only by the government through 
armed forces like the police or military (Morgenthau, 1970a, p. 292-314). In particular, 
this material aspect demonstrates that for Morgenthau there was a fine line between de-
mocracy and totalitarianism because also in democracies the government possesses the 
monopoly of violence or at least punishes its abuse, which helps to explain his insis-
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tence on dissidence. Yet, there is a second material aspect. A totalitarian government 
would have the ability to monopolise key economic sectors, such as communication and 
transportation, in order to exert violence over its subjects. This demonstrates that totali-
tarianism would have introduced a ‘… bureaucratization of terror … which gives politi-
cal power an efficiency it did not have before’ (Morgenthau, 1977, p. 127). Due to the 
material surplus on the side of the government, people may still be able to demonstrate 
or go on strike, but they would lack the means to overthrow the government  
(Morgenthau, 1970a, p. 32-3). The latter aspect, technology, would be particularly im-
portant because 
‘[i]t is not by accident that the rise of totalitarianism coincides with the devel-
opment of the modern technologies of communication, transportation, and war-
fare. These technologies have given modern governments the tools with which 
to penetrate and overwhelm the sphere that tradition has reserved for the indi-
vidual and his freedom … Before the advent of the technological age, no gov-
ernment … could have become totalitarian because of its limited technological 
resources; thus the freedom of the individual was protected by the inability of 
the government to utterly destroy it’ (Morgenthau, 1972, p. 80). 
Furthermore, advancements in the communication sector would have enabled the 
government to increase its influence in all parts of society and suppress criticism as they 
would now possess the means to create a surveillance society as depicted by George 
Orwell in 1984. That Morgenthau considered the United States at times on their way 
into such an Orwellian state becomes obvious when, for example, he analysed How  
Totalitarianism starts: the Domestic Involvement of the CIA in 1967 (Morgenthau, 
1970a, p. 51-5; equally: Young-Bruehl, 2006, p. 35). In such a surveillance society the 
private sphere would become abolished and criticism would be made impossible as no 
one could feel certain of not being spied on or tapped. 
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Second, totalitarianism would also be able to technically and contextually control the 
public opinion. Technically, totalitarianism would be able to do so as they would not 
only be able to police the media, but also to employ media and communication devices 
to spread their doctrines among their subjects (Morgenthau, 1973, p. 54-5). Morgenthau 
experienced these technical possibilities of totalitarianism to control its people’s minds 
with the introduction of the Volksempfänger, a radio receiver, which since its introduc-
tion in 1933, became one of the major propaganda devices for the NSDAP.111 Not least 
this experience must have brought Morgenthau to the conclusion that ‘[w]e must par-
ticularly recognize that the medium through which information policy proceeds is lan-
guage’ (1970a, p. 323) and that a totalitarian government would have an interest in 
transmitting their statements to its subjects. The indoctrination of totalitarianism, how-
ever, is even more important. Totalitarian rulers would be able to control the political 
discourses through a reciprocal discourse.  
On the one hand, technologisation would have provided totalitarianism with the 
means to create a bureaucratic apparatus with which totalitarian governments would 
have been able to monopolise the political discourses and create homogeneity in 
thought and life-style among its subjects (Morgenthau, 1977, p. 127). On the other hand, 
totalitarianism would establish an ideology to legitimise its rule and to further homoge-
nise its subjects. In such a system, the purpose of an ideology would have been to cloud 
the total de-politicisation because totalitarianism would remove the freedom to act 
(Morgenthau, 1977, p. 128). This would happen through the allocation for a place in 
society for each individual and the establishment of norms through which it would be 
possible for subjects to give meaning to their life-world. This is what Morgenthau found 
in Arendt’s “banality of evil” since ‘[t]he evildoer can be a minor figure in a bureau-
cratic machine believing in the presuppositions of the doctrine’ (1977, p. 129). As soon 
as an ideology provides a ‘mystical role’ (Pin-Fat,
198 
 
particular norms, totalitarianism would have reached its final level. Their foreign poli-
tics would not only be persecuted in dichotomies of good and bad or friend and foe 
anymore, but totalitarianism would be able ‘… to destroy its citizens in the process of 
defending them’ (Morgenthau, 1970a, p. 30). 
These two aspects – suppression of criticism and the creation of homogeneity – were 
Morgenthau’s main concerns of totalitarianism and made him stand up against any to-
talitarian development in liberal democracies. Still, Pin-Fat arrives at the conclusion that 
Morgenthau’s realism could eventually lead into totalitarianism due to Morgenthau’s 
universal moral standards, the European values. The only candidate Morgenthau would 
have been able to imagine to enforce these standards would have been the nation-state 
(Pin-Fat, 2005, p. 234). With this assessment, however, Pin-Fat failed to distinguish be-
tween content and scope of Morgenthau’s values (chapter four above), as the humanism 
Morgenthau universally aspired to was not to be acquired through collective enforce-
ment but as an individual act of will. She also misinterpreted Morgenthau’s stance to-
wards the nation-state since, as we read in Politics among Nations, ‘… [t]he light 
hearted equation between a particular nationalism and the counsels of Providence is 
morally indefensible, for it is that very sin of pride against which the Greek tragedians 
and the Biblical prophets warned rulers and ruled’ (Morgenthau, 1985, p. 13).  
 
6.4.2 The national interest and world community 
The problem Morgenthau faced on how to avert totalitarian rule, which previously 
had also drastically affected his life, led him to two conclusions: the national interest 
and world community. Although Morgenthau considered the national interest if under-
stood correctly as a feasible epistemological tool to evict totalitarianism from the sys-
tem of nation-states, he stressed that his second option, world community, was his pre-
ferred choice.  
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The national interest is a concept that in its diversity and quantifiable inconceivabil-
ity repeatedly led to misunderstandings about its meaning among practitioners and aca-
demics alike because, as Smith remarked, ‘[h]ow one defines the national interest de-
pends on the values he espouses and the way he ranks them’ (1986, p. 110; similar: 
Scheuerman, 2009a, p. 85). Despite Smith’s assessment being true in its essence and 
what Lebow referred to Morgenthau’s national interest as a ‘fluid concept’ (2003,  
p. 245), it is still possible to distinguish two elements in it which will document consis-
tency with Morgenthau’s view on human nature and its drives, which he had elaborated 
in his earliest academic writings in the late 1920s. This is to be remarked in a definition 
of the national interest provided by one of Morgenthau’s pupils, Thompson.112 He notes 
that the national interest 
‘… postulates that every nation by virtue of its geographic position, historic ob-
jectives, and relationship to other power centers possesses a clustering of strate-
gic interests each more or less vital to its security. At any point in time, a ra-
tional foreign policy must attend to the safeguarding of these claims. The na-
tional interest stands above and absorbs the limited and parochial claims of sub-
national groups, even though such groups seek to interpret the national interest 
in their own terms’ (1960, p. 36). 
These two dimensions which inform the national interest are, therefore, the element of 
survival and the element to collocate the diverging interests within the state. 
As Thompson’s definition accentuates, the first dimension of the national interest 
would be survival. Like an individual, a nation-state would also always consider it as its 
primary duty to secure its survival and the survival of its citizens (Morgenthau, 1950c,  
p. 841). A nation-state, therefore, would have a vital interest in existence (Lebensinter-
esse), as Morgenthau called it in his doctoral thesis (1929a, p. 98). This demonstrates 
that for the sake of one’s survival, conflicts may appear as no state would be able to act 
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completely unselfishly as otherwise its survival might be threatened and this selfish be-
haviour may have threatening consequences for other nation-states. For this reason, 
Morgenthau, like Arendt, did not oppose violence per se as a political means to achieve 
one’s interests, but clearly Morgenthau considered it as the last resort if all other options 
to secure one’s survival had failed. Scheuerman has recently pointed out that this ele-
ment would not only contain the territorial integrity of the state and physical preserva-
tion of its citizens, but also normative visions of social life. When Scheuerman speaks 
of an American ‘way of life’ (Scheuerman, 2009a, p. 83), however, one should not be 
inclined to follow the common, often materialistic images, but rather consider Tjalve’s 
assessment. What Morgenthau included in the national interest as necessary for the sur-
vival of a democratic nation-state was the ability to utter dissent in a public discourse 
through which policies aspiring to the common good would crystallise and finally be 
formulated  (Tjalve, 2008, p. 120-31). 
This normative element in the survival of a nation-state leads to the second dimen-
sion. As Morgenthau remarked in the early 1950s, a time when he devoted much of his 
academic interest in the elaboration of this concept, ‘[a]ll the cross currents of personali-
ties, public opinion, sectional interests, partisan politics, and political and moral folk-
ways’ (1952c, p. 973) would be part of the national interest. This demonstrates the im-
portance Morgenthau gave to the ability to express criticism in the public realm. Only if 
this would be secured and citizens could contribute to it widely, a national interest could 
evolve that follows no particular interests, but would be committed to a common good 
which would serve the various citizens’ interests best. 
In order to do so, this second dimension would require a ‘rational order’  
(Morgenthau, 1952c, p. 976). As Pin-Fat notes, this rational order would be created 
through a hierarchisation of the various interests in a society starting from ones that se-
cure survival (Pin-Fat, 2005, p. 232). The national interest was, therefore, for  
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Morgenthau an epistemological tool to rationally reflect on foreign politics. Morgenthau 
was aware that it required a particular person with strong qualities, like those he had 
found in Nietzsche’s Übermensch, to create such a rational order. In his American writ-
ings, Morgenthau (1945b; 1952b) had found the figure of the statesman to give these 
qualities a name, but without a doubt Morgenthau in his earliest German writings 
shaped the conviction that strong political leadership would be required in a democracy 
to lead the diverging interests of its citizens. Morgenthau (1930a) had found an example 
of such a statesman in the late German Minister of Foreign Affairs Stresemann, whom 
he prized as the ‘creator’ (Schöpfer) of German foreign politics as Stresemann peace-
fully reintroduced Germany into the community of states. Stresemann and other politi-
cians Morgenthau deemed highly, such as the US-Secretary of State (1949-1953), Dean 
Acheson, offered in Morgenthau’s view a particular quality: wisdom. As he remarked in 
some of his latest writings: 
‘[w]isdom is the gift of intuition, and political wisdom is the gift to grasp intui-
tively the quality of diverse interests and power in the present and future and the 
impact of different actions upon them. Political wisdom, understood as sound 
political judgement, cannot be learned; it is a gift of nature …. As such, it can be 
deepened and developed by example, experience, and study (Morgenthau, 1971a, 
p. 620; 1972, p. 45). 
Even though wisdom was for Morgenthau an inherent human quality, it still would 
require values that could be acquired. From Lang we know that these values are closely 
related to Aristotle’s ideal of a virtuous person who is characterised through prudent 
demeanour, courage, and sound judgement based upon knowledge and experience 
(Lang, 2007, p. 29). Due to Morgenthau’s personal experience (chapter three above), a 
fourth feature can be added here which is alienation (Neacsu, 2010, p. 104). As politics 
was for Morgenthau always a choice among evils and the task of a statesman was to 
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‘choose the lesser evil’ (Morgenthau, 1945b, p. 18), the latter would enable him/her to 
do so since alienation would provide the politician with an ability to compare and weigh 
the importance of interests due to an unbiased assessment of those interests. This feeds 
into the ability to judge. With the concept of wisdom, Morgenthau intended to criticise 
the tendency in political science to constantly accumulate data to provide political 
guidelines as he was not convinced that an increased quantity of data would create more 
knowledge and improve political decision-making. On the contrary, a politician would 
only need to have sound information after an alignment with his/her experiences. Any 
further knowledge would not improve the judgement, but would probably make it even 
more difficult as the amount of information could not be handled anymore. Once a 
judgement would have been achieved, a politician, finally, would have to have the cour-
age to implement his/her decisions. Like Caesar, ‘[t]he statesman has to cross the  
Rubicon not knowing how deep and turbulent the river is, or what he will find on the 
other side’ (Morgenthau, 1962c, p. 103). 
The political realm in which Morgenthau deemed wisdom as most important was di-
plomacy. Certainly, for this reason he devoted his research interest again and again to 
diplomacy, which is why one has to pose the question why so far only Russell (1991) 
developed a deeper interest in Morgenthau’s view on diplomacy. In his last publication 
on diplomacy, Morgenthau (1974a, p. 14) remarked that on the international scene one 
would deal with conflicts which were caused by the particular interests of nation-states. 
He elaborated on this argument in his doctoral thesis referring to ‘tensions’ (Spannun-
gen) as a source of conflict between states (Morgenthau, 1929a, p. 72-84) and in La  
Notion du Politique in which he spoke of ‘différends d’intérêts’ (1933, p. 23). This is 
why Morgenthau (1945-1946, p. 1079) was convinced that these kinds of conflict could 
not be settled by legal means because they were usually not caused by questions of uni-
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versal right or wrong, but each interest would have a right of its own as it would have 
been borne out of particular historic trajectories.  
In order to minimise the violent settlement of conflicts, Morgenthau proposed a two-
step strategy on the basis of equal rights. First, it would have to be determined which 
interests are involved and, second, terms of condition would have to be agreed upon in 
order to reach a settlement (Morgenthau 1956, p. 408; 1957b, p. 6-7; 1974a, p. 14). This 
procedure seems fairly simplistic, but the task ‘… to redefine the seemingly incompati-
ble vital interests of the nations concerned in order to make them compatible’  
(Morgenthau, 1974a, p. 15) and to achieve a compromise through negotiations, proved 
in the history of humankind more often than not to be unattainable. Still, Morgenthau 
(1950c; 1971c) repeatedly argued to enter negotiations with the Soviet Union, particu-
larly after their acquisition of the nuclear bomb, because violent conflict settlement 
would have been devastating for everyone. With regard to those negotiations  
Morgenthau proposed being aware of one’s own interests, while being sensitive enough 
to consider those of the other side so that a compromise could be reached. For  
Morgenthau, this compromise would have been to accept two spheres of interest in or-
der to minimise the risk of violence.113 This example with the Soviet-American relations 
demonstrates that diplomacy in Morgenthau’s understanding required a statesman. In a 
letter to the editor of the New York Times from 13th August 1957, Morgenthau remarked 
that he/she would require expertise in the sense of ‘… knowledge … of history, of cur-
rent events, of foreign countries, of men’ and a profound judgement ‘… of men and 
situations … and transform situations on behalf of the policies of his Government’ 
(HJM-Archive 43; equally: 1957c, p. 1) demonstrating Morgenthau’s insistence on en-
cyclopaedic knowledge. Prudence, judgement, and courage would enable the diplomat 
to find a viable compromise while not renouncing from one’s own interests. Consider-
ing what was earlier said about his insistence on civic engagement, it might come as a 
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surprise that Morgenthau was in favour of a Bismarckian cabinet and clandestine di-
plomacy, disapproving what he called “democratic diplomacy”. However, in a democ-
ratic diplomacy, Morgenthau was convinced that the necessary compromises could not 
be reached due to constant public scrutiny. The public at large would not have the quali-
ties of a statesman and would rather follow their own particular interests or even be ma-
nipulated in their thought by ideologies. This would make it difficult for the statesman 
to follow political wisdom and achieve a verdict that would suit one’s national interest 
best, being sensitive enough to have considered the national interest of the other party 
(Morgenthau, 1957b). 
The national interest was ever since the cause of academic concern about its feasibil-
ity (e.g. Good, 1960; Herz, 1981; Jervis, 1998; Meier-Walser, 2004; Pin-Fat, 2005; 
Scheuerman, 2009a) and also Morgenthau was aware that the qualities he asked from a 
statesman were not always attainable, particularly in democracies in which long-term 
values are often sacrificed for short-term achievements in order to secure re-election. 
What Morgenthau, therefore, aspired to was nothing less than a paradigm-change in in-
ternational relations. In fact, one could argue that he wanted to abolish inter-national 
relations altogether as he argued in one of his last public appearances while delivering 
the first Council on Religion and International Affairs (CRIA) lecture on Morality and 
Foreign Affairs that ‘… we are living in a dream world’ (Morgenthau, 1979, p. 42). 
Humans would still cling to a form of consociation, the nation-state, although the world 
would have so dramatically changed since 1945 that this form of consociation would 
have become outdated. In the same lecture, Morgenthau also gave reasons why this ob-
solescence was supposed to be the case. Nation-states ‘… are no longer viable economic, 
political, or military units’ (Morgenthau, 1979, p. 34) and thereby would lose the ability 
administrate their sovereignty. Philip Mirkowski (2011, p. 212) is, therefore, mistaken 
in his argument that Morgenthau, in agreement with the economist Friedrich Hayek, 
205 
 
would have promoted a strong state to minimise the perils of democracy. On the con-
trary, Morgenthau’s insistence on living in a dream world emphasises his quest for 
peace. As a German Jew, he had experienced the horror of the ideologies of belligerent 
nationalism and fascism and, therefore, dedicated his thought to create a more peaceful 
outlook on the world. As Steven Forde (1995, p. 155) notes this would have been a 
common trait among realistic scholars who often were also émigrés.  
That Morgenthau considered the nation-state as economically outdated can be ex-
plained by considering that he gave this lecture under the impression of the evolving 
second oil-crisis, which not just in the United States irretrievably destroyed the myth of 
a consistent economic upheaval in which numerous states in the Western world had 
lived since the late 1940s under the Bretton-Woods-System. This manifested that one 
state would no longer be able to yield enough economic power to control all the interre-
lationships of an increasingly globalised economy. Morgenthau, furthermore, consid-
ered the nation-state as a politically outdated model of consociation. These ‘blind and 
potent monster[s]’ (Morgenthau, 1962a, p. 61) would have an interest in securing their 
existence through an increase in the possibility of international conflict in which its citi-
zens could freely follow their drives because nationally various ideologies would have 
in their egalitarianism deprived them of their ability to act and establish thereupon an 
identity. Finally, Morgenthau also argued that in military terms nation-states would face 
threats to their sovereignty since a nation-state could not guarantee its territorial integ-
rity and the security of its citizens anymore. Indeed, the development of nuclear weap-
ons would have made the existence of borders obsolete because to overcome them an 
aggressor would not have to face own considerable losses any longer. A border would, 
therefore, be in Morgenthau’s sense reduced to an artificial line on a map (1966a, p. 9; 
1970b, p. 61-2). This final argument was prominently discussed in International Rela-
tions during the height of the Cold War, when more and more states acquired nuclear 
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weapons or the possibility to do so. The permeability of borders was most notably 
averted by another émigré scholar, John Herz, who stressed that although nuclear weap-
ons would provide the state with ultimate might, it would also lead to ultimate impo-
tence. This would be the case because neither ‘protection through distance’ would be 
given anymore, nor would distinctions of ‘front’ and ‘rear’ during wartime make sense 
since nuclear weapons could bring destruction to any place on earth (Herz, 1959,  
p. 168-72). 
Therefore, Morgenthau argued for the creation of a world-state which has repeatedly 
caused academic bewilderment. Either this part of Morgenthau’s normative world pos-
tulate was dismissed as a utopian wish (Söllner, 1987a, p. 264) or in consideration of 
the national interest discussed as a source of confusion in Morgenthau’s thought (Craig, 
2007, p. 210). Both assessments are comprehensible, but what they failed to understand 
is that the national interest is merely a concept to avert greater damage, but the form of 
society to which this concept applies is irrevocably antiquated. Therefore, Morgenthau 
aspired to a world-state and as Fromkin expressed in his commemoration of  
Morgenthau, he had also considered political preconditions. Before a world-state could 
be institutionalised, a world community would have to be achieved: if the citizens 
would not be willing to give their loyalty to a world state and rather leave it with their 
nation-state no attempt at establishing institutions for such a world-state would be suc-
cessful (Fromkin, 1993, p. 84; similar: Speer, 1968, p. 215). Furthermore, in the 1940s 
Morgenthau expressed doubt that the principle of national sovereignty could be circum-
vented in the near future because it would have provided the state with an impenetrabil-
ity. Morgenthau (1948b, p. 344) employed this term by Kelsen to stress that under the 
current system only one organisation could claim sovereignty within a given territory. 
Therefore, Morgenthau argued first to establish a world community, a concept that re-
sembles Raymond Aron’s transnational society, and who is also commonly associated 
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with realism (Hoffmann, 1985, p. 16). Aron defined the transnational society as the in-
tercultural exchange of individuals through  
‘… commercial exchange, migration of persons, common beliefs, organizations 
that cross frontiers and, lastly, ceremonies or competitions open to the members 
of all these units. A transnational society flourishes in proportion to the freedom 
of exchange, migration or communication, the strength of common beliefs, the 
number of non-national organizations, and the solemnity of collective ceremo-
nies’ (1966, p. 105).  
These were aspects Morgenthau had in mind to create a world community and in  
Politics among Nations we read how Morgenthau thought it could be established: ‘We 
find that the creation of an international community presupposes at least the mitigation 
and minimization of international conflicts so that the interests uniting members of dif-
ferent nations may outweigh the interests separating them’ (1985, p. 559).  
This means that Morgenthau considered a similar means for a world community as 
for the traditional form of diplomacy. Through negotiations on equal terms,  
Morgenthau hoped to distil a compromise that would prove feasible enough to establish 
such a community since it would eventually create common understanding, trust, and 
loyalty among people. Morgenthau, however, was cautious that an institution like the 
United Nations would be the ideal setting to achieve such a world community. In the 
1950s he argued that the United Nations would be a place where only national interests 
would be pursued. At that time Morgenthau’s scepticism still rested on the impression 
of the downfall of the predecessor of the United Nations, the League of Nations114 just 
20 years before and expressed itself in two major points of criticism. On the one hand, 
Morgenthau criticised specialised agencies of the United Nations that also recipient 
countries would be represented and more importantly, on the other hand, the right to 
veto of the Security Council member-states. With this right any member-state would 
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have the possibility to frustrate the making of any decisions which could run counter to 
one’s own national interest (Morgenthau, 1954, p. 81-2). Only in the 1960s, under the 
impression of the achievements of the late Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld 
(Morgenthau, 1970a), Morgenthau started to renounce from his overly critical position 
of the United Nations as he had realised that it offers, despite its failures, at least a fo-
rum in which the different nation-states are able to get together peacefully and exchange 
their ideas, as exemplified in his introduction to David Mitrany’s A working peace  
system: 
‘According to Professor Mitrany, an international community must grow from 
the satisfaction of common needs shared by members of different nations. Inter-
national agencies, serving all peoples all over the world regardless of national 
boundaries, could create by the very fact of their existence and performance a 
community of interests, valuations, and actions. Ultimately, if such international 
agencies were numerous enough … the loyalties to these institutions and to the 
international community of which they would be the agencies would supersede 
the loyalties to the separate national societies …’ (Morgenthau, 1966a, p. 11). 
Morgenthau followed a similar attitude towards the European Coal and Steel  
Community, the predecessor of the European Union. At the 46th annual meeting of the 
American Society of International Law, Morgenthau still expressed, equally under the 
impression of the failure of international law in the interwar period, doubts about the 
prospects of the Schuman Declaration to solve what Morgenthau perceived to be the 
main problem in European politics: the relationship between Germany with its ‘… natu-
ral superiority … among the nations of Europe’ and ‘… the unwillingness of the other 
European nations to accept that fact’ (1952d, p. 131). By the 1960s, however, when the 
European Coal and Steel Community merged with the European Economic and  
European Atomic Energy Communities Morgenthau changed his opinion about the 
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prospects of European unification for the same reason he had reversed his stance to-
wards the United Nations. The European Communities also provided a forum to ap-
proximate different national interests and find viable compromises.  
Hence, Morgenthau (1962a, p. 75-6) came to the conclusion that as much as a com-
mon agreement to shift loyalties to a world-state would have to be achieved by creating 
a world community, also international forums would have to be established in which 
such compromises could be facilitated because through daily contact they would allow 
countries to recognise commonalities, while being sensitive enough to accept those 
conditions and experiences which separate each culture. 
 
6.5 Conclusion  
The final chapter of this thesis has analysed Morgenthau’s political agency. The rea-
son why this was provided at the end of this thesis was partly owed to the analytical 
modus operandi since his ontology and epistemology both set the intellectual frame-
work for his political agency and, consequently, without knowledge about his ontology 
and epistemology it would be difficult to analyse his political agency. However, this is 
also due to the fact that Morgenthau devoted a lot of time and interest in this practical 
part of his Weltanschauung. During the 1950s and 1960s Morgenthau became truly a 
national figure, as Arendt wrote. Morgenthau deemed the public role of scholarship 
highly because for him a scholar was a person who is not only committed to create 
knowledge, but who is also guided by a normative concern on what ought to be known. 
The scholar turns, therefore, in his/her dissidence into a public corrective for the par-
ticular life-world he/she lives in. It is especially this insistence on being a critical nor-
mative scholar and the kind of criticism on liberal democracies Morgenthau brought 
forward that makes him, if nothing else, today worth considering for contemporary 
scholarship in International Relations and social sciences in general, especially at times 
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when the latest self-induced economic bubble burst that led to a “privatisation of profits 
and socialisation of losses” (Nouriel Roubini). 
The point that Morgenthau raised in all of his civic commitments was that the liberal-
ism of Western democracies would in its degeneration as idealism run the risk of im-
ploding and turn into totalitarianism, as he had witnessed in the 1930s in Germany and 
Spain. Liberal democracies were for Morgenthau transforming their transcendent politi-
cal ideals in immanent standards of action and, thereby, succumbing to political hubris 
and socio-economic de-humanisation. The former meant for Morgenthau that liberal 
democracies would be threatened with hubris by considering their way of life as most 
developed in which other conceptions of life would be either neglected or fought against. 
But like Pangloss in Voltaire’s Candide came to realise, Morgenthau also stressed that 
this transformation would not create the best of all worlds, but would lead to an artifi-
cial homogeneity in which criticism would be considered as a threat to society, despite 
being its lifeline. If all legal channels of dissent would be closed, liberal democracies 
would be endangered because citizens could only take recourse in violence or apathy.  
Also in the socio-economic realm Morgenthau expressed great concerns. The scien-
tification and the subsequent technologisation of life created an acceleration and com-
modification of respective life-worlds and would, according to Morgenthau, threaten to 
destroy the environment, the human, and humanity altogether. In a fierce critique on 
modern consumer societies, which bears resemblance to the kind of criticism we find in 
writings of the Frankfurt School and French Marxist philosophers, Morgenthau was par-
ticularly disturbed about the transformation of the human from a homo faber, a person 
who constructs his/her own life-world through wilful acts, into an animal laborans, a 
person who is forced to succumb to the industrial production process. He agreed with 
Arendt that the resulting faceless loneliness would be one of the major causes for the 
rise of totalitarianism and their seemingly identity-creating ideologies. He, furthermore, 
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expressed concern about the development of weapons of mass destruction because this 
would rule out violence as a means of politics and in awareness of human nature, 
Morgenthau stressed the uttermost importance of keeping peace.  
Therefore, he promoted the national interest as a way of keeping as much rationalism 
in politics as possible and a world community as a feasible alternative to the nation-state, 
which he considered as an antiquated form of society. Morgenthau argued for the na-
tional interest as a practical and normative guideline for politicians to enforce political 
decisions that serve the common good and on – the international realm – to consider the 
interests of other nation-states in order to ensure peace. This, however, would require 
particularly virtuous people in governmental positions who would have the ability to 
alienate themselves from their own interests and would, therefore, be able, due to their 
particular political wisdom, to have the knowledge about the different interests within 
society, judge them according to the common good, and the courage to enforce their de-
cision against all odds if necessary. Yet, Morgenthau was convinced that even if the na-
tional interest as an epistemological tool would be employed to balance potentially di-
vergent societal interests and not considered to be a justification for power politics, this 
would not hide from the fact that the nation-state has to be removed as their existence is 
too threatening for humanity. He, therefore, promoted a world community in which 
people start to shift their loyalty from the nation-state to larger bodies of representation 
and consider more the aspects that unite rather than separate them in order to eventually 
be able to institutionalise this world community in a world-state. 
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Chapter 7.  The marginalisation and rediscovery of Hans  
Morgenthau in International Relations 
 
In his recent monograph Jütersonke arrived at the conclusion that Morgenthau would 
today be largely forgotten if he had not written Politics among Nations.  
‘Were it not for those six principles of realism and the success of that textbook, 
it is doubtful whether we would be still talking of Morgenthau today, and even 
more doubtful that he would be considered a “canonical” thinker in International 
Relations. Grumble as he might about being misunderstood, even Morgenthau 
would have to accept that fact’ (Jütersonke, 2010, p. 175). 
This analysis of Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung, however, has provided evidence 
through its panoptical, unifying, and inclusive approach to successfully challenge this 
view. The current debate about Morgenthau and realism is owed to the fact that 
Morgenthau’s thought is still an important contribution to International Relations. 
Therefore, he has to be allocated a place in the discipline’s canon, although not for the 
reasons Morgenthau is usually added to the discipline’s introductory textbooks which 
often consider him to be a positivist and/or a predecessor of structural realism.  
To rebut Jütersonke’s assessment a conclusion of the previous chapters will be drawn 
by, first, discussing Morgenthau’s marginal existence and why it might have prompted 
Jütersonke to arrive at his conclusion. This will be divided into two parts. First, it will 
be argued that Morgenthau was a marginal man in the sense of Park because he was 
torn between American and German cultures. This will help the student of International 
Relations to realise that, despite Morgenthau’s personal gratitude to the United States, 
his thought remained in essence within the cosmos of Continental European humanities 
and social sciences (Chapter 7.1). In the second part we will discuss Morgenthau as a 
marginal man in International Relations stressing that he was and, indeed, for his kind 
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of scholarship he had to be part of the academic heterodoxy (Chapter 7.2). In the next 
step, we will talk about the post-structuralist turn in International Relations. This will 
take place by arguing in accordance with Jenny Edkins who made the point that post-
structuralism is a movement to re-introduce the political into politics (Chapter 7.3). This 
discussion of Edkins’s assessment of post-structuralism will take place in order to be 
able to classify Morgenthau’s contribution to International Relations in the final step 
(Chapter 7.4). This is not to argue Morgenthau would have been a proto-post-
structuralist or would have followed them in all regards, but it will be accentuated that 
Morgenthau pursued a similar research agenda and intellectual concern to establish In-
ternational Relations as a form of scholarship that is concerned with the human. It will 
also demonstrate that post-structuralism, irrespective of its merits, has to develop a 
more pronounced understanding of the history of (international) political thought be-
cause this history is much more eclectic than post-structuralism often concedes to it.   
 
7.1 Morgenthau, the marginal man 
Morgenthau’s life is an example of a marginal man in Parks’s sense. Morgenthau, 
like many other émigré scholars115, remained torn between his new home, the United 
States, and his old home, Germany.  
Certainly, Morgenthau had his own “from rags to riches” story. He rose from an ele-
vator boy (Lebow, 2003, p. 219) to an eminent political scientist, who almost overnight 
became renowned with the publication of Politics among Nations. Jütersonke is right, 
therefore, in this sense because this textbook not only made him a name in the discipline 
for what he is still remembered today, but he truly became a ‘national figure’ (Arendt 
and McCarthy, 1995, p. 217). Morgenthau’s Politics among Nations even became part 
of America’s popular culture, which is evidenced in a Mary Worth comic-strip from 14th 
August 1955 in which reference is made to Morgenthau’s textbook (HJM-Archive 130). 
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In addition, several rankings in the 1960s and 1970s listed Morgenthau among the most 
influential contemporary thinkers in the United States (Frei, 2001, p. 76-9). This re-
markable life-story lends to the interpretation that Morgenthau was all or part an Ameri-
can in his thought or significantly altered his thought after his emigration, as we find in 
numerous interpretations (e.g. Honig, 1996; Lebow, 2003; Guzzini, 2004; Scheuerman, 
2009b). Indeed, if we look into this relationship with Germany, this conclusion seems 
not to be unjustified. Lebow, a former student of Morgenthau notes that ‘… questions 
about his German past were taboo’ (2003, p. 219) and what is more the analysis of 
Morgenthau’s correspondence in the Library of Congress has shown that after his emi-
gration he never replied to a German letter in German, but only in English. Even con-
versations with friends within the émigré (scholar) circle were held in English from his 
side and in German from their side. Finally, in one of the first visits to Germany after 
his emigration in 1951 he admitted in an interview with the Munich-based Abendzeitung 
that his impressions about Germany were ‘ambivalent’ (zwiespältig) (HJM-Archive 
178).  
The impressions were ambivalent for Morgenthau because in his lifestyle and 
thought he remained German. Morgenthau was born into a liberal Jewish family that 
was part of the German Bildungsbürgertum and educated within the heterodox part of 
the German humanities and social sciences. The experiences he made, the insights he 
gained through studying works of Nietzsche, Simmel, Mannheim, Burckhardt, Freud, 
and Weber, and the education he received by people like Wölfflin, Sinzheimer,  
Mannheim, Rothenbücher, and Oncken were crucial for his own Weltanschauung. We 
see this German foundation of his Weltanschauung not only in Morgenthau’s life-style 
as most of his friends were also European émigrés who shared similar cultural and so-
cial interests and knowledge, but particularly in his way of thinking. This German fun-
dament of his thought has caused several American colleagues of Morgenthau to either 
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misinterpret his work, to be doubtful of its scientific value, or to even suspect ‘some-
thing almost continental’ (Good, 1960, p. 215) in it as if this would have a stigmatic ef-
fect. Hence, major concepts of Morgenthau can only be understood if comprehensively 
related to Continental European thought during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. 
Morgenthau’s empirical and normative concept of power, for example, can only be ap-
preciated if contextualised within the cultural crisis of the Weimar Republic, hence the 
decline of metaphysics and the rise of ideologies, and through an analysis of  
Morgenthau’s reading of Freud, Nietzsche, and Arendt.  
Still, arguing that the foundation of Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung was quintessen-
tially German did not mean that he would not have made amendments or alterations to 
his Weltanschauung because, as remarked in chapter two, it is characterised by a proc-
essual element. This means Morgenthau had experiences and faced different ways of 
thinking that caused him to rethink elements of his Weltanschauung. This can be seen, 
for example, in his assessment of the United Nations and European Communities. In the 
1950s, Morgenthau was still under the impression of the downfall of the League of  
Nations which he had experienced while in Geneva in the 1930s and was, therefore, 
sceptical about the promises of both institutions. In the 1960s, however, Morgenthau’s 
opinion changed when he realised that both offer, despite their organisational shortcom-
ings, an international forum for innovation and re-ordering in which divergent national 
interests can be approximated and a viable compromise eventually reached. Similarly, 
the development of weapons of mass destructions led Morgenthau to an even firmer be-
lief that the nation-state as a form of human sociation is out-dated and has to be replaced 
by a world community. This was, on the one hand, because Morgenthau feared that the 
deployment of such powerful weapons in the name of nationalism could lead to the ex-
tinction of humankind and, on the other hand, would erode the principle of sovereignty 
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and, therefore, the nation-state’s source of dominance. None of these experiences, how-
ever, were fundamental enough to completely change his Weltanschauung.  
 
7.2 The marginalisation of Morgenthau in International Relations 
Morgenthau, however, was not only a marginal man in the sense of being torn be-
tween the American and German culture, but also a marginal man in the discipline of 
International Relations. 
This marginalisation was already the case to a certain extent in Europe. Due to his 
faith, education, and research agenda, Morgenthau was part of what Bourdieu (1969; 
1985) called the heterodoxy in German jurisprudence. Like many other Jewish scholars 
before him, Morgenthau’s career in Germany was constrained during the Weimar  
Republic and came to a definite halt shortly after the national-socialist seizure of power 
when Morgenthau was dismissed as the acting president of the labour law court in 
Frankfurt due to the Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service. The os-
tracism Jews faced in Germany contributed to the fact that numerous Jewish scholars 
were part of the academic heterodoxy as they were intellectually open-minded and chal-
lenged established modes of thought (Coser, 1965a, p. 5). The intellectual network that 
evolved around Morgenthau during his graduate studies was predominantly, though not 
exclusively, Jewish with Nietzsche and Burckhardt as prominent exceptions.  
Morgenthau studied works of Simmel and Freud, he was educated by Sinzheimer, and 
held close links in Frankfurt to Mannheim and members of the Institute for Social  
Research. Numerous other clerks in Sinzheimer’s chambers were also Jewish, most no-
tably Fraenkel and Neumann. In fact, the intellectual air in Frankfurt that Morgenthau 
praised even half a decade later was predominantly conveyed by these Jewish scholars. 
However, it would go too far to claim that this close interrelation with other Jewish aca-
demics was always by choice or that his faith was the general aspect of his thought as 
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recent scholarship implied (Mollov, 2002). Certainly, however, Morgenthau, due to his 
humanism, felt more attached to these kinds of scholars than to others because Jewish 
scholars often advanced traits that Arendt (1978) had summed up under the term ‘con-
scious pariah’. This is evidenced, for example, in his critique of Schmitt and Kelsen. 
Morgenthau criticised both of their research agendas, but whereas he attempted to re-
main rather sympathetic with his criticism on Kelsen, even before Kelsen saved his aca-
demic career, Morgenthau was always critical of Schmitt. Morgenthau not only rebutted 
Schmitt’s scholarship as ideologically informed, but he personally attacked Schmitt as 
an immoral person in his inaugural lecture in Geneva.    
Even after Morgenthau came to the Institute des Hautes Etudes Internationales in 
Geneva, the centre of international law in Europe at that time, he experienced margin-
alisation. Pursuing his Habilitation in Geneva was to a good deal forced, even though 
the Academic Assistance Council did not acknowledge it (Skepper, 1934; 1935), but as 
we know from the memoir of Herz, at that time a doctoral student of Kelsen, Geneva 
used to be a haven for numerous Jewish social scientists (1984, p. 108). Morgenthau’s 
lectures were boycotted by German students and due to a negative judgement of 
Morgenthau’s colleague Paul Guggenheim his Habilitation was rejected. Only through 
a positive comment of Kelsen, who had come to Geneva shortly before, Morgenthau’s 
academic career was saved (Postscript, 1984, p. 353-4). Hence, to rephrase Jütersonke’s 
verdict, without Kelsen, Morgenthau would probably not have become what he is con-
sidered to be today; the doyen of International Relations. 
The marginalisation of Morgenthau did not come to an end when he emigrated to the 
United States, but aggravated even more. This might sound paradoxical because Frei is 
correct to call Morgenthau’s academic rise a ‘brilliant career’ (2001, p. 74). He taught at 
some of the most prestigious universities in the country, being amongst others a faculty 
member of the University of Chicago and the New School for Social Research. Equally, 
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Morgenthau held visiting professorships in Harvard, Princeton, Yale, Columbia, and 
Berkeley to name only the most well-known. Furthermore, he received numerous hon-
orary doctorates and, until the American involvement in the Vietnam War, Morgenthau 
was also successful outside the academic realm as a welcomed consultant to the State 
and Defence Departments.116 Certainly, most of this achievement rested on the publica-
tion and subsequent unprecedented success of his textbook Politics among Nations. On 
15th October 1953 Morgenthau reported to John Hawes that it ‘had more adoptions than 
all other text-books taken together and more than twice as many as its nearest competi-
tor’ (HJM-Archive 126). 
Still, Morgenthau did not manage to enforce his scholarly and political agenda which 
rested on Continental European thought. Ironically, Morgenthau even became remem-
bered, quoted, and criticised for having promoted a positivistic scholarship, something 
which he condemned throughout his life, as this thesis has shown.  
Politically, his efforts have been torpedoed because his understanding of scholarship 
as dissidence was not well received at the height of the Cold War, when liberalism in 
the United States became a political religion and critical thinking that might have ques-
tioned the foundations of common beliefs were considered a threat to society.  
Morgenthau saw this tendency evidenced during the McCarthy era in the late 1940s and 
1950s and, although Morgenthau did not become a victim of this “crucible” (Arthur 
Miller), he still had to tolerate criticism for his rejection of American involvement in 
Indochina. Morgenthau was never again appointed consultant to any governmental de-
partment and his candidature for the APSA-presidency was impeded. There is even evi-
dence for a “Project Morgenthau” to collect incriminating evidence against Morgenthau 
to publicly expose him. We know from the Arendt-McCarthy correspondence that 
Morgenthau was affected by the disrepute against him. After publishing We are  
deluding ourselves in Vietnam in the New York Times Magazine in 1965, for example, 
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Morgenthau received criticism by the journalist Joseph Alsop who considered  
Morgenthau’s stance as ‘pompous ignorance’ (Arendt and McCarthy, 1995, p. 181). 
Even more disheartening must have been for Morgenthau that other critics of the Viet-
nam War were sceptical of Morgenthau as they were arguing from a moralistic stand-
point and seemed to be unaware of the Continental European cosmos in which  
Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung was formed. If one, however, is able to consider 
Morgenthau’s arguments more thoroughly and go beyond the positivistic paradigm, one 
is often left in astonishment as it had happened to Lippmann, who is recorded to have 
said in the 1960s: ‘How curious you [Morgenthau] are misunderstood. You are the most 
moral thinker I know’ (quoted after: Thompson, 1980-1981, p. 197).  
Academically, Morgenthau became out-dated and subsequently marginalised when 
behaviouralism became the ruling dogma in the discipline from the late 1950s onwards. 
This is evidenced, for example, in the circumstances of his retirement from the  
University of Chicago. A comment in the student newspaper, The Chicago Maroon, in-
dicates that Morgenthau would have liked to stay at the University despite having 
reached the official retirement age (HJM-Archive 86). This request was turned down, 
demonstrating that Morgenthau’s academic position was in decline, whereas in other 
cases scholars were able to stay on beyond retirement age, like Leo Strauss. This grad-
ual academic marginalisation caused Morgenthau resentment, which is why he turned 
down the offer of the American University in April 1970 to become dean of their 
School of International Service (HJM-Archive 5) pointing out that there were times he 
would have been honoured to accept, but these times have passed.  
The reason for this marginalisation is to be found in the encounter of two contrary 
epistemologies. This thesis has provided evidence that Morgenthau’s work was in-
formed by a non-positivistic epistemology. He argued for consideration of the spatial 
and temporal conditionality of knowledge and political order that would not allow 
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claiming objectivity in an absolute sense. Therefore, Morgenthau, who had brought 
‘Old World wisdom to the continent of Utopia’ (Hoffmann, 1987, p. 76), remained 
sceptical about the promises of rationalism and empiricism and even attacked the hubris 
that would have befallen numerous colleagues in their urge to socially plan the world. 
Indeed, Morgenthau expressed gratitude that Scientific Man vs. Power Politics was pub-
lished shortly after he had received tenure at the University of Chicago as the book was 
a critique on liberal hubris and positivistic scholarship (1984, p. 371) which most of the 
other faculty members in Chicago promoted. Like the majority of his American col-
leagues, they were, due to their socialisation, characterised by an unflinching optimism 
(Shimko, 1992) and could not make sense of the pessimism and urge for scepticism that 
was underlying Morgenthau’s epistemology. Therefore, they criticised Morgenthau for 
being “unscientific” and/or praised Waltz for having made his thought suitable for sci-
entific analysis (e.g. Nye, 1988; Keohane, 1993).  
This caused an almost tragic element in Morgenthau’s life when during the height of 
behaviouralism, Morgenthau was marginalised because his scholarship was considered 
to be out-dated, un-American, and unsuitable for the purpose of International Relations 
theorising. This purpose was, due to its close interrelation with government institutions 
and agencies, to provide foreign policy recommendations to foster American interests 
on the international scene (Hoffmann, 1977; Krippendorff, 1989) rather than critically 
question the formation and deployment of these interests. When behaviouralism, how-
ever, started to lose influence, Morgenthau did not become rehabilitated, but he was 
now also perceived to have been a positivistic scholar who attempted to establish a 
“grand theory” (Holsti, 1971, p. 165). Even post-structuralist scholars, such as Barkawi, 
George, and Tickner, put Morgenthau on a level with Waltz, equally scolding him for 
having produced a belligerent picture of international relations. Therefore, precisely 
these scholars who might have profited from a serious engagement with Morgenthau’s 
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work as it would have told them that positivism was not the necessary mode of scholar-
ship but merely the representation of a particular phase in history disapproved of 
Morgenthau due to a non-observance of their own academic standards.  
Hence, for a good part of his academic career, he was taken to be someone whom he 
was not and/or his academic qualifications were called into question. On numerous oc-
casions Morgenthau took action against these misinterpretations and there are several 
personal accounts in the Archives in which Morgenthau lamented against this margin-
alisation. To be fair, however, Morgenthau’s terminology lends itself to be misinter-
preted. We have no concrete evidence why Morgenthau did not distinguish in his Eng-
lish writings his concepts as sharply as in his German and French ones. One reason 
might have been the unfavourable climate towards Germany during and shortly after the 
Second World War which is why Morgenthau certainly attempted to separate himself 
from his German past. A second reason was presumably the shift of interest from purely 
theoretical studies towards works with a higher interest in contemporary policy issues 
(Guzzini, 1998, p. 24), such as The problem of German reunification (Morgenthau and 
Warburg, 1960) or Vietnam and the United States (Morgenthau, 1965a). Still, this does 
not settle the question why Morgenthau did not attempt to improve the clarity of his 
concepts in the United States, especially since he had realised this problem early in his 
career. To Oakeshott Morgenthau wrote in 1948 that  
‘I can now see clearly that my attempts to make clear the distinctions between 
rationalism and rational inquiry, scientism and science, were in vain. I think I 
was fully aware of the importance and difficulty of these distinctions when I 
wrote the book, and it is now obvious to me that I have failed in the task to make 
my meaning clear’ (HJM-Archive 44). 
However, this thesis also stressed that Morgenthau’s thought and his Weltan-
schauung in general were fundamentally informed by the concept of alienation as an 
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epistemological source. His understanding of scholarship as a critical corrective of con-
temporary forms of sociation placed him outside the academic orthodoxy of his time 
and, indeed, required him to be on the margin. This is the case because, as Morgenthau 
emphasised on numerous occasions for example his article Reflections on the State of 
Political Science from 1955, being critical of contemporary society and challenging 
vested interests will not only cause discomfort among contemporaries because their ha-
bitual ways of thinking will be questioned, but it also means for the political scientist to 
place him-/herself outside of these interests to avoid being biased. Therefore, Morgen-
thau intellectually profited from his personal tragedy. 
 
7.3 Bringing the political back in: the post-structuralist turn in  
International Relations 
In order to assess Morgenthau’s contribution to International Relations, to counter 
the marginalisation of his work in the discipline, and help visualise that he is rightly part 
of the discipline’s canon, we will turn to Edkins’s reading of post-structuralism as a 
heuristic device. This is not to argue that Morgenthau was a proto-post-structuralist, but 
it will help to demonstrate that he followed similar academic and societal aspirations. 
Edkins understands post-structuralism as a movement that is committed to re-
politicise politics because in modern Western societies the political would have been 
gradually removed from it (1999, p. 1). Whether or not post-structuralism achieved this 
aspiration does not have to interest us here, but what is important for the argument of 
this thesis is to briefly outline the reasons and consequences of de-politicisation. 
To begin with, Edkins distinguishes between politics and the political; a distinction 
Morgenthau would have endorsed. Politics is defined by Edkins closely to the common 
meaning of it and would be, therefore, the realm of institutionalised execution of gov-
ernment. Elections, political parties, the Executive, Judiciary, and Legislature, diplo-
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macy, war, or international treaties would all be part of politics (Edkins, 1999, p. 2). 
What is commonly called politics would be, therefore, closely linked to the idea of the 
sovereign state (Edkins, 1999, p. 6) and Jellinek’s general theory of the state in which 
he distinguished between national territory, people, and authority. Politics is perceived 
to be the realm in which the government would have the means to execute authority 
within a certain area over a certain amount of people and it would have the rights to do 
so as other nation-states would mutually recognise each other’s monopoly of power. 
The history of the state would have to be perceived as a history in which the political 
would not only have been removed by a narrative of security, but the political would 
even be considered in modern societies to be a cause for insecurity as it could question 
the existential institutions of the state (Stern and Öjendal, 2010, p. 14). Therefore, post-
structuralism argues, according to Edkins, that sovereign politics would have led to a 
de-politicisation within the realm that sovereign politics is executed and the interna-
tional system it had created; the Westphalian system of nation-states. By referring to the 
examples of humanitarian aid and securitisation Edkins stresses that in particular tech-
nologisation allowed states to de-politicise politics because it would have provided them 
with the means to, on the one hand, deprive people of the possibilities to criticise gov-
ernment decisions, hence to fulfil their role as citizens, and, on the other hand, create a 
substitute for the political through ideologies and/or consumerism (1999, p. 9-14).  
Paul Hirst provided a further explanation why de-politicisation occurred in the West-
phalian system. He considered the very system of nation-states as an act of de-
politicisation because internally the idea of sovereignty would have permitted states to 
reduce if not remove conflicts from the realm of politics. This would have enabled 
states to build other forms of identification through ideology in order to create homoge-
neity and compliance within the state. Externally however, the establishment of states 
would have created a self-fulfilling prophecy by putting the focus on the primacy of the 
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reason of state. This would have reduced international relations to the question ‘… of 
the balance of power and the acquisition of territory in Europe and colonies abroad’ 
(Hirst, 2001, p. 57).  
According to Edkins post-structuralism was established as a movement to counter 
this de-politicisation and to bring the political back in. The political is defined by her as 
having ‘… to do with the establishment of that very social order which sets out a par-
ticular, historically specific account of what counts as politics …’ (Edkins, 1999, p. 2). 
The political would be, therefore, the moment when a new social and political order 
would be created, regardless of what this new order would look like. Hence, there 
would be uncertainty among its creators about the final objectification of this order, but 
it would also be a moment of openness characterised by a dispute of its creators as they 
would all attempt to reify their social and political ideals. The political would be, there-
fore, quintessentially a moment of subjectivity as the moment when people come to-
gether and act in their quest to establish some form of social and political order (Edkins, 
1999, p. 7-9). 
 
7.4 The anthropological condition of politics 
In consideration of Edkins’s reading of post-structuralism, it will be possible to high-
light that Morgenthau’s marginalisation is unjustified. The initial concern to bring the 
political back in, which had fostered post-structuralist theorising from the onset, is an 
endeavour to which Morgenthau felt obliged half a century earlier. Indeed, Morgen-
thau’s approach is even more sophisticated because his analytical focus rested on the 
anthropological condition of politics as this Weltanschauungsanalyse has shown. What 
is more, Morgenthau belonged to a group of European émigré scholars, whose contribu-
tion to political science and International Relations is yet to be researched, who were 
ahead of their time in the discipline because during their academic career, International 
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Relations remained dominated by positivism as the discipline was deeply enmeshed 
with governmental institutions and agencies that did not allow scholars to fundamen-
tally divert from the beaten tracks. Considering the post-structuralist agenda, this dem-
onstrates that International Relations is still not commonly aware of its own history out-
side the “great debates” – discourses (Wæver, 1998; Jørgensen, 2000, Thies, 2002). 
Elaborating Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung, therefore, has not only demonstrated that 
Morgenthau’s research agenda resembles common post-structuralist accounts (Wong, 
2000, p. 409; Cozette, 2008, p. 16) and that his thought is a useful addition to them, but 
also that International Relations’ scholars still apply broad brush strokes to paint pic-
tures of the world. Political thought, as condensed in Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung, is 
far more eclectic than post-structuralist scholars make students of International Rela-
tions believe and its acknowledgment would make their theorising even more convinc-
ing and worthwhile. Only recently analysts have emphasised that (international) politi-
cal theorising in the 20th century would have been deeply influenced by German intel-
lectual traditions (Bell, 2009, p. 7). 
In the course of the 20th century, the human factor would have had been removed for 
Morgenthau from politics because nation-states, as the major actors in international rela-
tions, would have had an interest in maintaining the status quo. This de-humanisation, 
as Morgenthau argued in accordance with Arendt (1970), would have not only had ef-
fects on international politics, but also on the discipline (Morgenthau, 1950b).  
Morgenthau saw the climax of this de-humanisation of politics reached in American 
foreign politics during the Vietnam War. Morgenthau criticised Robert McNamara, the 
Secretary of Defence at that time, for measuring the success of the Vietnam War 
through “body counts”. Killing humans, therefore, became the quantifiable end through 
which the implementation of foreign policy strategies could be scientifically assessed 
(Morgenthau, 1969a, p. 138). Three forms of reification in particular led Morgenthau to 
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this de-humanisation in modern societies: ideologisation, technologisation, and scien-
tification.  
Ideologisation. Morgenthau remained sceptical about the promises of ideologies and, 
indeed, understood Politics among Nations ‘as a temporary and historically caused 
counter-ideology to the ideologies of the 20th century’ (Behr, 2010, p. 211) rather than a 
theory of international politics as the subtitle of the German translation would make the 
reader believe. People yielded to the temptation of ideologies because they provided in 
Anthony Giddens’s words ‘ontological security’ (1984, p. 375). This means that ideolo-
gies furnished people in their yearning to give meaning to the social world and establish 
their identity within it, not only with the ontological framework that would allow them 
to do so and thereby gain security, but there would also be a reification of the ideology 
through social structures and institutions. Morgenthau (1960b) saw in this ideological 
takeover of reality two de-humanising problems, both of them prompting mediocrity. 
On the one hand, Morgenthau argued that ideologies would promote creative medi-
ocrity. Humans would not be able to fully utilise all their creative abilities within an 
ideological framework. Ideologies would be established to provide a discourse of le-
gitimacy for the current political order, but they would also provide ontological security. 
Retaining the social structures would be, therefore, a vital expression of this legitimacy 
and security. An alteration of these structures through the creative abilities of humans 
would mean that people would be threatened to lose their ontological security due to 
changes to the reification of their thought. Consequently, the creative abilities of hu-
mans would only be used to support the ideologised reality. Morgenthau’s criticism is 
similar here with Edkins’s final pledge that international relations theorists should ren-
der visible ‘the contingent, provisional nature’ (1999, p. 142) of political order. On the 
other hand, ideologies would also promote intellectual mediocrity. This would be the 
case because conflicting worldviews or merely a critical potential would challenge the 
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political order and could, therefore, not be tolerated. Morgenthau’s criticism of ideolo-
gies resembles Armin Nassehi’s concepts of inclusion and exclusion (2004). Hirst (2001, 
p. 53) remarked for nationalism, but which is true for all ideologies, that it would oper-
ate on dichotomous perceptions of otherness because this would create homogeneity 
within a group, which would be necessary to uphold the political order to monopolise 
narratives of reality. Therefore, anyone who challenges these narratives through his/her 
beliefs, knowledge, or even existence would have to be excluded. This exclusion may 
range from criminalisation to expulsion and even extinction, as happened in fascism and 
communism. Morgenthau was confronted with the intellectual mediocrity and exclusion 
during the evening in Neumeyer’s house in 1935 (Postscript, 1984, p. 363-4) when the 
other guests remained largely indifferent to the execution of a Jewish lawyer. That eve-
ning showed Morgenthau that it would require the qualities of an Übermensch to sur-
pass dichotomous thinking and a critical mass of them to re-establish the political. To 
avoid exclusion, even people critical about fascism could only resort to political apathy 
and, eventually, contribute to an intellectual mediocratisation since critical voices would 
and could no longer constitute public opinion.117 
Technologisation. Morgenthau (1973), furthermore, criticised modern societies for 
their technological penetration of social life which would have two de-humanising ef-
fects. First, the technological interlocking would lead to increased complexity. On the 
one hand, technological advancements would enable an accelerated individualisation in 
modern societies because people would acquire the spatial and temporal abilities to par-
ticipate in numerous sociations, but, on the other hand, technologisation would have 
also required them to meticulously structure their lives in a regulatory framework like 
timetables or diaries, as Rosa (2005, p. 97-100) recently emphasised. If these regulatory 
frameworks become unreliable, life would not only lose its synchronicity, but would 
come to a standstill altogether. Hence, it is not only in labour terms that people are 
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turned from a homo faber into an animal laborans (Morgenthau, 1960b; 1972) meaning 
that they lose their ability to pursue their life out of their own free will, but succumb to 
various societal and/or political requirements and structure their life accordingly.  
Second, technologisation allowed the production of mass-produced consumer goods 
which in modern societies would compensate for the loss of identity (Morgenthau, 
1960b). This would be the case because the common realms of identity-creation, poli-
tics and economy, would have been de-humanised. People could neither get politically 
involved as critical citizens, albeit being a zoon politikon (Morgenthau, 1947a; 2004), 
due to the ideologisation of politics and would be turned into an animal laborans which 
would suppress their drive to prove oneself. Modern marketing strategies would seize 
the yearning for identity to create a frantic and constant urge to consume commodities 
as a replacement for identity. For Morgenthau, this would not only create a ‘society of 
waste’ (1960a, p. 215; 1960b, p. 69; 1972, p. 23), but eventually a reification of identity.  
Scientification. The final aspect Morgenthau repeatedly criticised about modern so-
cieties is the scientification of politics. Similar to Edkins’s assessment of post-
structuralism Morgenthau was sceptical about the promises of the application of natural 
science methods in politics. Still, as the common usage of the term political science 
suggests the “separationist movement” (Guilhot, 2008) to which Morgenthau can be at-
tributed, unsuccessfully opposed the positivistic dominance. Morgenthau’s lore was 
suspicious of the epistemological value of such positivistic-structuralist approaches to 
politics (1944, p. 176; 1949, p. 1) because they would not concede a vital role to the 
human. Rather than focusing on the creative abilities of humans to act together and cre-
ate a compromise through the alignment of interests, as Morgenthau did with his con-
cepts of normative power and national interest, structuralist approaches often promoted 
a belligerent outlook on the world. In those approaches the nation-state would be con-
sidered as an ‘organismic’ unit (Waltz, 1954, p. 178), which would attempt to survive in 
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an anarchical structure. This, however, would cause a reification of politics, as Behr re-
cently noted. Due to scientification, political science would have omitted the distinction 
between the analytical and the normative. From the analytical assumption of anarchy, 
normative conclusions would have derived what measures have to be taken to secure 
one’s survival. These conclusions, however, were not termed in normative diction, but 
presented as a logical reasoning from which foreign policy guidelines would have been 
produced (Behr, 2010, p. 206-7).  
The result of this de-humanisation of modern societies caused by the ideological, 
technological, and scientific reification would have been the de-politicisation of politics 
demonstrating that post-structuralist accounts, as presented by Edkins, are congruent to 
Morgenthau’s argumentation. The political would have been eliminated from politics 
because scrutiny and criticism would have become considered as a menace to the politi-
cal status quo (Morgenthau, 1952b, 1974c). A questioning of this status quo would have 
seemed at times threatening, when the dominant liberal ideology was challenged, as 
happened during the “Red Scare”, and at times unqualified as the de-humanisation of 
modern societies had led to a hubris of thought, as depicted in chapter six. Ideologically, 
the discourse on freedom would have instilled the urge to maintain the status quo be-
cause living in the “Free World” would have to be safeguarded from the atrocities of the 
“Eastern Bloc”, but also political science would have pioneered the hubris. By not dis-
tinguishing between analytical and normative elements in their approaches, normative 
assumptions would have been presented as logical reasoning and their foreign policy 
advice would have had fewer guidelines than parameters. Criticism, therefore, would 
have seemed unqualified if not preposterous and humans could only resort to apathy or 
violence to express criticism (Morgenthau, 1965a; 1972; 1974c). Indeed, following 
Morgenthau’s letter to Dobell (chapter four), this is what would have happened during 
the student protests in the 1960s. Being unable to critically discuss existential questions 
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about the society students lived in, in particular the definition of the common good, they 
would have had to resort to violence to make themselves heard. Politics in modern so-
cieties would have been, therefore, reduced to its institutions – it would have been rei-
fied, so to speak – but the political, hence the quality or colouring of issues, as  
Morgenthau had defined it in his doctoral thesis, would have been eliminated from poli-
tics.  
The emphasis of the anthropological condition of politics and eventually the re-
humanisation of modern societies is to be considered as Morgenthau’s guiding principle 
of his Weltanschauung and his legacy for contemporary International Relations. For 
Morgenthau, scholarship would have had to make serious efforts to alter this de-
humanisation and act as its critical public corrective. However, political science in gen-
eral and International Relations in particular did not live up to Morgenthau’s expecta-
tions, but the positivisation of political science even contributed to this de-humanisation. 
He believed the discipline would ‘… retreat into the trivial, the formal, the methodo-
logical, the purely theoretical, the remotely historical – in short the politically irrele-
vant ...’ (Morgenthau, 1955, p. 448; 1966b, p. 73) rather than discussing politically rele-
vant issues that concern the well-being and interests of people. Morgenthau perceived 
the political wider than what is commonly called politics. Resembling Simmel’s notion 
of sociation, the political would have been for Morgenthau the constant interaction of 
people who would come together in the public realm, while everybody would express 
and pursue their interests, but they would also attempt to find a compromise that would 
suit the common good. In this sense his line of argumentation also exceeds post-
structuralist theorising since it argues that the political would be the moment of de-
politicisation (Edkins, 1999, p. 126). To ensure the political even in the ideologised re-
ality of nation-states, Morgenthau (1950a; 1951; 1952b; 1952c) introduced the concept 
of national interest, which he argued would allow the reconciliation of numerous do-
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mestic interests and transfer it into a classification in consideration of the common good. 
This demonstrates that politics was for Morgenthau a process that would require con-
stant political involvement of people. What is commonly referred to as politics would 
be merely the institutionalised expression of the political which would be, however, 
subject to constant revision due to the processual character of the political. Since poli-
tics, as an academic discipline and societal realm, would not have considered this proc-
essual character, it would have faced the same problem as (international) law during the 
interwar-period. It would become sterile (Morgenthau, 1966b) and, eventually, create a 
systemic outlook on the world in which the human would not be considered anymore. 
Problems or conflicts in the political realm would become issues of structural con-
straints in which remedy would be sought through technological measures.  
Emphasising the political as constant human interaction, eventually, allowed 
Morgenthau to pursue the normative side of power as this would have been required to 
re-establish the political. Any form of sociation would be constructed through the inter-
action, commitment, and will of people and could not be considered as naturally given 
and/or non-influenceable. In accordance with Arendt (1970), Morgenthau argued, there-
fore, for nothing less than a paradigmatic change in perceiving power not merely as its 
empirical concept in the form of a belligerent, suppressing, and authority-ensuring 
means, as in the case of the nation-state, but as normative power understood as empow-
erment which would become an end in itself. This is the case because power would be 
the very capability to create and act together and, eventually, manage to establish a rec-
oncilement of interests for the common good. To achieve this stage of empowerment, 
however, Morgenthau argued that it would require educated people, in the sense that 
they would have been able to transcend the de-humanisation in modern societies. Since 
he agreed with Nietzsche that this transcendence could not be achieved by everybody 
without guidance, it would require, therefore, people acting as an Übermensch to edu-
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cate and free the humans in their thinking from ideological, technological, and scientific 
constraints. Morgenthau, therefore, had high expectations of scholarship to fulfil this 
role of a public corrective. In the 1940s, however, he argued that social sciences would 
not yet have achieved this significance. 
‘The science of international law, as well as the social sciences in general, are 
still awaiting their Newton, their Leibniz, their Faraday, their Carnot, their 
Maxwell, and their Hertz. To expect the contemporaneous lawyer to be an “en-
gineer” or “technician” of the law means to expect Edison before Faraday, 
Wright before Carnot, Marconi before Maxwell and Hertz. And this is certainly 
a futile expectation. The great task which lies before the social sciences is to 
prepare the work of the latter so that the former can build upon it’ (Morgenthau, 
1940, p. 284). 
Edkins’s reading of post-structuralism as a movement to bring the political back in 
shows that Morgenthau’s agenda of a re-humanisation of social sciences is still contem-
porary and it is for this reason that Morgenthau is rightfully added to the canon of Inter-
national Relations and it is to this end that studying Morgenthau is a rich source for con-
temporary International Relations theorising.  
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1 HJM-Archive stands for the Papers of Hans J. Morgenthau at the Manuscript Division of the Library 
of Congress. The following number indicates the respective container. 
2 This was to a certain extent different in Germany, where Morgenthau’s former student and later 
professor in Munich, Kindermann, promoted Morgenthau’s work. In 1963 Morgenthau’s Politics 
among Nations, was published as Macht und Frieden. Kindermann (1965) equally published an in-
troductory article to Niebuhr’s and Morgenthau’s thought in the major German political science 
organ. Indeed, the 1960s marked a time when Morgenthau’s thought moved into the focus of Ger-
man political science, as articles of Krippendorff (1964) and Werner Link (1965) suggest. 
3 For Park the marginal man was a ‘cosmopolite and citizen of the world’ (1928, p. 892), while for  
Golovensky the marginal man remained ‘in the twilight zone of two cultures’ (Golovensky, 1952,  
p. 334). If Morgenthau was tending towards the one or other extreme is a source for speculation, 
probably at times he tended more to the one, while at other times he tended more to the other. It is 
certain, however, that Morgenthau was torn between the two cultures. His former student Lebow 
notes that ‘… questions about his German past were taboo’ (2003, p. 219). It fits well into this pic-
ture that research in the Library of Congress has shown that Morgenthau never replied to a German 
letter in German but in English, although some of these letters were written to him by personal 
friends. Still, Morgenthau remained attached to the German culture, most of his friends were also 
émigré scholars, and Morgenthau frequently visited Continental Europe. This yearning for Euro-
pean culture is exemplified in a letter to his doctoral student Gerald Stourzh from 24th September 
1951 asking him to bring various goods from Vienna (HJM-Archive 55). 
4 Also Guzzini (2004) implies this distinction, although he does not further elaborate it.  
5 In English-speaking academia this thought style is to be found for example in: Hollis and Smith, 
1990; Knutsen, 1997; Nye, 2000; Baylis and Smith, 2001; Jackson and Sørensen, 2003; Williams, 
Goldstein, and Shafritz, 2005; Collins, 2010. This thought style is so widespread that also German 
political science endorses it, as the following examples indicate: Zürn, 1994; Krell, 2000; Hubel, 
2005; Jacobs, 2006. For a critical elaboration, see: Cristol, 2009. 
6 Scientification is not similar with the more common term scientization. Scientification signifies the 
process of firmly grounding positivism as the only viable framework for theorizing in international 
relations and politics in general. This scientification or “reification of politics”, as Behr (2010, p. 
197-209) put it, is already visible in the common usage of the term political science rather than 
politicology to classify scholarly work dealing about political issues. 
7 A similar intellectual lineage is drawn by Erhard Forndran (1996, p. 1024) and Stephen Walt 
(2002, p. 198). 
8 The first German study to have relied on Morgenthau’s European works was Link’s Die  
Allgegenwart des Machtkampfes. Über die Prämissen der Theorie Hans J. Morgenthaus (1965) which 
appeared in the Neue Politische Literatur.  
9 Publish or Perish only shows twelve citations of which the first one was in 1990 (Accessed: 12th  
October 2010). 
10 The first version was published in 1977.  
11 (Allgemeine) Staatslehre is a German academic field which deals generally about questions of 
sovereignty, but also questions regarding the development, forms, and intentions of state. During 
the time of Morgenthau Staatslehre was primarily dominated by jurisprudence, but it is interdisci-
plinary because it touches upon political, philosophical, sociological, economic, and even theological 
aspects. Jütersonke translated it as ‘general theory of the state’ (2010, p. 37) and Ludwig  
Adamovich even called it ‘science of the state’ (1950, p. 25). However, like the prefix “neo”, the term 
“science” indicates a positivistic epistemology which is why we follow the more neutral suggestion 
of Jütersonke theory or lore.  
12 For more on the influence of German-speaking émigré scholars in American social sciences and 
humanities, see for example: Coser, 1984; Greenberg, 1992; Averbeck, 2001; Krohn, 2002. 
13 A conceptual history for the term ideology is provided by Emmet Kennedy (1976). From a term 
depicting the science of ideas, as used by the French idéologues, it turned into a largely pejorative 
term for false consciousness (equally: Bracher, 1985). 
14 Gnosticism refers ‘… to a purported direct, immediate apprehension or vision of truth without the 
need for critical reflection; the special gift of a spiritual and cognitive elite’ (Voegelin, 2000, p. 279). 
15 For more on a Mannheimian Weltanschauungsanalyse, see: Nelson, 1992, p. 31-7. 
16 The foreign-image is the perception other people have about oneself, whereas the meta-image is 
what one thinks how oneself is perceived by other people (Bolten, 2001, p. 52-5). 
17 Germany will be equated with Central Europe here. This does not mean that there was or is an 
intellectual dominance or primacy favouring Germany, but it rather follows Johan Galtung (1981) 
and Richard Münch (1990). Both argue that there was an intense intellectual exchange between 
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Germany and other Central European countries, such as Poland, Hungary, Austria, and the Czech 
Republic. Both scholars use the terms “German” and “teutonic” to characterise this exchange.  
18 A similar remark was given by Morgenthau at the end of his life in an interview with Johnson 
pointing out that it was not American pragmatism that shaped his thoughts (Postscript, 1984,  
p. 378-9). 
19 In order to catch the atmosphere of this time adequately, the term fin de siècle will be applied. 
Although traditionally reserved for France and Austria and restricted to the turn of the 20th century  
(Marchand and Lindenfeld, 2004, p. 1-2), much of what Philipp Blom (2009, p. 1-4) has recently 
remarked for the first 14 years of the 20th century, lingered on in the Weimar Republic. Old certain-
ties withered away and numerous ideologies co-existed next to each other, struggling for the mo-
nopoly of interpretation, be it in arts, literature, or politics, leaving the people with the feeling of 
alienation, crisis, and uncertainty. Nevertheless, at the same time the hope for the better, which 
dominated much of the 19th century, was still in the people’s minds. Stefan Zweig, the Austrian nov-
elist, remarked in his autobiographical The World of Yesterday that ‘[i]n its liberal idealism, the 
nineteenth century was honestly convinced that it was on the straight and unfailing path toward 
being the best of all worlds. Earlier eras, with their wars, famines, and revolts, were deprecated as 
times when mankind was still immature and unenlightened. But now it was merely a matter of dec-
ades until the last vestige of evil and violence would finally be conquered, and this faith in an unin-
terrupted and irresistible “progress” truly had the force of a religion for that generation’ (1943,  
p. 14). 
20 Altogether there were approximately 28,000 civil servants, 10,200 judges, 26,000 protestant 
priests, 9,300 teachers at secondary schools, 4,500 professors and Privatdozenten, 34,000 physi-
cians, and 12,500 lawyers. The Bürgertum consisted also of several thousands of journalists, catho-
lic priests, artists etc. With a family coefficient of four to five one reaches the number stated above. 
21 Coburg only became part of Bavaria in 1920 by popular vote. Until then it was the capital of the 
Thuringian duchy of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha. Hence, during the time Morgenthau lived there, it was 
actually not part of Bavaria. 
22 This centrality Bildung had then in Germany is further revealed by quoting Mannheim who wrote 
that ‘[t]he modern bourgeoisie had for the beginning a twofold social root – on the one hand the 
owners of capital, on the other hand those individuals whose only capital consisted in their educa-
tion. It was common therefore to speak of the propertied and educated class, the educated element 
being, however, by no means ideologically in agreement with the property-owning element’ (1985, 
p. 156). 
23 The German Confederation existed from 1815 (Congress of Vienna) until 1866 when the Austro-
Prussian War broke out. 
24 However, it took until 1834 before the university entrance examinations were abolished and the 
Abitur became the only state-controlled requirement. From this time on only persons with an Abi-
tur could enter universities. Since 1885 administrative privileges became more and more con-
nected to an academic education. For the right to receive a provincial administration post or to be-
come a higher official in a postal department at least six years of higher education were required 
(Ringer, 1969, p. 26-32).  
25 As Henry Pachter put it for the Weimar Republic: ‘As academic persons or teachers, they enjoyed 
the security and status of the civil service. In a society which still measured a man’s value by his 
title, they were Herr Direktor, Herr Geheimrat, Herr Advokat, Herr Rechtsanwalt, Herr Professor ...’ 
(1972, p. 228). 
26 Herbet Schnädelbach remarks that ‘[t]he Humboldt-University sought to achieve a creative com-
promise in all respects: academic freedom alongside responsibility for the requirements of state 
and society; vocational training combined with the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake’ (1984,  
p. 23). 
27 The successor of the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft are the Max-Planck-Institutes.  
28 Simmel noted that ‘[t]his primacy of technique has infected even the purely intellectual branches 
of knowledge: in the historical sciences, as in that of experimental psychology, investigations, es-
sentially worthless and, as regards the ultimate end of all research, most unimportant, frequently 
enjoy a quite disproportionate degree of recognition, provided only that they be carried out by 
means of perfect methodical, technical processes’ (2008, p. 169). 
29 In an earlier publication, Rosa gets even more to the point by calling this circumstance a 
‘rasender Stillstand’ (frenzied deadlock) (2005, p. 41), 
30 The term Kulturpessimismus was made popular by Stern in his The Politics of Cultural Despair 
(1989). 
31 This is possible since Bourdieu used, similar to the meaning of Ringer’s dichotomy, the terms or-
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thodoxy and heterodoxy. Another terminology, which eventually points out the same aspect, is pro-
vided by Gay. He distinguishes between insiders and outsiders (Gay, 2001).  
32 Robert Michels for example, a student of Weber, did not receive his venia legendi in Germany be-
cause he sympathised with socialist ideas. Therefore, he had to move to Italy, where he eventually 
became a supporter of Italian Fascism (Ringer, 1969, p. 143).  
33 Sinzheimer was one of the few people who saw Morgenthau off in Antwerp, where he boarded 
the SS Königsstein on 17th July 1937 (Frei 2001, p. 61).  
34 On Geneva as an asylum for German Jewish intellectuals, see: Herz, 1984. 
35 Morgenthau not only dedicated a collection of essays Truth and Power to Kelsen, but, as he 
pointed out in a letter to Hula from 4th January 1941, he was trying to promote Kelsen as a scholar 
in the USA and to find employment for Kelsen’s son-in-law (HJM-Archive 11). 
36 This becomes apparent in a letter to Masek from 13th May 1959 in which Morgenthau stated that 
‘... frequently in history men with good intentions ... have done great harm to their nation’ (HJM-
Archive 38). 
37 In his autobiographical sketch Morgenthau noted that ‘[i]t was inevitable that I would be influ-
enced – however temporarily and negatively – by Carl Schmitt ...’ (1984, p. 15). 
38 Similar evidence is given in a letter to Arendt from 14th January 1965 in which Morgenthau criti-
cised Schmitt’s work. Arendt had sent him Schmitt’s Theory of the Partisan which Morgenthau 
commented as ‘… interesting, but unbelievably shoddy, both in thought and exposition’ (HJM-
Archive 5). 
39 However, it has to be noted that Ex captivitate salus was published after the Second World War, a 
time when Schmitt was desperately trying to restore his reputation.  
40 In a letter to Magill from 5th January 1962, Morgenthau even remarked: ‘As concerns the pre-
dominant intellectual influences on me, a most powerful and probably decisive influence has cer-
tainly been Nietzsche’ (HJM-Archive 39).  
41  These books were: Philosophie der Mode, Grundfragen der Soziologie, Hauptprobleme der  
Philosophie, and Das Problem der historischen Zeit.  
42 A contemporary discussion of alienation is provided by Ian Burkitt. He remarks that ‘[a]lienation 
… is one of the central aspects of reflexivity … It is as an outsider that we can engage in the work of 
codification ….’ (1997, p.  195). 
43 Morgenthau recounts one of these anti-Semitic incidents himself. Being the best pupil in his 
grammar school, the Casimirianum, he was chosen to give a speech in front of the school and crown 
the statue of the duke afterwards. However, people in the audience were using foul language and 
were holding their noses because of this “stinking Jew”. Morgenthau recalled this incident to have 
taken place in 1923, but a look into the local newspaper, the Coburger Zeitung from 4th July 1922, 
shows that it happened already one year earlier (Postscript, 1984, p. 340-1; Fromm, 1990, p. 289). 
44 Lebow (2003, p. 219) notes that before Morgenthau was able to get the position at Brooklyn Col-
lege, he had to work as an elevator boy to make ends meet. 
45 Klaus and Erika Mann (1996) beautifully captured this particular life-world of German-speaking 
émigré intellectuals in the United States in their book Escape to Life by portraying the most impor-
tant personalities who forced to leave Germany.  
46 Similar appraisals are given by Amstrup, 1978; Thompson, 1980-1981; Tsou, 1984; Hacke, 2005. 
47 Irma Thormann, Morgenthau’s wife, later recalled that Morgenthau’s father was ‘a Jew who 
wanted to be a German and who adored the emperor Wilhelm II’ (quoted after: Frei, 2001, p. 13). 
48 Also daughters of Kurt von Hammerstein-Equord, head of the Supreme Army Command during 
the Weimar Republic and son-in-law of Walther von Lüttwitz, responsible for the Kapp-Lüttwitz-
Putsch, got attracted to communist promises and clandestinely supported the German Communist 
Party during their youth in Berlin (Enzensberger, 2009). 
49 Bendix argued that this continuity of thought is generally the case among émigré scholars (1988, 
p. 35-6). 
50 The original reads: ‘[D]er Impuls des Lebens, der danach strebt, sich zu erhalten, sich zu bewäh-
ren und sich mit gleichartigem Leben zu verbinden.’ 
51 Schuett uses a different term ‘the instinct of self-assertion’ (2007, p. 59). Translating it as the 
drive to prove oneself is, however, more accurate since, on the one hand, my translation is more 
accurate to the German term and, on the other hand, Morgenthau used this translation as well 
(1974c, p. 16). 
52 ‘Verdankt das Streben nach Erhaltung des eigenen Lebens einem Mangel seine Entstehung, ist er, 
um im Bilde zu sprechen, ein Kind des Hungers, strebt er danach, ein Defizit an Energie auszuglei-
chen bzw. zu verhindern, so entspringt das Streben nach Bewährung einem Ueberfluss [sic] an 
Energie, der nach Entladung drängt, findet er also, um wieder im Bilde zu sprechen, einen seiner 
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bezeichnenden Ausprägungen als Liebe.’ 
53 With this statement Morgenthau is consistent with Lord Darlington in Oscar Wilde’s Lady  
Windemere’s Fan. Wilde let Lord Darlington express ‘... that good people do a great deal of harm in 
this world’ (2003, p. 423). 
54 The original reads: ‘Ueberall [sic] wo der Mensch danach strebt zu zeigen “was er kann“.’ 
55 ‘... die wahllos, ohne Rücksicht auf ihren sachlichen Gehalt … ergriffen werden.’ 
56 Similar: Morgenthau, 1979, p. 1. 
57 Despite this problematic translation of Weber’s work, it is used here since it is the standard 
translation. The original, however, reads ‘Macht bedeutet jede Chance, innerhalb einer sozialen Be-
ziehung den eigenen Willen auch gegen Widerstand durchzusetzen, gleichviel worauf diese Chance 
beruht’ (Weber, 1947, p. 28) This essentially means: ‘Power means every chance to enforce his own 
will within a social relation, also against resistance, no matter what this chance relies upon’ (my 
translation). 
58 In his monograph German thought and International Relations, Shilliam makes the same claim, 
referring to page seven of Morgenthau’s autobiographical sketch (2009, p. 183). While at this page  
Morgenthau did refer to Rothenbücher’s seminar on Weber and we can assume that Morgenthau 
has read The Vocational Lectures, not least because his biographer Frei informs us that Morgenthau 
had read Science as Vocation (2001, p. 121), there is no clear evidence that he did so emphatically 
and that it had a lasting influence on his Weltanschauung.  
59 In relation to the state Morgenthau speaks of the following: ‘Toute politique étrangère n’est que 
volonté de maintenir, d’accroître ou d’affirmer sa puissance, et ces trois manifestations de la volon-
té politique se traduisent ici par les formes empiriques fondamentales de la politique du statu quo, 
de la politique impérialiste et de la politique de prestige’ (1933, p. 61). 
60 In Politics among Nations we read for example: ‘It should be noted that these formulations are of 
provisional nature and are subject to further refinement’ (Morgenthau, 1985, p. 53).   
61 Also later Morgenthau made a similar argument in a letter to Richard S. Cohen from 4th October 
1962 (HJM-Archive 10). 
62 The manuscript Morgenthau was referring to was Über den Sinn der Wissenschaft in dieser Zeit 
und über die Bestimmung des Menschen (1934b).  
63 The aphorism Morgenthau referred to is the 338th in Nietzsche’s The Gay Science (2003). 
64 In an earlier publication Morgenthau noted that ‘[f]acts have no social meaning in themselves. It 
is the significance we attribute to certain facts of our sensual experience, in terms of our hopes and 
fears, our memoires, intentions, and expectations, that create them as social facts’ (1962b, p. 110).   
65 Similar ideas were expressed in Truth and Power (Morgenthau, 1970a, p. 133). 
66 ‘… nichts sinnloseres für das menschliche Bewusstsein als eine Moral, die der Auflösung der 
menschlichen Gesellschaft gegenüber indifferent bleibt …’ 
67 The German original reads: ‘… wo mehrere Individuen in Wechselwirkung treten. Diese Wech-
selwirkung entsteht immer aus bestimmten Trieben heraus oder um bestimmter Zwecke willen.’ 
68 It is curious to remark that scholars like Simmel but also Scheler, despite their promotion of soci-
ety as a human construct, praised the First World War and warfare in general as a means to enforce 
the coherence of societies as “collective beings” (Kleinschmidt, 2000, p. 179). 
69 Social institutions are understood here following the definition of Jonathan Turner. They are ‘a 
complex of positions, roles, norms and values lodged in particular types of social structures and 
organising relatively stable patterns of human activity with respect to fundamental problems in 
producing life-sustaining resources, in reproducing individuals, and in sustaining viable societal 
structures within a given environment’ (Turner, 1997, p. 6). 
70 The original reads: ‘Träger aller gesellschaftlichen Kräfte aber sind immer nur Einzelmenschen …’ 
71 Morgenthau signed this manuscript, which is essentially a translation of parts of La notion du 
politique, as Privatdozent, a title which he was only allowed to carry after having finished his post-
doctoral degree. Since Morgenthau did so in 1934 and left for Madrid in 1935 this paper must have 
been written in between those dates. Curiously, it was neglected so far by those scholars who pro-
mote the Schmitt-Morgenthau relation, even though, as their references reveal, they speak German 
and had access to the Morgenthau Archive in the Library of Congress.  
72 The German reads: ‘Der Begriff des Politischen hat keine Substanz, die ein für allemal feststände, 
er ist vielmehr eine Eigenschaft, eine Qualität, eine Färbung, die allen Substanzen anhaften kann … 
Eine Frage, die heute politischen Charakter hat, kann morgen jede politische Bedeutung abgehen …’ 
73 ‘… Seele des Menschen als Trägerin des Politischen.’ 
74 Making a linguistic argument is permissible here since as Morgenthau’s son, Matthew, pointed 
out in a letter: ‘My father was very concerned about language. Each word was in there for a specific 
reason’ (Morgenthau, 2009). Hence, it is to assume that Morgenthau deliberately used the term 
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Kraft. 
75 The French original reads: ‘Les normes deviennent l’arme la plus redoutable dont la société hu-
maine se sert se protéger contre les dommages que les comportements asociaux pourraient lui cau-
ser.’ 
76 See as well: Murray, 1996, p. 92-3. 
77 A critical appraisal of the term “German-Jewish symbiosis” is provided by Scholem, 1979. 
78 ‘Der technische Fortschritt wird mit dem Verlust der kulturellen Substanz erkauft.’ 
79 The French original reads: ‘C’est précisément la crainte d’un déplaisir qui est le moyen le plus 
propre à provoquer la réaction voulue par la norme.’  
80 In the English-speaking academia historism and historicism are often used simultaneously. This 
is, however, misleading since both schools of thought are conflictive, as the definition of Berger re-
veals.  
81 The German original reads: ‘… solange die Gestaltung der staatlichen Wirklichkeit noch Gegen-
stand emotionaler Auseinandersetzungen ist … sich über den Staat Gedanken zu machen, in dessen 
Gestaltung ja zugleich auch ihr eigenes persönliches Schicksal eingeschlossen ist, ohne sinngebend 
und wertend zu den öffentlichen Dingen Stellung zu nehmen …’ 
82 E. H. Carr made a similar remark noting that ‘the age of innocence, [where] historians walked in 
the Garden of Eden, without a scrap of philosophy to cover them, naked and unashamed before the 
god of history’ had come at least in Europe to an end (quoted after: Carlsnaes, 1981, p. 173).  
83 Miles Kahler speaks in this regard of a discipline that is ‘driven by demand’ (Kahler, 1997, p. 22).  
84 Also Morgenthau’s last monograph Science: Servant or Master? (1972) bears this connotation.  
85 Mannheim claimed that ‘[w]hat has been said here about the teaching of the “arts” applies mutate 
mutandis, in a very large degree, to politics’ (1985, p. 181; emphasis in the original). 
86 This point was also stressed by Graebner (1984, p. 66) in his account on Morgenthau as a histo-
rian. 
87 The latter was the teacher of Luckmann and Berger at the New School for Social Research in New 
York during the 1950s.  
88 The German original reads: ‘… wo mehrere Individuen in Wechselwirkung treten. Diese Wech-
selwirkung entsteht immer aus bestimmten Trieben heraus oder um bestimmter Zwecke willen.’ 
89 See here as well: Duncan, 1959, p. 100; Frisby, 1984, p. 120-3; Jung, 1990, p. 74-85. 
90 These terms are taken from Friedrich Schiller’s inaugural lecture on the purpose of studying 
world history at the University of Jena in 1789 (1996). 
91 The German version reads: ‘als eine objektive Form subjektiver Seelen.’ 
92 The study of Weber’s work, intensified Morgenthau’s thoughts for chronological reasons, rather 
than being ‘… a Weberian at heart’ (Lebow, 2003, p. 246). Morgenthau (1984) got first into contact 
with Wölfflin and Burckhardt and only later he took the seminar on Weber. His biographer Frei 
(2001) also notes that Morgenthau never mentioned Weber in his diaries, unlike other thinkers 
who influenced him more, like Nietzsche. 
93 Similar: Morgenthau, 1970a, p. 257. 
94 In a later publication on Conservatism, Mannheim also referred to Seinsverbundenheit which he, 
however, used interchangeably. There would be, however, a difference between Seinsver- and 
Seinsgebundenheit whose elaboration is, however, for the purpose of this thesis not necessary  
(Kettler, Meja, and Stehr, 1984, p. 78). 
95 More on Elias’s concept of time can be found in: Tabboni, 2001. 
96 This was confirmed to the author by Frei in an e-mail from 6th June 2007. 
97 Morgenthau held this view not exclusively, but he is merely an example of the common belief of 
his fellow refugee scholars who argued that any discipline in the social sciences or humanities has 
to be theoretical or philosophical (Greenberg, 1992, p. 67-79). 
98 Later in his life Morgenthau essentially repeated these perennial problems right in the beginning 
of his lectures on Aristotle: ‘The problem of authority, the problems of the relations between the 
individual and the state, the common good, the issue of law versus naked power, the problem of 
violence, the class problem, the distribution of wealth in political terms – all those problems are 
perennial in nature’ (Morgenthau, 2004, p. 15). 
99 In an earlier publication, Morgenthau developed this even more profoundly: ‘The first lesson the 
student of international politics must learn and never forget is that the complexities of international 
affairs make simple solutions and trustworthy prophecies impossible. Here the scholar and the 
charlatan part company. Knowledge of the forces that determine politics among nations, and of the 
ways by which their political reflection unfold, reveals the ambiguity of the facts of international 
politics. In every political situation contradictory tendencies are at play. One of these tendencies is 
more likely to prevail under certain conditions. But which tendency actually will prevail is any-
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body’s guess. The best the scholar can do, then, is to trace the different tendencies that, as potenti-
alities, are inherent in a certain international situation. He can point out the different conditions 
that make it more likely for one tendency to prevail than for another and, finally, assess the prob-
abilities for the different conditions and tendencies to prevail in actuality’ (1985, p. 23-4).  
100Doubtlessly, employing such a heuristic device bears the danger of drawing an analogy between, 
in this case, Morgenthau and Koselleck where there is none and come to conclusions that at best 
distort reality (Skinner, 1969, p. 7-9). However, it will not be argued here that Morgenthau in-
formed Koselleck in the development of his approach, but both scholars were intellectually nur-
tured in a similar academic environment and arrived at similar epistemological conclusions, which 
is why it is suitable to view Morgenthau through Koselleck’s lenses.  
101 Große’s translation is appropriate since it catches the essence of the original which reads much 
more complex: ‘Abgesehen davon, daß für die griechische Geschichte allmählich durch treffliche 
Darstellungen gesorgt ist, würde uns die Erzählung der Ereignisse und vollends deren kritische Er-
örterung in einer Zeit, da eine einzige Untersuchung über Richtigkeit einzelner äußerer Tatsachen 
gerne einen Oktavband einnimmt, die beste Zeit vorwegnehmen.’ An Oktavband is an outdated 
German term to classify books through its size by which the Roman parchment was folded three 
times, creating eight sheets. The introductory section of Burckhardt’s book in which the above men-
tioned quotation is to be found was omitted in the English translation (1963).  
102 Morgenthau’s memory was wrong here. Wölfflin distinguished not between Romanesque and 
Gothic art, but the Renaissance from the Baroque.  
103 The term itself, however, was, according to Ringer (2000, p. 111), first introduced by Jellinek. 
104 ‘Das deutsche Volk, immer nur allzu gerne bereit in geistigen Dingen die äußersten denk-
möglichen Positionen einzunehmen und ein ideelles Gebilde in seinem Einfluß auf die Gestaltung 
der Wirklichkeit entweder aus tiefster Überzeugung für ernst oder leichtfertig für nichts zu nehmen, 
hatte die 14 Punkte Wilsons gläubig als die Verkündung einer neuen Epoche im Leben der Völker 
begrüßt.‘ Around the same time Morgenthau’s mentor Sinzheimer arrived at a similar assessment 
about the Germans in a letter to Morgenthau from 11th March 1932 (HJM-Archive 197).  
105 If the text refers to democracy, this is to be considered as a modern, liberal democracy since this 
is the form of government Morgenthau was referring to.  
106 The German original reads: ‘… führt eine Politik, die der Stabilität verschrieben ist, im Namen 
des Antikommunismus zur Unterdrückung aller Manifestationen sozialer Unruhe und zur Ersti-
ckung von Reformen.’ 
107 On the criticism on Morgenthau for his criticism on Van Doren, see: Arendt and McCarthy, 1995, 
p. 160. 
108 The German reads: ‘… keine Prinzipien einer Außenpolitik kennt, die von einer internationalen 
Moral oder vom geltenden Völkerrecht abgeleitet werden …’ 
109 The TET-offensive was a military campaign of Northern Vietnam forces named after the Viet-
namese New Year, Tết Nguyên Đán. On this holiday, the 31st January 1968, the campaign began. 
110 The reference to Carl von Clausewitz is appropriate here, as Morgenthau had Clausewitz’s dic-
tum in mind, when he made this argument. This is evidenced in a lecture he gave at Dartmouth  
College in 1958 (Craig, 2007, p. 203). 
111 From Peukert we know that in comparison to other countries at that time radio receivers played 
an important role in Germany as a medium of mass media. In 1932 there were 66 radio listeners for 
every 1,000 people in Germany in comparison to a mere 35 in the European average (Peukert, 1991, 
p. 174). With the introduction of the affordable Volksempfänger the ratio must have risen signifi-
cantly. 
112 Although it has to be agreed here with Scheuerman (2009a, p. 80-1)that this is one of the most 
concise definitions of the national interest, the implication he makes that the national interest is a 
concept from Thompson rather than from Morgenthau cannot be endorsed given that Morgenthau 
consequently elaborated on this concept from his doctoral thesis onwards. 
113 Morgenthau already argued at the beginning of the Cold War to accept the two spheres of influ-
ence because it would be the lesser evil (Morgenthau, Kuh, and Stevenson, 1946, p. 9).  
114 Morgenthau’s critical stance towards the League of Nations is, for example, apparent in his dis-
cussion on the non-compliance of Swiss neutrality and its admittance to the League of Nations 
(1938a).  
115 An example of this inner diremption numerous intellectuals faced after their forced immigration 
is to be found in the novelist Carl Zuckmayer (1896-1977): ‘I absolutely did not want to go to Amer-
ica. I hold it personally against Mr. Hitler and his Providence, the destiny, God, and the 20th century 
that I was forced to emigrate. It is embarrassing and disgraceful to a country, where we don’t be-
long, which does not have to tell us anything, from whom we could not learn anything, and to whom 
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we did not have anything to say. I was never in the United States and Werfel [Austrian novelist, 
1890-1945] only once for a short stay in New York. But we all knew exactly what we had to expect 
or better not to expect: from bad food, up to moral and sexual frigidity ... A country of unimaginative 
standardisation, shallow materialism, witless mechanics. A country without tradition, culture, urge 
for beauty or form, metaphysics, and Heurigen [Austrian tavern with new wine on tap]. A country 
of artificial fertiliser and tin openers, without grace and dung heap, classical music, sloppiness, 
Melos, Apollo, or Dionysius. Should we escape the enslavement of European mass dictatorship in 
order to proceed ourselves towards the tyranny of the Dollar, business, advertisement, and forced 
disposal? And, by the way, Werfel said, we have to learn English’ (quoted after: Adams and Lösche, 
1998, p. 519-20; my translation). 
116 Indeed, Young-Bruehl recalls that Arendt had suggested to her to take a course of Morgenthau at 
the New School for Social Research since ‘”[i]t will be very practical …” She [Arendt] viewed her old 
friend and fellow émigré as a practical man – that is, a man of praxis, action‘ (2006, p. 34). 
117 This, however, happened to the hosts of the evening, Karl and Anna Neumeyer. They committed 
suicide in 1941, when their library was confiscated and they were being threatened of expulsion 
from their own home.  
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